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ABSTRACT 
There has been a new wave of merger and acquisitions (M&A) activity since the early 
1990's across the world, much of this occurring in the financial services industry. 
This trend has affected Europe as well where the landscape of the financial services 
industry has been changing. This M&A activity in general has stimulated more in 
depth research to assess the consequences of the merger events, although 
comparatively little work has been done on M&A activity in the European financial 
services industry. 
This thesis uses a market return approach and an operating performance approach to 
evaluate the M&As outcome in European banking. We document a minimal total 
return, and a smaller target return in comparison to US studies. The post-merger 
operating cash flow return on assets deteriorated but we also found a very minimal 
improvement in efficiency which was not supportive enough to boost the cash flow 
return on assets and the profitability of the merging partners, although these mergers 
were mainly motivated by synergy. 
Deeper research may provide more interesting findings using clinical studies that seek 
as much detailed information about the merging partners as possible. It is also worth 
examining the pattern of managerial ownership and how it affects the merger outcome 
as this factor is an important one for regulators in the financial services Industry. 
VIII 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction. 
Mergers or takeovers have always promised a faster mean for growth and expansion 
in the markets. Nevertheless as takeover activity continues, the debate over its merits 
has increased. Advocates of the benefits of takeovers cite evidence of substantial 
wealth gains at the time takeover is announced (Franks, Harris, Titman, 1991). Critics 
claim, however, that the positive announcement returns reflect optimistic expectations 
that fail to be realised in the medium or the long term. 
Research in the field of M&A has been considerable and academics have used mainly 
two streams of methodologies to measure the takeover performance of the firms 
involved, the market returns studies and the operating performance studies. 
The standard procedure used for estimating market returns is the event study 
methodology, which tends to estimate the unexpected change in the firm's share price 
around the announcement of a specific event. The outcome from market return studies 
has, in general, reached a consistent conclusion that the target shareholders gain, see 
for example; Mandelker (1974), Langetieg (1978), Asquith and Kim (1982), Asquith 
(1983), Firth (1980), Sierns (1996), Houston and Ryngart (1994), Sudarsanam et al 
(1996), Hawawini and Swary (1990). The wealth position of the bidding shareholders 
however, is not so clear. The findings of some of the research done on UK data point 
to, at best. minimal gain to the bidder shareholders Dodd and Ruback (1977), Franks 
and Harris (1989), Franks, Broyles, and Hecht (1977) and recently Cybo-Ottone and 
Murgia (2000) for a merger sample in European Banking. Other research findings 
contradict this conclusion and present evidence of negative gains to the shareholders 
of the bidder firm and a negative aggregated total gain such as: Houston and Ryngart 4: ) 
(1994), Sudarsanarn et al., (1996), Hannan and Wolken (1989). 
This latter result, of negative total gain, seems consistent with the outcome of the 
majority of the operating performance studies no matter what measures of 
performance the authors have used, see for example Meeks (1977), Spindt and Tarhan 
(1992), Linder and Crane (1992), Srinivasan and Wall (1992) and Rhoades (1993). 
But stands in sharp contrast to the findings in European bank merger (Vander Vennet, 
1996 and 1999a). 
1.2 Research Questions. 
It seems therefore that the debate is still intense concerning the return to bidder 
shareholders and the total outcome of the merger. Therefore this thesis will try to 
answer the following questions: 
1. What is the return to target and bidder shareholders for European Banks involved 
in merger and acquisitions? 
2. How does the return change according to the characteristics of the deal? 
3. Which factors influence these returns cross-sectionally? 
4. What motivates banks to merge in Europe? 
5. What is the change in shareholders wealth two years post takeover? 
I? 
6. What is the source for value creation or destruction? That is, which bank 
performance components, post-merger, caused the change in wealth? 
7. What pre-merger factors determine the post-merger performance of the merging 
parties. 
1.3 Why is this research interesting and important? 
The value of M&As deals that took place around the globe between Jan 1987 and Dec 
1999 amounted to about USD 11,000 billion. The new merger wave started in the 
early 1990's and peaked in 1998 at almost USD 2,200 billion (see figure 1.1 and 
figure 1.2 below). 
Figure (1.1): Global M&As Statistics. 
Thisfigure shows the volume totalfor M&As deals completed between 11111987 and 
28111199 in all industries worldwide (USD Mil 10,73 7,799.2) 
USD 
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Figure (1.2): Financial M&As Statistics. 
The figure shows the volume total for M&As deals completed between 1/]/] 98 7 and 
28111199 in thefinancial services industry worldwide (USD Mil 4,481,385.1) 
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Source: Securities Data Company (Thomson Financial Securities Data) 
However, looking at the geographic distribution in figure (1.3) we notice that 33% of 
those total deals took place in Europe. 
Figure (1.3): Geographic Distribution of Global M&As Deals. 
Thefigure shows the volumes totalfor M&As deals completed between (1987-1999) 
in Mil qf USD partitioned by geographic area. 
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When we consider the partitioning of the M&As activity among industry sectors it 
appears that ah-nost 42% of the total deals, in the same period under revision, were 
fmance industry deals (see figure 1.4). 
Figure (1.4): Industry Sector Distribution of Global M&As Deals. 
Thefigure shows the volumes totalfor M&As deals completed between (1987-1999) 
in Mil of USD partitioned by industry sector. 
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Source: Securities Data Company (Thomson Financial Securities Data) 
Many forces of change have affected the competitive position of banks and other 
financial services firms around the world and especially in Europe, the most notable 
of which are regulatory change, technological development, globalisation, and the 
introduction of the Euro. The main components of the regulatory change in Europe 
have been the Second Banking Directive and the Capital Adequacy Directive, which 
removed restrictions on banks and paved the way for them to widen the scope of their 
operations functionally and geographically. Moreover, the rapid development in 
technology not only changed the way the banks deliver, bundle and structure new 
5 
products to their end customers but also provided cost cutting potentials through 
economy of scale and less dependence on human intervention which is also subject to 
error. These forces of change increased the competition in the market and caused 
banks to decrease their margins, a process which is still ongoing. Furthermore, this is 
pushing managers to take strategic decisions such as mergers. Hence, the level of 
consolidation in the financial services industry has accelerated and reached 
unprecedented levels around the end of the twentieth century. 
All these facts deem this class of merger of particular interest and encouraged 
researching the impact on bank performance change, which motivated us to do this 
research. Moreover, it is worth studying the merger in this large industry in view of 
the homogeneity of the merging parties, in the sense that their operations and 
activities are coherent in terms of the streams of their cash flows, their risk taking and 
profit making, and the relative precision of valuation of a high proportion of their 
assets and liabilities. In addition, the research done on this topic in the USA cannot 
necessarily be generalised to draw conclusions about the European scenario, for a 
variety of reasons, one of the most important being the differing regulations 
governing the activities of the financial services industry in USA and in Europe. The 
contradictory outcome of the research done on the M&A performance, revealed 
earlier, is one of the reasons that motivated this research. 
The research done using event study methodology to measure the M&A performance 
in European Banking has been very sparse, being limited to one study 
by Cybo- 
Ottone and Murgia (2000). Our study aims to help filling this gap in the literature, 
by 
presenting new findings and by using a larger sample with more updated 
data which t: ý 0 
includes some of the most important and largest deals that happened near the end of 
6 
the twentieth century. Moreover, we intend in this study to cover an area which is not 
fairly explored in the banking merger literature in the USA and was not also 
investigated by Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000), that is the relationship between the 
method of payment and the gains from merger to each party. 
Moreover, the studies that measured the operating performance associated with 
European Banking M&As are also minimal and reached contrasting conclusions 
compared to the USA studies. One study concentrated on the post-merger operating 
performance (Vander Vennet, 1996) and another on the causes of European bank 
merger (Vander Vennet, 1999a). Therefore our aim is to contribute to the literature by 
using a methodology developed by Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) for a sample of 
non-financial USA takeovers. We also correct for a methodological problem that the 
sample selection in Healy et al., (1992) was subject to, that is we chose deals where 
acquirers are not involved in any other deal two years before merger and three years 
after merger. 
The following areas, which have not been fully explored in the existing literature on 
bank mergers, are addressed in this study. 
I- In addition to examining the effect of the method of payment on the market 
valuation of M&As; we aim to make a link between the announcement penod 
return and the post merger operating performance. 
2- We search for the determinants of target bank market return. 
3- We examine the motives for European bank mergers. 
7 
4- We search for the pre-merger determinants of post-merger cash flow return 
improvement. 
1.4 Structure of the dissertation. 
In chapter two we review the literature on M&A and cover areas related to the forces 
of change that are accelerating consolidation in the financial services industry. We 
also review the theories of M&As and the research that examined the M&As 
performance. 
In chapter three we examine the market valuation of European bank merger. We use 
in this study 102 deals from 17 European countries. The deal characteristics vaned 
widely and included bank to bank vs. cross-product deals, merger vs. acquisitions 
deals, national vs. cross-border deals, and deals paid in various methods such as cash, 
equity, or a mix of cash, equity and loan notes. 
In chapter four we search for the determinants of target shareholders return, while in 
chapter five we examine the motives for the European bank merger. 
In chapter six we examine the post-merger operating performance, and we examine 
the relationship between the market return at merger announcement and the post- 
merger operating performance change. We also search for the pre-merger 
characteristics of the merging parties that improve the cash flow returns. We finally 
conclude in chapter seven. 
8 
Our conclusions point to small total gains and target shareholders gains around 
merger announcement. We also found that high target returns are driven by high 
target profitability, lower capitalisation, a conservative credit policy and a better 
efficiency status relative to the acquiring bank before merger. Although we C 
documented that synergy was the ma or motive for bank mergers in Europe, we could i 
not find an evidence of improved post-merger operating cash flow returns, while the 
cost efficiency ratios improved only marginally. We also documented that the positive 
market valuations at merger announcement were positive expectations that were not 
realised after merger. 
9 
CHAPTER TWO: THEORIES, FACTORS ACCELERATING 
M&As, AND THE IMPACT ON THE PARTICIPATING FIRMS. 
2.1 Introduction. 
In chapter one we showed clearly the importance of examining the valuation of 
M&As in the European banking industry. However our aim is to study the market 
valuation, the determinants, the motives and the operating performance change 
associated with bank mergers in Europe. Therefore, in this chapter we review the 
literature related to the topic of this dissertation and we start by discussing the factors 
that accelerated the consolidation in the banking industry. In section three we talk 
about the theories of M&As in general, then in section four we review the literature 
that examined the M&As performance. However, in the subsequent chapters we also 
review the studies that are closely related to those chapters. 
Jensen and Ruback, (1983) view the market for corporate control, often referred to as 
the take-over market, as a market in which alternative managerial teams compete for 
the rights to manage corporate resources, and therefore the take-over market is an 
important component of the managerial labour market. 
In the USA definition, take-overs, mainly, take the form of a merger or a tender offer 
and sometimes elements of both are involved. The words merger and tender offer are 
frequently used but the distinctions are not precise. In general, mergers are negotiated 
directly with target managers and approved by the target's 
board of directors before C) ZI-: ) "D 
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going to a vote of target shareholders for approval. Tender offers are offers to buy 
shares made directly to target shareholders to sell their shares to the bidding firm. 
However in practice, one firm in a merger may be stronger and may dominate the 
transaction. Similarly, tender offers can be friendly or hostile. Generally speaking. 
mergers are mostly "friendly". Some tender offers are "hostile" in the sense that an 
offer is made to the shareholders without the approval of the board of directors. 
However, in the UK definition the use of the two terms, merger and acquisitions is 
more frequent than merger and tender offers while the distinction between both is 
quite clear. Merger is used to refer to the consolidation of two equal partners while 
acquisitions is closer to the USA definition of tender offer where a transfer of control 
is clear and the dominance of one party is obvious. 
Fama and Jensen (1983a, b) define corporate control as the rights to hire, fire and set 
the compensation of top-level managers. Hence when a firm acquires another, the 
control rights to the target firm changes hand to the board of directors of the acquiring 
firm. While corporate boards always retain the top-level control rights, they normally 
delegate the rights to manage corporate resources to internal managers. In this way the 
top management of the acquiring firm acquires the rights to manage the resources of 
the target firm. 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) argue also that the term corporate control is frequently 
used to describe many phenomena ranging from the general forces that influence the 
use of corporate resources (such as legal and regulatory systems and competition in Z: ) 
II 
product and input markets) to the control of a majority of seats on a corporation's 
board of directors. 
On the other hand the market for bank control has been influenced by general forces 
of change that accelerated the consolidation recently. We discuss these in the next 
section. 
2.2 Factors accelerating consolidation in the Financial 
Services Industry. 
Many forces of change have affected the competitive environment in the banking 
industry, those included: deregulation, the Euro, information technology, and 
international integration (see White, 1998; Den-nine, 1999; and Berger et aL, 1999). 
We will deal with these in tum. 
2.2.1 The regulatory environment (deregulation). 
The government and regulatory bodies play a vital role in M&A decisions and pace in 
the banking industry, e. g. limits on interstate or international M&A, or M&As 
between banks and other firms. In the USA there were restrictions on geographic 
expansion of banks from the 1930s, (Glass-Steagall Act) until the 1980s and early 
1990s when these restrictions were gradually relaxed culmlnatln,, c-), In the Riegle-Neal 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, which permits interstate 
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branching in almost all states'. M&As activity increased in states after they joined 
interstate banking agreements (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1998). 
The Banking Act of 1933 (the Glass-Steagall Act) and the Bank Holding Company 
Act of 1956 put restrictions on investment banking and other powers of commercial 
banking institutions. Relaxation of these restrictions began in 1987, when the Federal 
Reserve expanded BHC's abilities to underwrite corporate debt and equity. However, 
the revenue from these underwriting could not exceed 5% of the subsidiary's total 
revenue, and then more relaxation were put in place in 1996 so the revenue was 
allowed to be 25% of the total revenue (Berger et al., 1999). This deregulation 
encouraged cross-product M&As, i. e. M&As between commercial banks and other 
financial services firms, such as: investment banks and securities firms (Saunders, 
1999). 
The reason for such earlier restrictions could be to protect the national economy from 
any sudden downturn and shock as a result of the collapse of one major bank. These 
restrictions have until the 1990's prevented the USA banks from leading the league of 
the largest banks in the world. For instance, the largest American bank in 1990 in 
terms of market capitalisation was JP Morgan and was ranked tenth on the league 
2 
while Japanese banks were taking the lead . In 1998 the picture changed considerably 
and BankAmercica and Citigroup sat on top of the ranking table. But these rules lead 
to direct efficiency losses, due to the lack of competition and diversification (this 
probably explains the existence of huge inefficiencies in the USA banking industry in 
the 1980's that we show later in section four). Therefore the relaxation of these 
1 Berger et al., ( 1995) provides year-by-year details on the chantues In state laws. 
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restrictions came to respond to the need to improve the efficiency of the banking 
sector through increasing the competition among the market players. The outcome 
was a continuous increase in the consolidation, within and across the state lines that 
peaked in 1998. 
On the other hand Europe also witnessed a change in regulation which aimed to 
harmonise the bank regulations among EU states. Similar to the observation 
concerning the USA, White (1998) observes that the excessive regulation in the 
financial sector has been recognised as a problem for over 30 years, but the last ten 
years witnessed several attempts to deal with it 3. The Second Banking Co-ordination 
Directive was passed by the European Community Council of Ministers in December 
1990, and came into effect in January 1993. The European Second Banking Co- 
ordination Directive has allowed banks to operate fairly freely across national 
boundaries in Europe since 1993 based on a single "passport" (allowing financial 
activity anywhere in the Community), mutual recognition and home-country control 
(for purposes of supervision), the objective was to ensure the fullest possible degree 
of cross-border competition subject to adequate supervisory oversight. The 
harmonisation of the bank regulation among the member states of the European Union 
is seen as one of the many steps taken to achieve full integration in the EU, which 
tnggered the consolidation wave among the financial institutions feanng the coming 
intense competition. 
I Ichi, Tokyo-Mutsubishl, and The Japanese banks were in order: IBJ, Fuji bank, Sumitomo, Dai- 
Sanwa as in Danthine et al., (1999). 
3 Llewellyn (1996), page 158, notes that the universal trend is that public policy priorities have shifted 
towards enhancing banking efficiencies through competition and in the process public policy has Z-1 L- 
become less protective of the banking industry. 
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The change in regulation cannot be considered the only cause of the acceleration in 
consolidation, other factors have also played a role or they are expected to contribute 
in increasing consolidation. 
2.2.2 The introduction of the Euro. 
The introduction of the Euro should also foster M&A as Berger et al, (1999) argue. 
The implementation of monetary union may increase cross-border consolidation by 
increasing trade, by reducing the currency conversion costs of institutions operating in 
multiple nations, and by reducing costs to customers of purchasing services from 
foreign-owned institutions. 
The Euro will impact the banking industry in several ways, particularly through the 
government bond market, the corporate bond market, the fund management market, 
and the foreign exchange market (Dermine, 1999). With the Euro, and the Second 
Banking Co-ordination Directive the competitive advantage of local banks in the local 
government bond market and the corporate bond and equity markets, regarding the 
underwriting and trading business, has started to diminish gradually. The reasons 
being, as Dermine (1999) argues, with the monetary union the sources of the 
competitive advantage for the local banks no longer exist, which are: the privileged 
access to the public debt issuer, the public currency denomination, the expertise in the 
domestic monetary environment and policy. For similar reasons, fund management 
and the foreign exchange markets will no longer be the areas of expertise of the local 
financial institutions. 
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This in general will create room for foreign banks to be more active in these markets 
and hence intensifies competition. Therefore, domestic or cross-border mergers might rý 
become relevant strategies for banks to consolidate their market position and face the 
intense competition (Dermine, 1999). 
2.2.3 The Technological change. 
One of the most fundamental forces of change in the financial services industry has 
been the development in technology, most notably in computing and 
telecommunications. White (1998) states that the developments in technology affects 
banking in three main ways. First, they contribute in reducing the costs associated 
with the management of infori-nation (collection, storage, processing and 
transmission), second they provide more advanced distribution channels through 
remote banking, and third they have led to the development of new financial products. 
Remote banking is now offered by all of the banks in the European Union. The most 
popular means are the Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) and the telephone banking 
which are becoming increasingly sophisticated. However the provision of banking 
services through the Internet via what is known as PC banking or Online Banking 
is 
also increasing rapidly. The lower-priced computers, and the continuous advances in 
technology 4, in addition to the familiarity and increased confidence in the security of 
the technology will accelerate the dependence on remote banking (White, 1998). 
4 Cheap access to the Web via television sets and nteractive TV technology will all work 
in the 
direction of increasing access to the Internet. See Stewart (1997). 
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Consequently, as an implication we believe the viability of the branching system is 
-), 5 questionable as is the concept of "one-stop shopping . This also constitutes a direct 
attack on the concept of "relationship banking,, 6 and in turn will probably lead to 
more branch closure and cost cutting policies aimed to improve efficiency. Moreover, 
these technological developments may provide ample opportunity for decreasing costs 
and achieving economies of scale (Radecki et al., 1997; Danthine et al., 1999). For 
instance Bauer and Hancock (1995) find that the cost of processing an electronic 
deposit for an average US bank decreased by 85% between 1979 and 1994. In 
addition Berger et al., (1999) provide a similar argument that the new tools of 
financial engineering, such as derivative contracts, off-bal ance- sheet guarantees, and 
risk management may be more efficiently produced by larger institutions. 
Maybe these facts enable large banks to grasp the benefits while small banks become 
potential targets to be swallowed by a "bigger fish" in the market. This could be due 
to the fact that small banks do not have the financial ability to invest heavily in 
technology and therefore, they may not be able to fully benefit from the potential cost 
savings. 
The general outcome is increase in competition and a race among banks towards 
achieving higher efficiency gains by consolidation with others, which enable them to 
gain competitive advantage over other market players. 
5 See Freedman and Goodlet (1998). 
6 For example, HSBC Group and Citibank have electronic banking services 
designed to allow C 
customers to perform money transfer, open letters of credits. and process inter-bank accounts 
transfers 
without the need of any direct contact with the bank staff. 
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2.2.4 The consolidation of international markets. 
The globalisation of markets has made the world the so-called "Big Village" with the 
transfer of goods, securities and services in the world creating more demand for 
financial services and intermediary institutions to be involved in the process. But the 
globalisation can be seen as a by-product of the other forces of change mainly 
technology and deregulation. The cheaper ways of communications make a global 
reach more practical, in addition deregulation makes new markets wide open to 
competitors. Nowadays, for example the foreign exchange business, the derivatives 
business, and even the fund management business are globallsed. This has increased 
competition in the local markets from outsiders; for example the main competitors for 
European banks in the area of investment banking are the American banks (see 
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 1998). In addition, the growing competition is also 
coming from global banks in the retail services, and other non-local banks are 
emerging as potential competitors for local banks (White, 1998). 
Hence Berger et al., (1999) argues that the globallsation of markets has likely 
contributed to cross border M&As and the globalisation of financial services 
firms 
while Kwast (1996a) and Meyer (1998) see it the other way around. The argument 
and finding above is supportive of the opinion that the European integration and the 
implementation of the single currency will foster M&As in the European banking 
markets. In fact we showed earlier in figures (1.1) to (1.4) comprehensive statistics of 
the acceleration of M&As activity around the world and the share of 
Europe and the 
financial services industry. 
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2.2.5 The aggregate impact and effects. 
We have dealt with the various forces of change in the financial services and showed 
how every one of them can separately affect the competitive environment. However, 
these forces are, in fact, inherently interrelated. The development in technology 
provided new ways of delivering and bundling products to the end customers 
regardless of the geographic locations and borders. This in turn has encouraged t 
regulators to deal with a new reality of no borders affecting the transfer of services 
and capital. But in turn deregulation and the relaxation of previous constraints on the 
operations of financial institutions in the USA aimed to improve efficiency through 
increasing competition as we showed earlier. A similar pattern was observed in 
Europe, where the deregulation was part of the process of harmonising the economies 
of the member states, which in turn should increase competition. However the 
increased competition in the financial services industry leads to more reliance on 
technology to gain a competitive advantage. White (1998) also argues that as 
competitive pressures mount, banks may find that their credit ratings fall below those 
of their customers, providing a further boost to securitisation and causing further loss 
of profits for many traditional intermediaries. This in turn may lead to more pressure 
for a level playing-field, more investment in technology, and so on. 
Therefore, summarising the effects of the forces of change, the bottom line would 
be, 
in White (1998)'s words, "bank profits in continental Europe are already under 
pressure and there are some groundsfor believing that these pressures could 
intensib, 
sharpl-N, and quickly ". 
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2.3 Theories of Mergers and Take-overs. 
Many individual theories or explanations for mergers and take-overs have been 
formulated. We present below a full overview of those theories, the categonsation 
being that adopted by Weston, Chung, and Siu (1998), page 75. 
Theoties of M&As 
1. Total value increased 
1. Efficiency increases 
2. Operating synergy 
3. Diversification 
4. Financial synergy 
5. Strategic realignments 
6. The q-ratio 
7. Information 
8. Signalling 
11. Hubris- acquirer overpays for target 
111. Agency-managers make value-decreasing mergers to increase size of fin-n 
IV. Redistnbution 
1. Taxes-redistnbution from govemment 
2. Market power-redistribution from consumers 
3. Redistribution from bondholders 
4. Labour-wage adjustments 
5. Pension reversions. 
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To look at the take-over motives in another more general context, those motives can 
be rearranged into Value Maximisation motives and Non-value maximisation 
mo ives 
7. 
2.3.1 Value-Maximisation motives: 
Value can be maximised in one of two main ways through merger, by increasing 
market power in setting prices, or by increasing efficiency and achieving synergy 
gains. 
2.3.1.1 Market Power 
Merger among institutions that have significant local market overlap ex ante may 
increase local market concentration and allow merged firms to raise profits by setting 
prices less favourable to customers and by selling off properties due to branches 
closure in the same locality. Merger and acquisitions of the market extension type that 
join institutions in different parts of a nation or in different nations are less likely to 
increase local market power. There is enormous research, in the financial services 
industry, suggesting that in-market M&A's that substantially increase market 
concentration may increase market power in setting prices on retail banking services 
(Berger and Hannan, 1989,1997; Hannan, 1991; Hannan and Berger, 1991; 
Neumarck and Sharpe, 1992; Hannan, 1994; Jackson, 1997). Presumably, this was an 
7 Berger, A. N., Demsetz, R. S.. Strahan, P. E., 1999. The consolidation of the financial services Industry: 
Causes. consequences, and implications for the future. Journal of Banking and Finance 23,135-194. 
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expected consequence of many of the M&A's and provided at least part of the 
mo ivation. 
2.3-1.2 Efficiency increases. 
There are two aspects to efficiency in the merger context according to Copeland and 
Weston (1988). These are 'differential efficiency' and 'inefficient management. The 
theory of differential efficiency states that, if the management of firm A is less 
efficient than management of firm B then value can be increased by improving the 
efficiency of firm A when it merges with firm B. On the other hand the 'Inefficient 
management' theory implies that other management teams could control the resources 
of the firm more efficiently than the current management team. Copeland and Weston 
point out that the 'differential efficiency' theory is most likely a motive for horizontal 
mergers, while the 'Inefficient management' theory could be a reason for unrelated 
mergers. 
The inefficiency theories imply therefore that the acquiring company's management 
thinks that it can manage the assets of the target more efficiently than the present 
management, and some research on US bank merger does indeed suggest that M&A 
may increase efficiency. Berger and Humphrey (1992), Pilloff and Santomero (1998) 
found that acquiring banks tend to be more cost efficient than the target banks on 
average. Another study of US banks found that acquiring banks are more profitable 
and have smaller non performing loan ratios than targets (Penstiani, 1993). Other 
studies also suggest that large X-Efficiency gains are possible if the best practice 
banks merge with the least efficient banks and reform the practices of the least 
efficient banks (Savage, 1991, Shaffer, 1993). C) 
-'7 
European studies present similar findings, Focarelli et al, (1998) find that large, Z: ) 
profitable banks tend to be acquirers, while small non-profitable banks tend to be 
targets. In the same line of argument Vander Vennet (1999a) find that large, efficient 
banks tend to acquire small, less efficient banks. Consistent with these findings, are 
results reported by Altunbas et al., (1995) for UK banks and building societies. 
2.3.1.3 Synergy. 
On the other hand, the operating synergy theory assumes that the economies of scale 
do exist in the industry and that individual firms, prior to merger, are operating at 
levels of activity which are below the levels required for achieving potential 
economies of scale. Economies of scale arise because of indivisibility, such as human 
resources, plant and machinery, and overheads may provide increasing returns if 
spread over a large number of units of output. Thus operating synergy requires much 
overlap in the activities, products and markets of both parties. If synergies are present 
then the equity value of the merged firm AB is higher than the equity value of the 
stand-alone firms A and B i. e. VAB > 
VA + VB the value increase is consequently a net 
shareholder gain 8. Another source of synergy can be achieved by economy of scope 
where the combined entity can offer a wider range of products to a larger customer 
base, by combining their resources which might not have been possible 
if both 
entities I resources were not merged together. 
Operating synergies may also be achieved in vertical integration. 
Where firms are 
operating at different stages of production, the operating synergy may 
be more 
" The sharing of gain between the different shareholder groups Is a question of negotiations. L- C- 
C7 
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attained by co-ordination of the different levels. The argument suggests that costs of 
communication and various forms of bargaining can be avoided by vertical integation 
(Arrow, 1975; Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1975). 
If, on the other hand, merging firms are from unrelated industries (conglomerate 
merger) value creation might be sought from other sources of synergy such as 
managerial or financial synergy. 
Financial synergy may be achieved in different ways. Firstly, there is the tax 
advantage of unused debt capacity. The debt capacity of the merged firm can be 
greater than the sum of the two firms' capacities before their merger, in the sense that 
one of the merging firms has unused debt capacity while the other operates near its 
optimal gearing level. The tax advantage of debt means that the merging firm will 
gain from exhausting the unused debt capacity, which implies that the larger the 
difference in debt levels between the merging companies, the greater the value 
creation from their merger. 
Secondly, the complementary nature of the investment opportunities and financial 
resources of the merging companies, which results in lower cost of internal funds. 
This internal funds effect is supported by empirical findings, for example Nielsen and 
Melicher (1973) found evidence of redeployment of capital from the acquiring to the 
acquired firm's industry. Similar evidence was reported by Myers and Majluf 
(1984) 
where in their model, slack-rich bidders (i. e. those with low gearing 
levels) buy slack- 
poor targets. Slackness is relative to the availability of positive net present value 
investment opportunities. Therefore there is a mismatch 
between resources and 
investment opportunities within each merging firm and this mismatch is corrected 
by 
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merger. The Myers and Majluf model predicts that bidders will be less geared than 
targets and the larger the gearing difference the greater will be the wealth gains to 
shareholders9. On the other hand Palepu (1986) argues that mismatch between growth 
and resources in a firm will make it more likely acquisition candidate and finds 
evidence in support. 
Another source of financial synergy is the coinsurance of debt, which results when the 
creditors of the merging firms receive better protection for their debt from the 
combined entity than from the individual merging partners before the merger. This 
better protection is derived from the combination of two firms lacking perfect positive 
correlation of cash flows which can decrease the default risk of the combined entity 
and, therefore increase its debt capacity due to the coinsurance effect. Moreover after 
the merger the creditors of each firm also have the asset backing of the other firm thus 
strengthening the security for their debt. However, unless capital restructuring occurs, 
this should result in more benefits accruing to the merging firrns' creditors at the 
shareholders'expense (Lewellen, 1971; Galai and Masulis, 1973; Higgins and Schall, 
1975; and Kim and McConnell, 1977). On the other hand another possible dimension 
is economies of scale in flotation and transaction costs of securities (Levy and Sarnat, 
1970) 
9 Bruner (1988) finds empirical support for the Myers and Majluf hypothesis and reports that acquirers 
have significantly greater financial slack and targets display significantly 
higher leverage in the two 
years prior to the merger. He also finds successful bidders have more slack 
than unsuccessful bidders. 
Similarlv, successful targets have less slack than unsuccessful ones. Slusky and 
Caves (1991) report 
that the difference in leverage between bidder and target has a positive impact on 
bid premium but not 
on the returns to bidder shareholders. This draws on Sudarsanam, Holl and 
Salami (1996), page 693. 
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2.3.2 Non-value maximisation motives. 
2.3.2.1 Agency problem. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) formulated the implications of agency problems, which 
arise due to the separation of ownership and control with managers having a different 
incentive structure than shareholders. Take-overs decisions may, then, be driven by 
managerial utility maximisation motives rather than shareholder value 
. 10 maximisation 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the agency problem anses because contracts 
between managers and owners cannot be costlessly written and enforced. The costs of 
enforcing such contracts are known as the agency costs and involve monitoring costs, 
bonding costs and a residual loss (for shareholders) which can be present even if 
monitoring and bonding costs are at the shareholders optimal levels. 
However, there are arguments that the agency problems can be controlled by some 
organisational and market mechanisms. Compensation can be tied to performance by 
means of bonuses and executive stock options, moreover the labour market also plays 
its role in setting the managers' wage levels based on their own reputation 
(Fama, 
1980), consistent with setting suitable organisational and corporate governance 
structures to monitor the agency problems. For example Berger et al., 
(1999) notice 
that banks that have addressed managerial agency problems through high levels of 
managerial shareholdings and/or concentrated ownership experience 
higher (or less 
6 
negative) abnormal returns when they become acquirers than 
banks that have not 
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addressed these conflicts. Moreover, Hadlock et al., (1999) find that banks with 
higher levels of management ownership are less likely to be acquired. This effect 
appears to be driven by acquisitions where target managers depart from the banking 
organisation following the acquisition. Additionally they do not find that poorly 
performing banks are particularly likely to be acquired. Hadlock et al, (1999) argue Z. ) 
that this evidence is most consistent with an entrenchment hypothesis, where 
management teams with significant ownership positions block value increasing 
acquisition attempts. Although this is counted as a cost of having an entrenched 
management, yet they observe that a potential benefit of this is that a bank's managers 
may be willing to accumulate more firm specific human capital in the bank since they 
assess that there is a low probability of a control change. Moreover, Morck et al., 
(1988) reported evidence of the entrenchment hypothesis at 5 to 25% of management 
ownership and that at an ownership level of more than 25% the company performance 
starts to improve slowly. Therefore it appears that controlling for the agency problem 
can be attained through increasing management ownership but maybe at a very 
significant level (above 25%) at which having an entrenched management may also 
be avoided. 
On the other hand Fama and Jensen (1983a) hypothesised that control functions are 
delegated to a board of directors by the shareholders, who retain approval rights on Z7 
important matters including board membership, mergers and new stock issues. 
Moreover, the stock market provides an external monitoring too], since share prices 
reflect the decisions taken by the managers, and therefore low share prices puts 
pressure on managers to change their behaviour and to stay in line with the interests of 4- 
'0 Morck et al., 1990, Holl and Pickering, 1988; and Taffler and Holl, 1991 provide arguments and C7 
evidence on the impact of managerial objectives on acquisitions. 
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shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). When these mechanisms fail to provide a 
control tool for the agency problems, the market for take-overs plays its role as an 
external control device of last resort (Manne, 1965). 
2.3.2.2 The Free Cash Flow Hypothesis. 
Jensen, (1986 and 1988) maintains that the major cause of take-over activity is the 
agency costs associated with conflicts between managers and shareholders over the 
payout of free cash flow. According to Jensen the free cash flow is the cash flow in 
excess of the amounts required to finance all net present value projects available for 
the firm. Therefore, in order to maximise share value such free cash flow must be paid 
out to shareholders, which also serves as a control mechanism by having the managers 
subject to monitoring by the markets in case they seek to finance any additional 
projects with new capital. 
In order to tighten the control, Jensen also considers that an effective way is to issue 
debt in exchange for shares, without retention of the proceeds of the issue, which 
means that managers would be liable to serve the debt, and payout any free cash flow 
more enforced than in any announced dividend policy situation. As a support of this 
theory, Berger et al., (1999) report that one of the main reasons for the acceleration of 
consolidation in the financial services industry in the USA, is the improvement in the 
financial situation of firms as a result of record breaking profits in the mid 1990s, low 
interest rates and high stock prices, which reduced financing constraints on M&A, 
making excess cash flow available for managers. 
" 
On the other hand, another bank-specific incentive for growth is based on the too-big- 
to-fail argument. This implication is that banks have an incentive to grow in order to 
join the club of the too-big-to-fail banks. However this motivation for increased size 
does not classify with an agency problem type of explanation, since having too-biCr- r) 
to-fall status may be beneficial for the shareholders too (O'Hara and Shaw, 1990). 
2.3.2.3 Winner's curse and Hubris. 
The winner's curse concept states that when there are many bidders in an auction 
bidding for the same object, this may result in a very wide range of bids, especially 
when the true or the fair value of the object is unknown. The winning bidder in this 
case will be "cursed" in the sense that he will end up paying the highest bid price, 
which is highly likely to be above the fair value of the object. Roll (1986) analysed 
the effect in the take-over context, assuming that markets are efficient of the strong 
form, the market value of the target already reflected the full value of the firm. The 
fact that bidders overvalue the target at higher than the prevailing market price 
resulted from hubris, i. e. the bidders excessive self-confidence, pride, and arrogance. 
Therefore, as Roll states hubris is one of the factors that caused the winner's curse 
phenomenon to occur, and to wipe out any potential synergistic gain that might have 
resulted from merger. And even without competition, Roll (1986) hypothesised that 
managers committed errors of overoptimism in evaluating merger opportunities 
due to 
hubris. Morck et al. (1990) formulate a version of hubris which predicts that the worst 
acquisitions are made by well-performing firms since their managers are the most 
likely to be infected by hubns. 
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2.3.2.4 Relationship among the takeover theories. 
We explored the various takeover theories one after another, however, this does not 
mean that they are not related to one another. Moreover, in many cases more than one 
theory or motive might explain the M&As activity in one sample or even in one 
transaction. Maximising shareholders value, as we showed earlier, can be attained 
through many ways: market power, increasing efficiency or through achieving Cl 
synergy gains. In fact market power can be seen as another form of increasing profit 
efficiency in the sense that the same quantity of input (labour or capital) is generating 
a higher quantity of output (revenue). Hence it becomes very difficult to decide 
whether it is attaining market power or increasing efficiency is the explanation of the 
takeover decision. Moreover, synergy gains can also result in a way of improving the 
efficiency of the merging firms. Scale efficiency, and scope efficiency are the two 
sources for efficiency increases and thence when the merging firms cut the unit cost 
by implementing scale economies or when they distribute the total fixed cost on a 
wider range of products then synergistic gains are realised. Therefore it might be 
really difficult to disentangle one motive from the other when a takeover transaction 
takes place. 
On the other hand when no net shareholders gain is realised, we may assume that 
agency could be one of the explanations in addition to hubiis. But it is also possible 
that both explanations are valid for the same set of takeover deals or even one deal. 
In sum this poses one important question, that is, is there a way to distinguish among 4D 
these various motives" In other words are these motives related to one another, and 
how? Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) surnmansed the vanous theofies and motiv, cs 
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of M&A into three main categories and concluded that total gains are positive for 
synergy, zero for hubris, and negative for agency problems and so on. In their study 
they maintained that, in analysing a sample of takeovers, synergy is the theory that 
explains the takeover decision when the relation between target gain and total gain, 
and between acquirer gain and target gain are both positive. Whereas, when there is 
no relation between target and total gain in the sample, and when the relation between 
acquirer and target gain is negative then hubris is the best explanation or the motive 
for takeover. Finally, agency is the explanation when the relation between target and 
total gains in the sample, and the relation between acquirer and target gains are both 
negative. 
We provide a more detailed explanation of this argument and the hypothesis 
postulated later in chapter five. 
2.4 M&As impact on the participating firms. 
After going through the take-over theories, in general, and the factors accelerating the 
M&As in the financial services industry in the last 15 years, it is the appropriate time 
to examine the most important issue around which the debate starts whenever a 
merger transaction is announced, that is, the merger outcome or the benefit from 
mergers. 
The literature on the effect of M&A on the performance of the parties involved 
included two main streams of studies, the market return (event study methodology) 
and the operating performance. In addition to these two areas, the literature around the 
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M&A in the banking industry also included measuring the X-efficiency effect of 
M&A on the firms involved, examining the effect of M&A on small business lending, 
and examining the market concentration and market power as a result of M&A. 
In the rest of this chapter we will try to review the literature and surnmanse the 
findings of these studies. Moreover, there is a considerable body of the literature we 
review at the beginning of every consequent chapter since we believe some of the 
studies are closely relevant to the research we performed in each chapter. 
2.4.1 Market Return Studies. 
2.4.1.1 Summary of general rindings. 
Research in the field of M&A has been considerable. Studies that examined the 
effects of M&As on share prices of acquiring and acquired institutions around the 
merger announcement and throughout various time penods have followed the same 
standard procedure. This procedure is known as event study methodology, which 
measures the economic effect of the merger by estimating the unexpected share price 
changes around the announcement date of a specific event" 
The outcome from market return studies has, in general, reached a consistent 
conclusion that the target shareholders gain- see for example, Mandelker 
(1974), 
Langetieg (1978), Asquith and Kim (1982), Asquith (1983), Firth (1980), Siems 
11 The unexpected stock returns are abnormal returns and measured as the 
difference between the actual 
and expected stock return. Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) 
first used the event study methodology 
in their study of the price effects of stock splits. Brown and 
Warner (1980.1985) provide a detailed 
discussion of the techniques and various methodological issues regarding their use and interpretation. Z-- L- L- 
in our turn we provide a more detailed explanation of the event study methodology 
later in chapter '). 
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(1996), Houston and Ryngart (1994), Sudarsanarn et a] (1996), Hawawini and Swary 
(1990). On the other hand there has also been some rare evidence of zero abnormal 
return to the target shareholders in USA bank mergers reported by De and Duplican 
(1987) for the announcement week period and by Trifts and Scanlon (1987) for the (- 
20,0) weeks event window. 
The wealth position of the bidding shareholders however, is not so clear. The findings 
of some of the research done on UK data point to, at best, minimal gain to the bidder 
shareholders (Dodd and Ruback (1977), Franks and Harris (1989), Franks, Broyles, 
and Hecht (1977) and recently Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) for a European 
banking sample). Other research findings present evidence of negative gains to the 
shareholders of the bidder firm and a negative aggregated total gain such as: Hannan 
and Wolken (1989)1 2, Houston and Ryngart (1994), Sudarsanam et al., (1996). 
Moreover Bames (1984), and Dodds and Quek (1985) also show negative 
announcement period for acquirers, as do Walter (1980) and Casy, Dodd and Doolan 
(1987) using Australian data, and Firth (1979,1980) using UK data. 
This latter result, of negative total gain, seems consistent with the outcome of the 
majority of the operating perfon-nance studies no matter what measures of 
performance the authors have used, see for example Meeks (1977), Spindt and Tarhan 
(1992), Linder and Crane (1992), Srinivasan and Wall (1992) and Rhoades (1993). 
C) 
in many articles, these included Jensen 12 The findings of non-bank M&A event studies were reviewed II 
and Ruback (1983), Cook (1987), Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988). The general conclusion is that 
target shareholders gain, while acquirer shareholders gain according to some studies such as: Dodd and 
Ruback (1977), Franks, Broyles and Hecht (1977), Kummer and Hoffmeister (1978), Bradley (1980). 
Jarrell and Bradley (1980), Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1982). Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983), 
Franks and Harris (1989). Other studies did not find significant gain or loss for the acquirer 
shareholders and those included Eckbo (1983), Asquith (1983), and Dennis and McConnell (1986), 
v, 'hile another group of studies reported negative gain for acquirer shareholders and included Dodd 
(1980), Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983). Limmack (1991). and Sudarsanam, Holl, and Salami (1996). 
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Many studies in the US have examined the long-term effect of merger announcement 
on the share price of the acquiring firm. The early evidence presented by Mandelker 
(1974) reported positive abnormal gain for the 12-month period subsequent to the 
merger month. However other studies found that the gain for the same period was 
insignificantly different from zero (Asquith and Kim, 1982). 
On the other hand, Dodd and Ruback (1977), Langetleg (1978), Asquith (1983), 
Malatesta (1983), and Lahey and Conn (1990) repoi-ted significantly negative 
abnormal return for acquirers. Similar findings where also reported by early studies 
for UK mergers, those included Firth (1979,1980) and Limmack (1991). One 
explanation for the negative post-outcome abnormal returns is that the studies impose 
ex post selection bias by using information that is not available at the announcement 
date to select samples. Altematively, the negative dirift could be caused by non- 
stationary parameters or other forms of model misspecification (Jensen and Ruback, 
1983). 
This latter observation by Jensen and Ruback (1983) was supported later on by 
Franks, Harris and Titman (1991). Franks et al., (1991) investigated the post-merger 
share price performance following US corporate takeovers. Using an equally weighted 
index, their findings confirm earlier studies that found negative post-merger tý 
performance. However, this result was not robust to the choice of the benchmark. 
The 
value weighted benchmark yielded positive post-merger performance, meanwhile the 
results generated with multiple factor benchmarks, and in particular the eight-portfolio In 0 
benchmark exhibit no statistically significant abnormal performance for the overall 
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sample of bidders, and for the various sub-samples examined as well (all cash, all 
equity, contested, uncontested, opposed ). 
Therefore, Franks et at., (1991)'s final results indicate, as they conclude, that prior 
findings of negative post-merger share price performance for bidders are more likely 
to be due to benchmark errors than to mispricing at the time of the announcement. 
The findings of Franks et al., (1991) were contrasted later on by Agrawal, Jaffe and 
Mandelker (1992) who analysed the post-merger performance of acquinng firm using 
a sample of 937 mergers and 227 tender offers which represented the entire 
population of NYSE firms over the period 1955 to 1987 13 . They found that 
stockholders of the acquiring firm suffer a statistically significant wealth loss of about 
10% over the five years following the merger completion and concluded that the 
efficient-market anomaly of negative post-merger performance highlighted in Jensen 
and Ruback (1983) is not resolved. 
Moreover, Gregory (1997) 14 applies six benchmark control models to a sample of 
companies, which undertook successful UK acquisitions in the period 1984-1992, a 
total of 420 companies. The general conclusion supported the findings of Agrawal et 
al., (1992) and reported that the two year post take-over performance was 
significantly negative. 
13 Agrawal et al., (1992) measured the post acquisition performance after adjusting for the firm size 
effect as well as Beta risk, using the methodology of both Dimson and March (1986) and Lakonishok 4-1 
and Vermaelen (1990) and that of Ibbotson (1975) RATS model with an adjustment of firms size. 
14 Gregory (1997) intended to measure the effect of the choice of the benchmark on the long-run 
abnormal return. His work N,,, as motivated mainly by the growing importance of this issue in the I 
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The method of computing the post-merger abnormal returns has been, so far, the same 
across these studies, that is, the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR). However, 
Barber and Lyon (1997) document that CARs are biased predictors of Buy-And-Hold 
returns, and that matching sample firms to control firms of similar size and book-to- 
market ratios yield well specified test statistics. Loughran and Vijh (1997) adopted 
this methodology and argued that month] y-rebal anced returns may not be a good t-) 
estimate of how a buy-and-hold strategy performs over five years. Therefore, they 
measured the abnormal returns by the difference between five-year holding period 
returns of sample stocks and matching stocks (chosen to control for size and book-to- 
market effects). The return reported vaned significantly and ranged from -25% for 
stock mergers to 61.7% for cash tender offers. The difference is quite significant, 
ranging from -25% for stock mergers to 61.7% for cash tender offers. 
Madura and Wiant (1994) also used two methods of computing the abnon-nal return in 
order to examine the long-term valuation effects of 152 bank acquisitions between 
1983 and 1987 in the USA. Their results show that banks experienced negative 
abnormal returns on average over the 36-month period following the acquisitions 
where the CAR reached -27.06% in the 36 
th month. The Proportional Abnormal 
Return revealed similar results but at a lower magnitude of -18.77% in the 36 
th 
month 15 . These results are similar to 
those of Agrawal et al. (1992), and consequently 
these results lend support to the agency problem as explained by Madura and 
Wiant, 
(1994). Moreover the post acquisition performance was higher for intrastate 
previous literature (e. g. Dimson and March, 1986; Agrawal et al, 1992; Gregory et al, 
1994; Kennedy 
& Limmack, 1996; and Fama and French, 1996). 
'ý' The PAR is calculated using the buy-and-hold method by calculating the difference 
between the 
actual and the expected change in value and then dividing by the expected change in value 
from the 
two-factor model applied to measure the expected return. 
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acquisitions, acquisitions by relatively low-growth banks, and acquisitions by 
relatively low-performance banks. The implications of these results are that the bank 
performance is more favourable when banks have more opportunities to reduce 
redundant operations, and when banks are more focused on attempting to make their 
acquisitions work. 
Some challenges face event study methodology and deem its outcome debatable, one 
of these challenges is that the event day must be accurate in order to capture the 
market reaction which is due to this specific event at the specific date examined. 
Secondly, consideration should be taken for confound events, that is, the event during 
the period of examination must be the only event that stimulates the market to react; 
otherwise, the measurement of the market reaction might be biased in either 
directions. Having said that, we believe that the measurement of the long-term 
announcement effect cannot be reliable as such, since the long-term horizon carries 
many events that affect the firm share price therefore, this renders the outcome biased 
as well. Examples of such events could be the announcement of the annual report, the 
interim results, or the engagement in a new research and development project etc 
Moreover, Barber and Lyon (1997) document that there are significant biases in test 
statistics when long-run abnormal returns are calculated using a reference portfolio, 
such as the market index. They identify three reasons for these biases: the new listing 
bias, the rebalancing bias, and the skewness bias' 6. Cumulative abnormal returns are 
most affected by the new listing bias. "As a result, long-run clanulative abnonnal 
16 The three biases are defined in Barber and Lyon (1997) page 342 as: new listing bias arises because L_ Cý 
in event studies of long-run abnormal returns, sampled firms generally have a long post-event history r__ 
of returns, while firms that constitute the index (or reference portfolio) typically include new firms that 
be, -, In tradimi subsequent to the event month. The rebalancing 
bias arises because the compound returns r-I 
of a reference portfolio, such as an equally weighted market index, are typically calculated assuming C 
37 
return and the associated test statistics are generally positively biased. In contrast, 
long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns are more affected by the rebalancing and 
skewness biases. As a result, long-run buy-and-hold abnomial returns and the 
associated test statistics are generally negatively biased' Barber and Lyon (1997), 
page 370. 
The literature examining the market reaction to M&As announcement in the banking 
industry has been, to a large extent, limited to the studies covering the USA bank 
merger experience. The conclusions reached by these studies were similar to the 
findings of non-bank mergers, albeit they cannot be generallsed to the European 
context. 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) is the only event study that examined the European 
banking Merger. The sample consisted of 54 M&As deals observed from 1988 to 
1997. The main findings were that there is a positive and significant increase in value 
for the average merger at the time of the announcement, (-1.0) event window 
17, of 
2.06%. Their results for acquiring banks were not robust for the benchmark used and 
thence they contradicted one another. 
The studies that examined the M&As in the USA banking industry reached a 
consistent conclusion that target shareholders gain, see for example 
Neely (1987), 
Tnfts and Scanlon (1987), Hawawini and Swary (1990), Cornett and 
Tehranian 
(1992), and Pilloff (1996). However the outcome regarding the acquiring 
bank 
periodic (generally monthly) rebalancing, while the returns of sample 
firms are compounded without 
rebalancina. The sk-ewness bias arises because Iong-run abnormal returns are positively skeýýed. 4-- r_1 17 (-1,0) event window is the two-day announcement Nvindow where -1 is relative to the announcement 
day, i. e. a day before the announcement day, and the day zero is the announcement 
day. 
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shareholders is still ambiguous. We provide a more detailed discussion of the market 
reaction to merger announcement in the banking industry in chapter 3. 
2.4.1.2 The effect of the method of payment. 
The outcome from market return studies may vary according to various characteristics 
that accompany the deal; one of the major variables is the method of settlement. 
M&As participants have used several ways, ranging from pure cash offers, equity 
exchange offers to a combination of various means such as cash, equity, and loan 
notes. Nevertheless, every method of settlement signals certain information to the 
market concerning the likelihood of the acquiring firm financial status or valuation, 
according to this information, the market reacts to value the expected outcome of the 
merger deal. 
Consequently, many theories have been formulated to explain the differences in 
abnormal returns associated with various payment methods the main ones are 
discussed below. 
I- the larger abnormal returns observed for target shareholders in cash bids are 
consistent with a tax explanation. That is, target shareholders are taxed immediately 
for capital gains in cash mergers, but the taxes are deferred in mergers involving 
equity exchange until the shareholders sell their shares in the newly merged firm. 
A cash offer, therefore, would have to be larger than a stock offer to offset the 
increased target shareholders' tax liability (Hansen, 198T. Huang and Walkling, 41=1 tn 
1987). Moreover, Huang and Walkling (1987) argues that, transactions that use other 
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payment methods (e. g., convertible preferred stocks) can be tax-deferred or taxed 
immediately, depending on the specific situation. 
2- the other explanation is the asymmetric information explanation. That is, one 
reason why bidders may use cash as a method of payment (if the bidding firm 
managers believe that their own firm's shares are undervalued) is to avoid issuing 
undervalued equity (Travlos, 1987; and Brown and Ryngaert, 1991). Assuming that 
the bidder would only issue correctly valued or overvalued shares, target shareholders 
may then be concerned that the bidding firm is overvalued. Therefore, they would 
prefer cash, because from their own perspective a cash offer reduces the advantages of 
asymmetric information. Finally the market would value a cash offer as a more 
valuable offer than equity which value might deteriorate if it was overvalued, 
8 
although you can sell the shares immediately' . Moreover, Myers and Majluf (1984) 
and Loughran and Ritter (1995) argue that the method of financing an investment 
conveys (signal) information. They argue that when the firm sells shares to finance a 
new project, it is because managers judge the firm's shares to be overvalued. 
Consequently, equity financed acquisitions would result in lower abnon-nal returns for 
the acquinng firm than a cash financed acquisition. 
The studies that examined the effect of the payment method on the return to acquirers 
had, one more time reached contrasting conclusions. Some studies, in non-banking 
M&As, found higher returns to acquirers in cash deals than in equity deals (Travlos, 
1987; Agrawal et al., 1992-, Suclarsanam, Holl and Salami, 1996; Gregory, 199T and 
Loughran and Vijh, 1997). On the other hand other studies in the literature reported 
18 Although there could be transactions costs and also the possibility that the shares could not be 
disposed of immediately and a price decline might occur. 4-- 
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contrasting results (Allen and Sirmans, 1987 and Chang, 1998). Chang (1998) found, 
for stock bidders acquiring privately held targets, a two-day positive return of 2.6417c 
and insignificant 0.09% return for cash bidders. 
Another line of enquiry revolved around whether the negative acquirer returns is due 
to value transference to the bondholders. Travlos (1987) finds that non-convertible 
bondholders do not gain at the announcement of take-over bids. He also finds that 
there is weak statistical evidence that they lose when the acquisition is financed with 
common stock, implying that the wealth transfer to bondholders is not the source of 
the negative abnormal stock returns to the bidders in stock exchange offers. Other 
studies on acquisitions provide mixed evidence on the existence of wealth-transfer 
effects. Kim and McConnell (1977), Asquith and Kim (1982), and Dennis and 
McConnell (1986) find that non-convertible bondholders of bidding firms neither gain 
nor lose from mergers. While Eger (1983) reports marginally significant (t-test = 
1.69) positive abnormal returns to the bondholders of bidding firms at event day t=0. 
However Davidson (1985) argues that in the case of the offer taking the form of debt 
securities in the bidder, there may be value transference implications if the 
shareholders of the target firm have inferior information regarding the prospects of the 
combined firm, or where other debt securities are in issue. 
Further analysis by Chang (1998) revealed that bidding firms returns in stock offers 
are positively correlated with the presence of a new blockholder from the target and t) 
the amount of common stock issued to target shareholders. The evidence is consistent 
with the view that large shareholders are effective monitors of managerial 
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performance and enhances the take-over prospects of the firm (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985; and Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). 
However, concerning the returns to target shareholders and the total returns from 
merger, the general conclusion in the literature of non-bank merger is that these 
returns, in cash deals are higher than in equity exchange offers, e. g. Gordon and Yagil 
(1981); Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983); Eckbo and Langohr (1986); Niden (1986); 
Huang and Walkling (1987); Franks, Hams and Mayer (1988); Queen (1989); Franks, 
Harris and Titman (1991). Moreover, Davidson and Cheng (1997) found that target 
firm abnormal returns at the bid announcement are unrelated to payment method after 
they control for the bid premiums. They showed, instead, that cash acquisitions are 
associated with larger bid premiums, and it is these larger premiums that are 
positively related to abnormal returns. 
On the other hand the limited evidence from bank merger is mixed. Cornett and De 
(1991a, 1991b) find no statistically significant difference in the excess returns, for 
target and acquirer shareholder and the total return, earned in mergers involving cash 
offers and stock offers. Whereas other studies reported that returns to target 
shareholders and weighted-average returns in cash deals are higher than in equity 
exchange offers (Baradwaj et al, 1991). Hawawini and Swary (1990) find that bank 
acquirers receive higher abnormal returns when acquisition is paid for in cash. In 
addition Beatty et al (1987) and Rogowski and Simonson (1987) found a positive 
relationship between cash transactions and the bid premium. 
42 
The literature about European bank merger has not covered this area yet, we therefore 
intend, as part of this thesis, to contribute to filling this gap. 
2.4.2 Operating performance and X-efficiency Studies. 
The second approach used to evaluate the effect of merger on firm perfon-nance has 
been the examination of the operating performance change due to the merger. The 
early evidence from studies of non-bank merger that used accounting ratios, has 
reached a consensus that merger did not improve operating performance. 
Singh (1971), Utton (1974), Meeks (1977), and Kumar (1984) provide evidence for 
UK mergers that the majority of the amalgamations experienced a decline in 
profitability after merger. An exception was Cosh, Hughes and Singh (1980) who 
found a small improvement in profitability. Other studies that reported decrease in 
profitability included Peer (1980) for mergers in Netherlands, Ryden and Edberg 
(1980) in Sweden. Other studies reported no statistically significant change in 
profitability for mergers in Germany (Cable, Palfrey and Runge, 1980), Belgium 
(Kumps and Wtterwulghe, 1980), France (Jenny and Weber, 1980), and USA 
(Mueller, 1980). While Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) reported very small 
profitability improvement between 1975 and 1977 for merger in USA between 1950 
and 1976. 
The contrasting findings of these studies could be due to various sample size, 
location 
and time period or even to methodological shortcoming. For instance 
Ravenscraft and Z7 
Scherer (1987) measured the operating performance between 1975 and 1977 for firms 
which merged between 1950 and 1976. Those fin-ns, which mercred in 
1950, have 
Zý C 
I- 
4 
probably changed drastically after a quarter of a century due to circumstances other 
than merger. On the other hand accounting rates of return studies are always criticised 
for the inability of those rates to measure economic profitability (Fisher and 
McGowan 1993). The main draw back of which is the substantial distortions, which 
the choice of accounting treatment of take-over can introduce into the conventional 
profitability measures (Chaterjee and Meeks 1996). This fact was acknowledged by 
other studies which opened the gate for other measures of performance to be used 
such as cash flow measures. 
Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) used the industry adjusted operating cash flow 
return on market value of assets for 50 USA take-overs between 1979 and 1984. They 
found that merged firms show significant improvement in asset productivity relative 
to their industries, leading to higher median operating cash flow returns for 5 years 
after merger. Higson and Elliot (1994) looked at the performance of UK takeovers 
using both a profit to book measure and cash to market measure. For the complete 
sample of 310 takeovers they found that there is a decline in median profitability 
(profit/book) in all 5 years post takeovers. In contrast there is an improvement in the 
cash flow / market measure in all 5 years post takeover when the sample is restricted 
to 50 large takeovers. The cash flow return on market value of equity measure was 
also used by Cornett and Tehranian (1992) for USA bank mergers. We explore this 
methodology and the findings of Cornett and Tehranian, 1992 in chapter six. 
However, the studies that aimed to measure the operating performance change after 
merger in the banking industry tended to measure various sides of bank performance, C) t: ý 
which represented potential improvement ex ante for analysts and bank managers. 
44 
The potential performance improvement through consolidation, which maximises 
shareholders' value in the long-term, can be attained through increasing market power 
in setting prices, improving profitability and/or efficiency, or via product and/or 
market diversification. 
2.4.2.1 Market Power Change. 
A number of studies examined the effects of M&As on the merging banks in terms of 
gaining market power in setting prices for loans and deposits. The evidence from 
these studies was mixed; Prager and Hannan (1999) found that M&As that involve 
increases in market concentration, reduced the deposit rates paid by the merging 
partner. On the other hand an earlier study found contrasting results (Simons and 
Stavins, 1998). Moreover, Akhavein et al., (1997) analysed the mega-mergers in the 
USA and reported a slight decrease in loan margins and an increase in deposit margin 
following merger. Whereas, Sapienza (1998), in a study of Italian M&As, found that 
when there was market overlap, the loan rates increased when the market share of the 
acquired bank was large, opposite findings were documented when the market share 
was small. 
2.4.2.2 Accounting Ratios Change. 
A number of studies examined efficiency improvement due to M&A and used various 
accounting ratios to analyse primarily, profitability and cost ratio changes. 
Profitabili! ý, ratios: One group tended to measure the profitability change relative to a 
benchmark of non-merging banks. Most of those studies used the two popular ratios r: ý 
return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). (we provide a comprehensive 
summary of these studies covenng the methodology they used, the sample size, time 
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period, geographic location, the ratios analysed and their main findings in table (2.1). 
Some of them reached a conclusion of no improvement in profitability for various 
samples, time periods, and geographic location (Rhoades, 1986; Berger and 
Humphrey, 1992; Linder and Crane, 1992; Pilloff, 1996; Akhavein et al., 1997-, 
Chamberlain, 1998). Kwan and Eisenbeis (1999) found a significant decrease in ROE. 
Whereas, the evidence of profitability improvement is limited to very few studies in 
the USA such as: Spindt and Tarhan (1992), Cornett and Tehranian (1992) and to 
Vander Vennet (1996 and 1999a) in European bank mergers. Spindt and Tarhan 
(1992) reported improvement in ROE but not in ROA. 
Ex I iour, , penses ratios: 
Some other studies examined the change in the bank cost behavi 
and used items such as: non-interest expenses, personnel expenses, and overheads 
scaled down most of the time by assets, or sometimes by revenues. The general 
conclusion for USA bank mergers is that cost ratios do not show any improvement 
after merger (e. g. Rhoades, 1986; Rhoades, 1990; SpIndt and Tarhan, 1992-, Berger 
and Humphrey, 1992; Cornett and Tehranian, 1992; Snnivasan and Wall, 1992; 
Peristiani, 1993a). Whilst some other studies documented a decrease in some or one 
of the ratios they analysed e. g. Linder and Crane (1992) and Crane and Linder (1993) 
using non-interest expenses to assets, Spong and Shoenhair (1992) for the overheads 
to assets ratio, and Pilloff (1996) for the expenses to assets ratio. However 
Kwan and 
Eisenbeis (1999) found that one ratio only, the expenses to assets, improved after 
merger. The findings for the European banking merger stand in sharp contrast to the 
majority of the USA merger studies and show improvement in the personnel expenses 
to assets ratio (Vander Vennet, 1996) and in the cost to income ratio 
(Vander Vennet, 
1999a) for domestic merger of equal partners. 
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In general, efficiency may be improved in a number of different ways. M&A may 
allow the merging partners to achieve economy of scale and/or economy of scope, or 
it may provide the institutions with the ability to change the output mix in a more 
profitable manner (Berger et al., 1999). The difference in results between USA and 
European bank mergers could be due to the ability of achieving scale economies in 
Europe at a higher level of assets size 19 . Moreover less restrictions on universal 
banking in Europe could be another source for improving performance 20 . However, 
the evidence of efficiency improvement through M&As in Europe is further explored 
in chapter six. 
In addition to the effect of the accounting treatment on the accounting ratios, other 
critics consider that the drawback of the accounting ratios is that they incorporate both 
changes in market power and changes in efficiency, which can not be disentangled 
without controlling for efficiency (Berger et al., 1999). Hence we provide the findings 
of efficiency studies in the next sub-section. 
19 The early evidence from US studies showed that scale economies are exhausted at very low levels 
(Clark, 1988) and the measured inefficiencies were relatively small. Moreover, recent US studies 
documented the evidence of scale economies being at a higher level of assets size, up to $10 billion, 
which increases when the banks in the sample are larger (e. g. Noulas, Ray and Miller, 1990; Hunter, 
Timme and Yang, 1990; Berger and Humphrey, 1991; Bauer et al., 1993; and Clark 1996). Although 
the findings vary considerably, Berger et al. (1999) observes that there are no scale efficiencies to be t- 
gained. For the European Community, Vander Vennet (1994a) reports scale economies up to 25 billion 
USD in loans for a sample of 1500 EU banks, while Vander Vennet (1994b) finds significant scale 
economies up to a size level of $3-10 billion of total assets. 20 In most European countries, the ability to perform investment banking functions had been broadened 
since the mid-1980s. In Germany and several Nordic countries, few if any restrictions have existed. On 
the other hand the amendment of the Glass-Steauall act, in the USA, by the Federal Reserve raised the L- 
ceiling on the proportion of total revenue a commercial bank can earn from underwriting corporate debt r-- 
and equity from 5% to 101/'( in 1989 and further to 25% in 1996 only Vander Vennet (1999b). Although 
US banks are more restricted than European banks, they do undertake a number of nontraditional 
activities (Rogers 1998). Cý 
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2.4.2.3 Cost and Profit Efficiency change. 
Measurement of the cost and profit efficiency effect of merger has been another 
important dominating issue in the literature of M&A. The data on banks merger 
suggest that there are substantial potential cost efficiency gains from megamergers 
that dominate the minor anti -competitive effects. Prior studies of bank efficiency 
found average inefficiency to be 20% or higher, primarily due to X-inefficiency or 
difficulties in managerial cost contro, 21 . The X-efficiency of a bank is measured by 
how close its costs or input requirements are to those of a best-practice, fully efficient 
firm within the data set, holding constant the effects of scale, product mix, input 
prices, and other exogenous influences on bank costs 22 . The efficient frontier is 
estimated using a cost function and all other firms are measured relative to this 
frontier 23 . In other words the cost 
function includes prices of input variables, such as 
cost of labour and capital, and output variables related to business of the bank such as 
loans and other earning assets. The process then produces cost functions for every 
bank in the set, the bank with the least total costs using the same output, and input 
prices is the best practice bank and thence others in the sample are compared to it. 
The findings of such a high inefficiency in banks provide a good ground for a 
considerable potential for cost improvements from mergers, provided that relatively 
efficient banks acquire relatively inefficient banks and restructure them so that the 
21 For a general review of X-efficiency studies of financial institutions, see Berger and Humphrey 
(1997). 
Z-- I 
iency as an 22 Berger, AN., Humphrey, D. B., 1992. Megamergers in banking and the use of cost effic' 
antitrust defence. Antitrust bulletin 37,541-600. 
23 There are various forms of cost functions used in the literature such as: the Cobb-Douglas cost L- 
function, the constant elasticity substitution (CES) function, the Generalised Lieontlef function, the 
quadratic cost function, the translog cost function, and the hybrid translog cost function. Other 
approaches to estimating efficiency in banking markets included the stochastic cost frontier and Data ltý Envelopment Analysis. The most popular of these is the translog cost function which ýý as developed 
for a single output technology by Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1971.1973); the multiple output L- L- - 
case was defined by Burgess (1974) and Diewert (1974) (quoted from Altunbas, 1994). 
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efficiency of the consolidated institution levels that of the acquinng bank. However, it 
is worth mentioning that other studies (e. g. DeYoung, 1993) find that efficiency 
improvements are more likely when both the acquiring and the acquired firms are 
relatively inefficient prior to merger rather than when the acquiring firm is more 
efficient. 
Similar to the cost ratio studies, the studies of US banking generally show, either very 
little effect, or no cost X-efficiency improvement on average from the M&As of the 
1980s, of the order of 5% of costs or less (Berger and Humphrey, 1992-, Rhoades, 
1993; DeYoung, 1997; Peristiani, 1997). On the other hand the efficiency studies 
using data from the early 1990s are mixed. Rhoades (1998) summarised nine case 
studies, by nine authors, on the efficiency effects of bank mergers, and found modest 
cost X-efficiency gains in most cases. Berger (1998) also found little improvement in 
average cost X-efficiency for M&A of either large or small banks. On the other hand 
the evidence for European bank merger is limited to Vander Vennet (1996) who found 
that cross-border mergers and domestic mergers of equal partners improve 
efficiency. We discuss this paper and Cornett and Tehranian (1992) in more details in 
chapter 6. 
However, two studies of the profit efficiency effects of US bank M&A found that 
M&As improved profit efficiency, and the source of this improvement could be 
higher diversification of risks (Akhavein et al., 1997; Berger, 1998). Fixler and b 
Zieschang (1993) obtained consistent findings by using a Tomqvist productivity C) 
index-, a value-weighted output index divided by a value weighted input inclex, ývhjch 4111 tý 
Is similar to profit efficiency. 
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The main difference between the Tronqvist productivity index and the cost functions 
is that the Tronqvist index results are determined based on the endogenous variables 
of the banks, that is deposits, and other funds, and loans and other assets. Whereas the 
cost functions use the prices of input not the input themselves and tend to estimate 
inefficiency by assuming that the total cost deviates from the optimal cost by a certain 
amount which is a stochastic variable in the model. 
2.5 Conclusion. 
The level of takeover activities has been accelerating everyday around the globe. The 
phenomenon has been a contagious one for almost every country. Research in the 
field of M&A has been enormous and academics have used mainly two streams of 
methodologies to measure the takeover performance of the firms involved. Authors 
using event study methodology have, in general, reached consistent conclusion that 
the target shareholders gain and this gain varies significantly from one study to 
another depending on the sample characteristics, the model and method used to 
measure the abnormal returns, or the period involved. However the debate is still 
intense concerning the return to bidders shareholders and the total outcome of the 
merger. While the findings of most of the research done agree on minimal gain to no 
gain to the bidder shareholders, yet other research findings contradict this conclusion 
and present evidence of negative gains to the shareholders of the bidder firm and a 
negative aggregated total gain. This latter result, of negative total gain seems rý 41-) kl: ý 
consistent with the outcome of the majority of the operating performance studies 
whether they used accounting ratios or estimates of cost and production functions. 
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The evidence for European bank merger is still very thin and restricted to three 
studies, namely Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) and Vander Vennet (1996,1999a). 
and the outcome from consolidation is not yet fully explored. The coming change in 
the financial services industry around the world, and especially in Europe, in terins of 
technology, the regulation, the Euro and the globalisation is intensifying competition 
in the banking industry and changing the way these banks deliver, bundle and 
structure new products to their end customers. Moreover this has accelerated the level 
of consolidation and therefore encouraged researching the impact on bank 
performance change. In the next chapter we study the effect of M&As on the share 
price of the merging partners in Europe. 
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CHAPTER THREE: MARKET VALUATION OF THE 
FINANCIAL SERVICES M&As IN EUROPE 
3.1. Introduction. 
Despite the extensive research in the M&As area the increase in the pace of M&As 
still requires more research to try to explain this ever-increasing phenomenon that 
influences the nature of industrial organisations and corporate ownership. In addition, 
the findings of the USA studies cannot be generallsed to draw conclusions about the 
European scenano, for a variety of reasons, a particular one being the differing 
regulation governing the activities of the financial services industry in USA and in 
Europe. 
The research done using event study methodology to measure the M&A performance 
in European Banking has been, so far, limited to one study by Cybo-Ottone and 
Murgia (2000). In this chapter we aim to help filling this gap in the literature, by 
presenting new findings and by using a larger sample with more updated data which 
includes some of the most important and largest deals that happened near the end of 
the twentieth century. 
In the next section we provide some empirical evidence of the findings of the research 
on M&A in the banking industry. In section three we present our sample design and 
the data source, section four explains the methodology we used. In section five we 
report our findings of the market reaction to merger announcement. We conclude in 
section six. 
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3.2. Summary of the Empirical Evidence. 
A number of studies have examined the M&A in the banking industry, mainly in the 
USA. The early studies that examined the market reaction to merger announcement 
have concentrated on the returns to the acquiring banks, as the majority of the target 
banks were not publicly listed. 
The event studies in the literature of banks M&A in USA differ from one another in 
terms of sample size; the benchmark used, the market model, the mean-adjusted 
return model, a two factor model etc ... ; the method of aggregating the abnormal 
retums, the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) method or the buy-and-hold (BAH) 
return method; the time period examined, the geographic scope they concentrated on, 
interstate, intrastate or within one state only; or the type of merger that took place, i. e. 
failing, not assisted, or hostile. Yet the general outcome concerning the target 
shareholders is that these shareholders gain. The magnitude of this gain then differs 
due to the different characteristics of each study. The target abnormal gain found 
ranged from as high as 30.32% in successful hostile tender offers in the largest event 
window (-60,60) examined by Baradwaj et al., (1990)24 to 6.08% in the (-1,0) event 
window by Cornett and De (1991), and to as low as 4.7% for the same period by 
Cornett and Tehranian (1992) for the sub-sample of interstate mergers. The three 
studies used similar benchmarks. Whereas Zhang (1995) found 6.13% CAR for two- 
day announcement period using size adjusted return for the target shareholders. Other 
studies used weekly returns and found one-week announcement abnormal return 
being 15.04% (Neely, 1987), 7.4% (Trifts and Scanlon, 1987), and 11.541/-1 4. 
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(Hawawini and Swary, 1990). On the other hand there has been also a rare evidence 
of zero abnormal return to the target shareholders reported by De and Duplican (1987) 
for the announcement week period and by Trifts and Scanlon (1987) for the (-20,0) 
weeks event window. 
However concerning the acquiring bank shareholders, the general findings of those 
studies, similar to non-banking merger studies, reached contrasting conclusions. see 
Table (3.1) for a summary comparison of selected earlier studies. Some studies 
documented evidence of positive gain to the acquinng banks, those included Desai 
and Stover (1985), Pettway and Trifts (1985), James and Wier (1987a), and Cornett 
and De (1991). Other studies reported negative returns to the shareholders of 
acquinng banks, those included Tnfts and Scanlon (1987), Hannan and Wolken 
(1989), Hawawini and Swary (1990), Houston and Ryngaert (1994), and Sierns 
(1996). And others found no evidence of gain (see for example De and Duplican, 
1987; and Allen and Cebenoyan, 1991) while another group reached mixed findings 
(Neely, 1987; Dubofski and Fraser, 1989). The same pattern of contradicting findings 
was also documented for the aggregated total return, which in some cases was 
cancelled out by the acquirer negative gain. 
Although, the finding from merger studies, concerning the acquirer gain and the 
aggregate total gain is still ambiguous, yet the outcome from within each group of 
studies (positive, negative, or zero gain to acquirer shareholders or to all 
shareholders), as to which mergers create value is still unsettled as well. 
Hannan and Wolken (1989) reported that returns for bidders or targets are not related 
24 Baradwaj et al., (1990) reported an announcement period (-1,0) CAR for total sample of targets being 
17 - 29"i, 
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to size, net combined dollar gain does not differ between intrastate and interstate 
mergers and therefore merger between parties is not motivated by geographic 
diversification. A further finding is that net combined dollar gain is positive for deals 
involving less capitalised targets and negative for deals involving more capi I i tal i sed 
targets. Desai and Stover (1985) found evidence that the relative size is not relevant in 
explaining bidder returns. On the contrary, Trifts and Scanlon (1987), James and Wier 
(1987b), De Cossio Tnfts and Scanlon (1988), and Kaen and Tehranian (1989) 
concluded that a higher return is positively related to the size ratio of target to 
acquirer. On the other hand Zhang (1995) found that, a wealth gain is driven by the 
relative size acquirer to target not target to acquirer. We believe that these 
contradicting results are mainly due to differing sample size and periods examined 
across these studies. For example the sample size varies from 18 deals in Desai and 
Stover (1985) who examines the mergers from 1976 to 1982, to 107 deals in Zhang 
(1995) for the period 1980 to 1990. 
Siems (1996) investigates the banking megamerger deals that took place in the USA 
in 1995. Analysing the 24 deals, the cumulative average abnormal return during three 
days around the announcement day was 13.04% for target banks. He concluded, 
similarly to Pilloff (1996) and Houston and Ryngaert (1994) that banks in mergers 
with higher percentage of office overlaps earned higher returns than banks in mergers 
with fewer office overlaps. Moreover, Sierns (1996) found no evidence supporting the 
market power and diversification hypothesis. On the other hand, the results for the full 
sample are consistent with the manager-utility-maximisation hypothesis and the 
hubris hypothesis as for reporting total negative returns. Nevertheless, it appears that 
banks in in-market mergers receive higher returns because of potential cost reductions r) 
417) 
ial market power gains. While James and and synergistic gains as opposed to potent] 41-1) 
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Wier (1987b) found no support for the market power hypothesis as well, Hannan and 
Wolken (1989), Hawawini and Swary (1990), Baradwaj, Fraser and Furtado (1992), 
and Cornett and Tehranian (1992) found also similar findings to those of Siems 
(1996) that acquisitions are not driven by geographic diversification motives and that 
returns did not differ between interstate and intrastate merger deals. On the other hand 
contrasting findings to these are reported by Zhang (1995) and Cornett and De (1991) 
who reports a two day abnormal return of 0.55% for acquirers involved in interstate 
mergers. 
In one of the very few event studies on European banking mergers, Cybo-Ottone and 
Murgia (2000) examined the stock market valuation of mergers and acquisitions in the 
European banking industry. Their sample consisted of 54 M&As deals observed from 
1988 to 1997. Their results document that there is a positive and significant increase 
in value for the average merger at the time of the announcement 2.06%, (-1,0) day. 
They also reported significant positive returns for acquiring banks using the all sector 
index as the market benchmark and negative returns using the bank sector index. 
Their results are not consistent with the bulk of the literature in the US banking where 
no value creation effects are generally found. This different outcome, as they contend, 
stems from the different structure and regulation of EU banking markets, which are 
shown to be more similar to each other than to the US one. Moreover, they also 
reported higher abnormal returns for domestic deals, merger deals and Bancassurance 
deals. 
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3.3 Sample design and Data Sources. 
The first step we performed was to look at a set of merger and acquisition transactions 
that were announced in the European financial services industry, which is taken to 
include the European Union and in addition Switzerland and Norway. Our main data 
source was the SDC Platinum CD, which provides access to Securities Data 
Company's online databases of financial transactions such as: Global New Issues, 
Mergers and Acquisitions and Corporate Governance. 
We searched all the deals in the database between Jan 1987 and Dec 1999, where the 
acquirer is a publicly listed financial institution in the EU, Switzerland or Norway. 
The initial sample consisted of 2359 transactions, but when we restricted the sample 
to transactions where there was transfer of control as a result of the deal, the number 
dropped to 882 transactions, 238 of which had a publicly listed target firm as required 
for the study. Finally for completed deals, we ended up with 89 targets and 89 
acquirers from 102 deals for which the stock return data were available. 
In order to get at this final number of targets and acquirers, we also followed a very 
strict refinement strategy which aimed to ensure that the event we are examining, 
M&A, is the main event in the period studied for each transaction, that is, acquirers 
involved in another M&A deals within 6 months around our event date were 
excluded. Targets which received more than one offer within the same period, 6 
months, were excluded. In sum we insured that the event dates were clean events. 
Foi- evcry transaction \ve collected the following information: 
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The announcement date of the deal and the effective date. 
- The value of the deal. 
The percentage of shares owned by the acquirer before, during and after the 
transaction. 
25 The form of the deal, whether it was a merger or a takeover deal . 
The consideration offered, cash, equity or other 
We performed a consistency check on the announcement day of the merger using The 
Financial Times and Reuters databases. Therefore we are confident that the 
announcement date reported by SDC Platinum is the exact date when the information 
about the deal was first announced to the public. 
Stock price and market value data for the sample banks and firms were collected from 
the Datastream database. The accounting data were collected from three main sources, 
the FitchIbca Bank Scope CD, the annual reports available on Laser D and the 
Datastream database. 
In Table (3.2) we provide a summary statistics for the total sample of 102 deals. We 
notice that the deals are almost evenly distributed between merger and acquisition 
deals, however the number of cross border deals is not significant compared to the 
national deals. Moreover, most of the deals (71%) are among commercial banks, 
which could be seeking to exploit economies of scale and synergistic gains based on 
closure of overlapping branches (89% are national deals), while the rest is cross- 
product deals, where the partners could be planning to exploit economies of scope and 
25The form of the deal is clearly stated in the SDC Platinum database, moreover, the synopsis of each 
deal states details of the negotiation and offer process. L- 
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diversify their product portfolio. Another remarkable point is the high percentage of 
deals settled in cash as compared to equity settled deals. This might be due to having 
a good percentage of acquisition deals (52%), 5 deals of which are settled by equity 
exchange offers while the majority of the rest are settled in cash, and 10 deals are 
settled in a combination of cash, equity and loan notes. In Panel B of the table we 
report the geographical distribution of the deals in our sample and notice that France, 
Italy, and UK stand at the top of the league followed by Switzerland and Norway. 
In Tables (3.3) and (3.4) we provide descnptive statistics for the sample of matched 
targets and acquirers in 76 deals completed between 1987 and 1999. We notice that 
the average size of target institution relative to the combined institution (table 3.3) is 
large enough, almost 29%, to constitute a strategic investment decision by the 
management of the acquiring institution. Moreover, the percentage of shares acquired 
during these deals is 79% on average for the total period. These two latter 
observations imply that these mergers are of a significant size to affect the 
performance of the acquiring institutions and therefore to stimulate the stock market 
to react when they are announced. 
Compared to Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) our sample excludes all uncompleted 
and withdrawn deals. Moreover we are covering a larger sample in a longer period, 
and most importantly, Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) did not examine the effect of 
the method of payment. The final point is an important issue, which has received 
much attention in the M&A literature for the non-financial services industry 
worldwide and for the financial services industry in the USA, but little attention in the 
European context. 
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3.4 The Methodology. 
The event stud Y26. 
The rational behind the use of an event study is to measure the effect on share price of 
an "event" (announcement of a merger proposal, share repurchase, and so on). In 
other words the aim is to assess the extent to which share price behaviour around the 
announcement of an event has been beyond expectation i. e. abnormal. The research 
27 involving abnormal returns provides a direct test of the efficient market hypothesi s. 
In pnnciple nonzero abnormal returns which persist over time after the announcement 
of an event violates the hypothesis that security prices adjust quickly to fully reflect 
new information, unless new information concerning the companies is continuing to 
be received by the market. 
However the security price performance in response to an event is considered 
abnormal in comparison to the expected return had the event not happened. There are 
several approaches in the literature to estimating what normal returns 28 would have 
been in the absence of an event. No matter what model is used, the measurement of 
26 Event studies have a long history, which dates back till the early thirties, e. g. Dolley (1933) 
examined the price effect of stock splits. The level of sophistication of event studies increased with 
time and other researchers used the event study afterwards those included Myers and Bakay (1948), 
Barker (1956,1957,1958), and Ashley (1962). The improvements included removing general stock 
market price movements and separating out confounding events. Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et 
al., (1969) introduced the methodology that is essentially the same as that is in use today. 
27 An efficient market is defined as one where a share price fully reflects all available information. The 
efficiency in this context is that of informational efficiency. Fama (1970) distinguishes three forms of 
informational efficiency: (1) weak form, where prices fully reflect information regarding the past 
sequence of prices (2) semi- strong-form, where prices fully reflect all publicly available information 
such as announcement of financial statements data, and (3) strong form efficiency. where prices fully 
reflect all information, including inside information. 
2' The share return can be calculated in two ways: discrete and logarithmic. 
The discrete return is (Pi, + Di, - Pi, -, 
)IPi, 
-,. The Loaarithmic return is Loo, [(Pi, + Di, )IPi, 
Where Pi, is the price of a security 1 at the end of period t, D, is the dividends paid during period t. and 
Pi, 
_1 is the price of security 
iat the end of period t-1, adjusted for any capital change (Strong, 1992). 
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shareholder returns (the abnormal return) as a result of the merger announcement for 
example is defined as the difference between the actual return and the expected return 
generated by one of the following modelS29. 
1) The Market Adýusted Retum Model: is also referred to as the Index Model 
(Armitage, 1995) and is based on the assumption that the expected return for any 
security equals to the expected market return in the same period. Expected returns, 
therefore, are constant across securities but not across time. Studies that used this 
model include Latane and Jones (1979), Dennis and McConnell (1986) and 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990). 
2) The Mean Adjusted Retum Model: assumes that the expected return is the average 
return earned by this security during a certain estimation period. Other researchers 
used this model such as Masulis (1980). 
3) The Capital Asset Pricing Model or the Market and Risk Adýusted Retunis Model: 
this mode, 30 sets: E[Ri]= Rft +A(E[Rm] - Rf). Where E[Ri]is the expected return 
of security i, Rf is the risk-free rate of interest, E[Rm] is the expected return on the 
market index, andAis the systematic risk of a security i relative to the market 
index 31 
19 Many papers have analysed the use of an event study methodology, the statistical tests used, and the 
weaknesses and strengths of different approaches used, these included Strong (1992), Armitage (1995), 
MacKinilay (1997). 
30 The CAPM is due to Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). 
31 The Fama-MacBeth Model: is another variant of the CAPM developed by Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) and is given by: ER, = alt +(x-)t)6j, 
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4) The MatchedlControl PoLtfolio benchmark: is another variant of the CAPM, 
under this model the sample securities subject to analysis (calculation of abnormal 
returns) are formed into a portfolio. Another control portfolio is formed and 
matched based on systematic risk. The portfolios are weighted to have the same 
systematic risk beta, often constrained to unity (Strong, 1992). The abnormal 
return is the difference between the returns on the sample portfolio and the control 
portfolio. 
5) The Market Model-32: is probably the most popular benchmark employed in event 
studies the return generating process for stock i during time t is given by: 
ri, = ai 
+ 
9, 
rnit + Eit 
Where rit = the return for security i at time t., in the absence of any event, rmt = return 
on the market, at time t, which is the benchmark against which the return for any 
security i will be compared. 
ai and #-, are the market model parameters, and Eit is a statistical error term where 
E(Cit) = 0, Var (Cit) is constant, and E(EitEi't-j) =0Vj. OLS (ordinary least square) 
regression using days in the estimation or clean event period will generate estimates 
Where #, is the beta defined in the CAPM above of share i, cc,, and (12t are cross-sectional regression 
coefficients for time t of share returns against beta during an estimation period. In this model al, is 
interpreted as the return on a zero-beta portfolio. 
32 There have been a number of simulation studies of the various event study methodologies. The most 
influential of these have been a study by Brown and Warner (1980) on monthly data, and articles by 
Brown and Warner (1985), Dyckman et aL, (1984) and Jain (1986), all extending the original Brown 
and Warner (1980) study to daily data. The conclusion of BW (1980) was ... a simple methodology based on the inat-k-et niodel perfoi-ins vvell under a ýOde iariety of conditions. In addition both Brown 
and Warner (1985) and Dyckman et al., (1984) find daily data result in more powerful test statistics 
than are found for the monthly data simulations in Brown and Warner (1980). In addition Morse (1984) 
sui, -i-, ests that a shorter measurement Interval is more likely to detect information effects unless there is 
uncertainty over the exact announcement date. 
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of ai and #'. The estimate of #will be the same as that of the CAPM, 8if eitherg= 
I or the risk-free rate does not change over the estimation period. 
The predicted return for a firm for a day in the event period, is the return given by the 
market model on that day using these estimates. Therefore, the abnormal return is 
given by the actual return on day t less the predicted return on the same day. 
We use the market model to perform a standard event study, in order to measure the 
abnormal stock return. 
We used two different benchmarks, as in Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000), to estimate 
regression parameters, that is, the Datastream General Market index and the 
Datastream Bank Sector index for the bidder and target's country. We also converted 
all market returns and security returns to the Euro currency using daily time series 
exchange rates for the securities, which are not reported in Euro, in Datastream. This 
procedure is done in order to maintain homogeneity when comparing returns across 
all the securities of the banks and firms used in the sample. We estimated the market 
model parameters over -210 to day -21 before the event day, and estimated the 
abnormal return between -20 and +30 days around the event day. 
The individual daily abnormal returns, Rit, are then averaged across banks and firms 
in the sample to calculate the daily average abnormal returns. That is: 
AR=-IR, N i=l 
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Where i=1, ----N is the number of 
banks and firms in our sample. Additionally, we 
then aggregated the daily average abnormal returns, across several event windows, to 
arrive at the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns, CAR. 
We have also re-estimated the market model parameters using the Scholes-Williams 
(1977) procedure in order to correct for the estimation error in beta due to possible 
non-synchronous trading. In general many securities listed on organised exchanges 
are traded only infrequently, with few securities so actively traded that prices are 
recorded almost continuously 33 . One of the results of the infrequent trading of some 
shares is that reported returns reflect dated transactions and therefore these returns are 
non-synchronous across securities, the accurate calculation of returns over any fixed 
sequence of periods becomes virtually impossible. Consequently, this introduces into 
the market model the econometric problem of errors in variables, which result in 
biased and inconsistent beta estimates 34 . With daily 
data this problem appears 
particularly severe. 
The Scholes-Williams beta estimator assumes that although trades are non- 
synchronous, a transaction takes place in every measurement interval; in addition it is 
assumed that price-adjustment delays arise only through non-synchronous trading so 
that an observed transaction price is the true price at the time of the transaction. 
According to Scholes and Williams (1977) the estimator of beta is given by: 
33 Fama (1965) and Fisher (1966) first recognised the non-trading of securities as a potentially serious 
empirical problem. 
34 A number of methods for correcting for this bias have been proposed in the literature (Scholes and ltý Williams, 1977; Dimson, 1979-, and Cohen et al., 1983) 
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j6 sw 
18 
0+ )6 +1 
I 
Where 8" is an estimator of the slope coefficient in a simple regression of the return 
on the security in period t against the return on the market in period t +n. 
p,, is an estimate of the first order serial correlation coefficient of the market index. 
In order to measure the outcome of merger on the combined financial institution we 
compute the wei ghted- average abnormal returns, for both parties target and bidder in 
every deal. The weights we used, are the market value of equity, one month before the 
announcement of the deal. In order to examine how the results might differ we also 
substituted the market value of equity by the total assets value at the end of the year 
before the announcement year of the deal. 
Statistical tests used. 
The statistical significance of cumulative abnon-nal retums is tested using the Dodd 
and Warner (1983) method. See Appendix A for the detailed calculation. 
However, when we partition the sample into sub-samples according to some criteria 
such as: Merger vs. Acquisition, National vs. Cross border and so on... we 
constructed table (3.21) summansing the findings from these sub-samples in the pre- 
merger announcement event window (-10,0) and used non-parametric tests, e. g. the 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests and the Mann-Whitney tests (Baradwaj et al., 1990 used 
both tests). The rational for using these non-parametric tests is that in case of small 
samples z-test and t-tests may not be accurate in testing for significance especially 
that small samples may be grossly non-normally distributed. We use the Mann- 
78 
Whitney 35 test in order to test for significance of the difference of abnormal returns 
for every two sub-samples. 
3.5 Market Reaction to Merger Announcement. 
Table (3.5) shows the value weighted cumulative abnormal returns for 76 deals 
calculated on different event windows extending from 20 days before the 
announcement of the merger until 30 days after the announcement, the weights being 
the market value of equity of both parties, target and acquirer, one month before the 
announcement month. The CAR for the total sample of 76 merger deals two days 
around the announcement of the merger, (-I, I) is 0.49 % which is significant at the 
5% level. The percentage of deals with positive CAR in the sample is 62%, shown in 
the last column of the table, which is above the percentage of having positive CAR 
due to chance alone i. e. 50%. The CARs in the other event windows are all significant 
except the pre-merger event window of (-20,0) days. The ma ority of this return is j 
achieved in the first two days after the announcement of the merger and then it starts 
to drop gradually afterwards until it reaches a small and significant negative CAR of - 
0.23% 30 days after the merger announcement date. Comparing our results to other 
studies in the area of bank merger in the USA we find that Houston and Ryngaert 
(1994) reported a value weighted CAR of 0.46 %, in the (-4,0) event window, but this 
is insignificant for the total sample of 153 bank merger between 1985 and 1991. Our Z-: ) 
closest comparable window is the (-5,0) were the CAR was almost the same at 0.45% 
35 "The test focuses on the median as the measure of location or central tendency. When a population is 
symmetrical. the median and the mean are equal. Therefore, when two sampled populations are 
symmetrical, conclusions about their medians based on the Mann-Whitney test also apply to their 
means" Daniel, W and J. Terrell, Business Statistics for management and economics. seventh edition. 
Houghton Mifflin Co. Boston, 1995, Page 726. 
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but highly significant for our total sample. Moreover, other studies with close results 
to ours are Pilloff (1996) where he reports (-5,0) CAR of 0.6% and Kwan and 
Eisenbeis (1999) where they report pre-merger CAR of 0.77% during (-1.0), and 
0.56% in the (-5,0) window. Our comparable CARs are 0.34% and 0.45% 
respectively, both figures being significant at the 1% level. Kwan and Eisenbeis 
(1999)'s CAR for the (-20,0) event window was 0.28%, our comparable figure being 
0.36%. Both are not significantly different from zero. 
On the other hand Zhang (1995) reported a positive CAR of 7% for the (-2,2) event 
window while our comparable window shows a CAR of 0.48% which is significant at 
the 1% level. Pilloff (1996) shows a (-10,0) CAR of 1.44% which is significant at the 
10% level while in our study the CAR is 0.27% which is significant at the 1% level. 
In sum the weighted average CAR for both targets and acquirers in the pre-merger 
period implies that there is a leakage of information to the market about the merger at 
least ten days before the announcement (see Table 3.5 for the details about the CARs 
in different event windows and for tests of significance). 
One paper of particular interest to our research is Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) 
who examined the mergers in the European financial services industry between 1988 
and 1997 for deals above USD 100 Million in value. The CAR reported by Cybo- 
Ottone and Murgia (2000) in the different event windows that are examined are much 
higher than those we report, the lowest return they report being 2.65% during (-1,0) 
while our highest return is 0.49% in the (-2,2) event window, both figures being C) C) rýl 
significant at the 1% level. Looking at the figures they report using the Market value t) I 
of Equity as the weight to measure the CAR of target and acquirer banks, we notice 
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that the abnormal returns start to drop in day +1 after the merger announcement and 
continue this trend until day +20. While the highest return they report is 4.49% during 
(-20,0), our comparable figure for this event window is 0.36% but this is not 
significantly different from zero. 
Since our study is not restricted to large deals as was Cybo-Ottone and Murgia 
(2000), we tried to construct a similar scenario by examining the CAR for deals larger 
than USD 100 Million in value. Moreover, we tried to match their sample and 
examined the CAR for another sub-sample, which is restricted to large deals 
completed between 1988 and 1997, the same penod examined by Cybo-Ottone and 
Murgia (2000). We report the results we obtained in table (3.6) for two sub-samples in 
Panel A and Panel B, yet the highest return, for the total sample of large deals, Table 
(3.6) Panel A, that we obtained was 0.83% dulring the (-20,0) event window, 
significant at the 10% level while the (-2,2) CAR was 0.81% significant at the 1% 
level. While for the sub-sample which matches theirs, shown in table (3.6) Panel B, 
our highest reported CAR was just under 1.2% in the (-20,0) event window. Further 
down, we perform a bivariate analysis which shows that the highest return we obtain 
is for deals settled in a mix of cash, equity and loan notes, this return being almost 2% 
in the (0,2) event window (significant at the 1% level). In sum our results, in contrast 
to those reported by Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000), seem to be in line with previous 
findings in the USA literature of bank mergers and acquisitions and do not Point to 
exceptionally high CARs in the European context. 
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3.5.1 Returns to target firms shareholders. 
Table (3.7) reports the results for the sample of target and acquiring banks and 
firmS36. We report the CAR for 89 targets and 89 acquirers from 102 different deals. 
The returns to targets are all significantly different from zero at the 1% level. The two 
days announcement penod CAR, in the (-1,1) window, is 2.3%, while the highest 
return for targets is in the (-20,20) event window register a CAR of 4.4%. A very 
interesting finding is that the returns persist until 30 days after the merger 
announcement where the CAR was 2.8% in the (0,30), and 2.9% in the (0,20) event 
windows. 
Our results are similar to the general findings of other studies in the field in terms of 
reporting significant positive returns to targets. The value of this return is very close 
to findings of some studies and lower than others in different event windows 
examined, thence a brief comparison follows. Cornett and Tehranian (1992)37 report a 
two-day announcement period CAR of 8% for the total sample and 4.7% for interstate 
mergers, our comparative figure being 1.4%, however if we look at our two sub- 
samples of deals larger than USD 100 Million (see table 3.8), the comparative CARs 
are 2% and 3%. For the same event window, Zhang (1995) found 6.13% positive 
abnormal return while Baradwaj et al (1990) reports 17.29% and 10.92% for target 
banks in hostile and non-hostile takeover deals respectively. However in order to gain 
more insight by comparing our results to this study we split the sample into two sub- 
samples based on the legal aspect of the deal, merger vs. acquisition, in table (3.13). 
36 We also report the pattern of changing CAR for target and acquiring institutions form -20 days to 
+30 days in Figures (3.1) and (3.2). 
37 Cornett and Tehranian (199-1) study is restricted to deals larger than USD 100 Million. I-- 
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The total CAR to target banks in acquisition deals 38 for our longest period, (-20,30) 
days, is just under 10% which is significant at the 1% level while the return reported 
by Baradwaj et al (1990) is 14.35% for the (-60,60) event window. On the other hand 
Houston and Ryngaert (1994) reported 14-77% CAR for the five days event window 
they examined for acquisition deals, where our result for the same window is almost 
2.1% for acquisition deals as well. However, Cornett and De (1991) reported a two 
days announcement CAR of 8% for targets in interstate takeover bids while our figure 
for the same window is 3.5% for acquisition deals. Moreover, our result for the (- 
10,10) event window is 7% and for the (-20,20) window is 9.5%, these results being 
significant at the 1% level, while Cornett and De (1991) reported very close results of 
8.7% and 9.6% in the (-10,10) and the (-15,15) event windows respectively, their 
results also being significant at the 1% and 10% level. 
On the other hand Neely (1987) reported 17% return for the BHC (Bank Holding 
Company) target banks during the announcement week of the acquisition and a lower 
return of 7% for the individual bank target sub-sample. Our closest comparative 
windows are (-2,2) and (-5,5) days where the results are 4% and 5.5% respectively. 
Comparing our results to those reported by Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000), we 
notice that the announcement period return they report for the target banks, (-I, I) 
days, is almost 12% while in our comparative sample for large deals the target bank 
return was almost 4.3% (Table 3.8 Panel B) and for the (-20,20) window was 7% 
while their reported figure for the same window was 14%. 
18 Note that hostile takeovers are very rare in the banking industry and therefore we consider that our Z__ 
results for acquisition deals should best be compared to the returns in non-hostile takeover deals. 
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Figure (3.1): Pattern of Target CAR. 
The figure shows Cumulative Abnormal Returns for targets between -20 and +30 days around the announcement day of the merger. 
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Figure (3.2): Comparative CAR for both targets and acquirers. 
The Figure shows comparative CAR for targets and acquirers between -20 and +30 
days around the announcement day of the merger. 
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Having compared our results to other findings in the bank merger literature, mainly in 
the USA, we notice that in many cases our results for target shareholders are lower 
than other findings. In principle the market reacts to merger announcement in a way to 
value the expected benefit from the merger of two parties, in the sense that the market 
prices reflect the expected economic gain out of the merger. The event studies use 
estimates of the abnormal share price changes around the announcement date as a 
measure of the economic effects of the merger (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). In addition 
the return to target shareholders is a function of two main factors, namely the offer 
terms and the expected synergy gains from the merger. Having said that, we also add 
that the expected synergy might have been influenced by the forces of change that 
have affected the competitive environment in the banking industry. 
These forces of change are discussed by Dermine (1999), who names six of them, viz: 
national deregulation, international integration, demographics, information 
technology, entry of new competitors, and the Euro. The latter holds in particular for 
the European Union, knowing that the adoption of the Second Banking Co-ordination 
Directive as part of the single European market has removed institutional obstacles for 
banks to operate freely across national boundaries in Europe since 1993. This means 
more competition and more pressure on profit making were foreseen in the skies, 
hence the acceleration of the merger wave in the nineties. With the Euro and the 
Second Banking Co-ordination Directive, the competitive advantage of local banks in 
the local government bond market and in the corporate bond and equity markets, 
particularly in respect of the underwri iI iness, started to diminish iting and trading busi 
gradually. The reasons being, as Den-nine (1999) argues, with monetary union the C) CII) 
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sources of competitive advantage for the local banks no longer exist (we have 
discussed this issue in details in chapter two). As for the foreign exchange markets, 
for example, BNP Paribas will be no more a French Franc specialist, but competes 
with other European banks for the Euro/Dollar business. 
These developments increased competition in the European financial services industry 
and will boost competition even further, which is leading to more consolidation and 
rationalisation in the market. We believe that this scenario was foreseen by the market 
players and fostered the merger wave, mainly in the banking industry in order for 
banks to consolidate their market position and improve efficiency if they could. 
Therefore merger might have been the main strategy for banks to prepare for a 
tougher market environment in order not to lose their current position. Hence the 
expected benefit maybe very limited and achieving high synergy gains may also be an 
ambitious objective which may not be realised easily. This vague picture of the 
expected synergy gains might have been the main source of concern for merger 
participants and probably caused acquiring banks not to pay high prices for target 
banks. 
On the other hand another argument can be drawn from the historical profitability of 
the European banking industry, the pattern of profitability has, on average, decreased 
in most of the European countries we cover in our study since 1988 (see figure 3.4). 
This pattern becomes so apparent when we observe the figures of Net income to 
average assets (ROAA), for the Europe as one unified market. The ratio dropped 4- 
about 20.5% between 1988 and 1997, whereas for the USA it has increased about 
38% for the same period, see Figure (3.3) for comparison. The trend of increasing 0 
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profitability in USA is maybe a source of optimism about the expected future 
performance in the industry and therefore acquirers may be tempted to pay higher 
prices for the targets. These higher prices are driving the market to react more 
favourably to the merger announcement and therefore are generating high target 
abnormal returns. Whereas,, we believe that the scenario of decreasing profitability in 
the European banking markets, in addition to the changing environment and the 
increased competition, creates more of a gloomy picture of the future performance in 
the industry as a whole. Therefore acquirers in European bank mergers may not be 
willing to pay high prices to the target banks hence target returns are not very high 
compared to those in the USA. 
Figure (3.3): Comparative Return on Assets for Europe and USA. 
The figure is a comparative chart for the Net income/Average Balance Sheet Assets in 
Europe and the USA between 1988 and 1997. 
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Source: Bank Profitability- Financial Statements for Banks, edition 1999, Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
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Figure (3.4): Net Income/Average Balance Sheet Assets Charts for The European 
Countries between 1988 and 1997. 
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3.5.2 Return to acquiring firms shareholders. 
In table (3.7) we report the cumulative abnormal returns for the total sample of 89 
acquirers. And in the Figure (3.2) we show a comparative pattern of the CAR of the 
target and acquiring banks between -20 and +30 days. The results we obtained were 
in general in line with many of the findings of other research done in the literature of 
the USA banking merger and acquisition. For our total sample of 89 acquirers, the 
three days announcement period return is not significantly different from zero, while 
in the (-2,2) event window the return is 0.18%, minimal but significant at the 1% 
level. The return fades out afterwards until it negates itself 30 days after the 
announcement day but again it is not significantly different from zero then. This 
return of 0.18% is very close to the comparative CAR reported by Cornett and De 
(199 1) for the same event window, which was 0.16% however, for the sub-sample of 
acquisition deals the CAR was negative but not significantly different from zero, the 
same result is found in Palia (1994a). 
Other studies reported lower (negative) returns for acquirers. For example, Baradwaj 
et al (1990) found significant negative CAR of -1.28% in (-1,0) event window, a 
return close to the one reported in Sierns (1996) of -1.5%, while Cornett and 
Tehranian (1992) found slightly higher return of -0.8% for the same event window. 
The result we found for this window is 0.13% and is significant at the 5% level. 
When we compare our findings to those of Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000), we 
notice they reported negative but not significantly different from zero CAR for all 
event windows they examined when they use the Datastream Bank Sector Index as 
their Benchmark to calculate the abnormal returns. However their results differ when 
they employ the Datastream General Market Index to the extent that they reported 
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positive but not significant returns in the pre-merger announcement event windows, 
while for the (-1,1) window they found 0.99% return. Our result for this period is 
0.28% for the sub-sample of 55 acquirers involved in large deals (table 3.8 Panel A), 
and 0.17% for the second sub-sample of 41 acquirers in large deals extending until 
1997 only (table 3.8 Panel B). We also remark that our results for these two sub- 
samples of large deals are significant at the 1% and 5% level in all the event windows 
we examined except the window (-20,0) in Table (3.8) Panel A, where the CAR is 
0.5% significant at the 15% level. 
3.5.3 Bivariate Analysis. 
We have also considered adding more insight into the analysis and therefore, have 
subdivided our sample into sub-samples based on various criteria and deals 
characteristics. After constructing our sub-samples we have also carried out 
significance tests for each sub-sample using z-tests, and finally we examined the 
difference in returns for the sub-samples in various sub-groups, such as merger deals 
vs. acquisition deals. In order to investigate the significance of our results, we 
computed statistical tests for the mean difference returns between sub-samples using 
z-tests for difference in means. 
3.5.3.1 In-Market vs. Cross-Product Deals. 
In our first criterion we split the sample into one sub-sample of M&A between 
commercial banks (in-market deals) and another between commercial banks and other 
financial institutions, such as insurance companies and securities firms and brokerage 
houses (cross-product deals). The weighted-average return for deals between 
commercial banks (table 3.9) is higher than that for cross-product deals in the various 
104 
event windows examined. The difference in returns is significant in the one day and 
two days event windows preceding the announcement day, and in the five and ten 
days following the announcement. This latter result reveals that the return is persistent 
for 10 days after announcement. Moreover the returns in in-market deals are 
characterised by high variability compared to those in cross-product deals. This 
finding is contrary to the outcome reported in Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) 39 . 
The target returns in both sub-samples are all significantly different from zero, and the 
magnitude of the return reaches its maximum value in the large windows of (-20,20) 
and (-20,30) at almost 6%. As for the difference in returns in both sub-samples, it 
seems that, throughout all the event windows examined, the differences in returns are 
almost evenly distributed between the two sub-samples of in-market and cross- 
product deals. But if we consider the (-10,0) event window, as examined by Cybo- 
Ottone and Murgia (2000), we again find contrasting results to theirs since the 
average return to targets in in-market deals is slightly, but significantly, higher than 
the return to targets in cross-product deals (table 3.10). 
The acquirer return (results are reported in table 3.11), on the other hand, is 
significantly different from zero at some event windows only in in-market deals but 
not in cross-product deals where there is no evidence of positive returns. However, as 
in the wei ghted- average returns and the target returns, our findings contrast with those 
of Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000), since first, the acquirer returns, which are 
significantly different from zero, are positive. Second, in the event window (-10,0) the 
acquirer return is positive but not statistically significant. 
-samples for one event window only that 39 Cybo-Ottone and Murcia (2000) examine the returns in sub I 
IS, (- 10,0). 
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We also provide a summary of our findings in the event window (-10,0) according to 
various deals' charactenstics, and we report those In table (3.21). 
The conclusion we get from these findings is that mergers between commercial banks 
are creating higher value to shareholders than mergers based on diversifying the scope 
of banks' operations into insurance business or brokerage and securities services. 
These findings support the market power hypothesis and the synergy hypothesis, so 
that the acquiring bank can succeed in reducing price competition in the market by 
acquiring some of its competitors (see Stigler 1964) and can also benefit from cutting 
operating expenses via economy of scale or consolidating overlapping businesses and 
operations, such as back office operations. Similar results were found by Vander 
Vennet (1999a) in a study that examined the post-merger performance of a sample of 
European banks between 1988-1992. Other findings similar to ours were reported by 
DeLong (1998) who found that a more 'activity focus' merger had positive effect in 
value. Moreover, studies outside of financial services suggest that diversifying M&As 
are generally value-reducing, and that increases in corporate focus are value- 
enhancing (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; John and Ofek, 1995). 
These results seem logical on the basis that, where they have thought it appropriate, 
many banks have already established their own insurance business divisions or 
investment banking arms rather than acquiring these by merging with or taking over 
other firms in the market. 
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3.5-3.2 Acquisition vs. Mergers Deals. 
Our results table (3.12) show consistency with other findings on European bank 
mergers 40 in that merger deals create more overall value to shareholders than 
acquisition deals. On the other hand the target returns are much higher in acquisitions 
deals than in merger deals (table 3.13) so it is also not surprising to notice that a high 
percentage of targets earn positive abnormal returns in acquisition deals. We also 
document positive and significant returns to acquirers in merger deals, while in 
acquisition deals the retums are negative but not statistically significant except in the 
(0,5) and (0,30) event windows (see table 3.14). The mean difference returns between 
the two sub-samples are statistically significant in a few event windows, mainly in the 
various short windows around merger announcement. These findings also support the 
view that bidders overpay in acquisition deals more than in merger deals, which result 
usually in negative or non-positive acquirer return. These results are consistent with 
the hubris hypothesis. 
3.5.3.3 National vs. Cross-Border Deals. 
When we partition our sample geographically we find that cross-border deals are 
creating more value to shareholders than national deals in most of the event widows 
we examined in table (3.15) but the differences are not significantly different from 
zero, except in the (0,5) and (0,10) event windows. 
40 Cybo-Ottone and Murcyla (2000) find imilar results. Vander Vennet (1996 and 1999a) reported an 4-- s 
improvement of post-merger performance for mergers of equal partners but no performance 
improvement for acquisition deals. 
III 
Q) Q) 4.. 1 ýd-i 
>- - -- E ce 
, 6ý -ZJ 
ce , Z: 4ý Q) (U Z 
-ZJ ý_, -u -1i r- C) UU 
c12 4ý mm 
Co 
.-= -z: i , C1 Z c: r -uu UU =-O 
CZ j- 
, rz 
. 
uý r0 
C) 
CD rz 
ý: -"ý >, UE 40 C, 2 Ms cn r -CJ 
ce Z 4ý 
u cn 
(U 
;ý CD cý 
lzz u c02 C) E 
ce 
C, 
11 cz 
c c7, ci 
CZ 
C'2 c: > 4- cn +-i 
-ý 
0 
C, 2 cq U 
ce 
> 
CIJ 
cý$ 
0£4- Z 1., cn C) 
S. w C) 
Q. -A -CJ -0 >u ce U 4.. ä 
zi 
u Z' 
vi 
E 
rz 
ce 
N-., C 
cz ce u C, 2 
CD 
4- ce cz C CD 
Z C-) 
< C) 
cn ce 
ýx ýý cn C) Q) -zi 
> ÖÜ C, 2 
cu 0£ u 
_C CZ cz U 3U 
ce Z CD r> .ýý -0 UU cn < 
, *.. ) cn -, 14 7 ce 
cu 
ý: 1. ) m- .e < CD 
cn 
q) 
a U) IRT CY) (D 0 00 C\l CV) cr) CID 'TT - 0 0 cv) CO U) 0) T. - OD V-- 0 T-- r, - (D - (0 7-- 0 0 0 (0 r, - 0 C) C\j M; t 0 T ýr- CO 0 T-- ItT 0 C) qlT qlT 
0 0 Cl) R: r 0 C) CV) (D a) 0 0 0 0 CV) 
OL C; 0 0 c; 0 6 0 0 C; C; 0 ci 0 0 0 0 C; 
V-_ 
"t (o -: t Cj Rt 0) 00 (0 - 0 r- r-- , co r-- a) m c, j cj 00 m C\j C) 0) 'IT C\j C) r-. 0) cy) (D 0c) C\l CF) T: r o c\j a) r-- c\' 00 C) 00 C\l LO - 0) LO (Y) 
- cv) , (0 0) rý- cý V) Cý "t Lo d , zj- r-- t a) 
Cq - m C\j o o ý) Cý 7 C? C; C\j Cý Lo ,. I- , c) 
U) 
10 --. -o -. -o- --, -o -, -o -0-0 --e -,, -o- -, -o -0-0 -0, ý -0-0- --e --e --e -60, -, -o --e Q, 0 N m N r- 00 N t- C\j r- N LO r- 0 00 0 m LO (D (D (D LO LO Lr) (D LO (D LO LO (0 qT LO 19t 
C) - rl- C) a) ý- CY) 00 ý (D C") ý C> (Y) r- r- LO ' C) 0 (D t'- (D C\l C) 00 (D C\l (D C) C> - r- CY) cy ) 
C> C> C> C) C\l (D 0 0 0 (Y) C) C) C\j M (. 0 U') 
C) C> C) ý LO 00 0 0 0 N 0 0 C) 0 (D LO 
CL c: > c: > C> C: ) c: > o C> CD o CD o C> CD o CD o ci 
4-d C) C) CY) r-- r-- 00 C\j 0 rý- Lo 'T cr) Lo C\l Co 0) (0 (Ij T- Lo 0) ý N CO r- M o ý (O CT Lo " N (O CT Y a) C) N C> , (Y) C) N 'CT 00 ob 0) 0) b Lo C ) - L : 0) rl- (D (D 7 (D (D P- LO - r-- (Y) M (0 j q 
rý zr cr; Cý -* c; 9 C6 Cý Cý C6 4 Cý -: 6 
ýlb 
C*4 4) r- 't C\l LO CY) CD rl- Cf) 0) r- (D C) OD lq: r LO c) - W* Q co C) C\j r- (Y) ý ý*- (D do C\l r- P- r-- 00 CY) (C) C\l 
-r-- (Y) CY) Cf) Nt LO - -r-- C\j C\l C\l C\j (V) CY) qt CD CD C> C) 0 CD 0 0 0 0 CD 0 0 0 CD C> CD 
6 C) C5 6 6 6 o o o o c) 6 6 o 6 6 6 (j) 
IE a 
4) Lo cy) C> CD "T - 
CY) LO Lo 0c) r- (D y C\j 00 - V) - 
C> - M C\j V) r- cc (. 0 C> Lo o ,: I- C> , c, o a -, t o c) o Lo 0 c ) o "t o 5 0 ,t o cm o - 6 o c q) 5 o C5 C5 C> 9 o 0 o o 5 o o C5 C) 0 C) 
o c) C> C> (? C? o o o C) o a o a c cp, 
10 
O>Q lo-ý 10-0 -0-0 C-P -oiý loý lo-ý >0ý C-io- 0-0- -00- -do- 80- -60- (D 06 c) C\j 00 Lo Lo CC) 0) 4 c) 4 00 4 co 4 m 
r- (0 LO (D (D (D (0 (. C) Lf) 'IT LO - r, (c) 'IT (0 r- LO 
0) 
z co (Y) C) C) C) 0 0 0 C) IRT 00 ICT (D 0 0 0 0 (0 C\j C) 0 0 0 0 0 C> 0 (Y) C\j U) C) C) 0 0 
C\l T- C) C) 0 C> CD C> 0 0 CO (D 0 C) 0 0 C, 
C\j (0 C) 0 
. 
C) 
. 
Co 
. 
0 
. 
CD 
. 
0 
. 
0 
. 
r- 
. 
- 
. 
41' 
. 
0 
. 
C> 
. 
C> 
. 
C) 
. 
CL 
. 
0 
. 0 . 0 0 0 C) 0 0 0 0 0 0 C> C) C> (D 0 
. b. 0 LO 0) cr) C) 
(D 
1 (D co (D C\l 0c) r- rl- 
(0 It LO 
(Y) 
a) 0) It C\l co 0 (D 0 cr) 9T U) r- 00 r- (D m Cf) , co CD 00 (o Cý, 1- (7) " Cf) r- 0) (D r- N LF) - - CY) LO C") 0) r-- Lo Cr) 
C ) 00 . LO LO 
C5 P, ý r*-: a; r-ý L6 Cyi 6 C5 Lo 0) c6 P--ý 
(D LO M 0 C\j - It LO P- rý- C) r- C\j (D C\l rl- rl- 
C\J C\j (0 OD rl- 0') C) 0 9t Co C\j rl- (D OD (C) 
T. - -r-- C\j C\l T--- r-- C\l 7-- 7- V-- T. - -r-- 0 0 0 C) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 CD 0 0 
C; C) CD 0 0 0 6 6 6 ci ci ci ci 
E a) co N (o r, C\j r- 0 Lo t- C\j Y cl (D 0 't q- (n to Z 
C\j .* 0 0 (y) (o 'i C\l C\j co , C\l ( ) 0 "t 0 C) 'T C) (b 0 c) C) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 C) 0 q) C) 0 0 0 C) C) 0 0 0 0 0 C) 0 b 0 o Z 
c; c; 9 ci C; 0 c; c; c; 6 C5 c; 6 C? 6 ci C5 
CM Lf) CM CO) =ý 0 0 
0 
- 
0 CM Lf) C-4 m 
t t t . - C 4 ) U :5 T + + + + + Cm Lr) CT 7 . . ' - Cý CT 6 6 6 CT CT C, 4 I N u cc cc cc CC IX: CC CC CC a: Cc 
CC CC CC CC 
L) u 0 LU 
I 12 
9.9 
-*. lb CL) 
u 
kw 
w 
04 
U ý00 C 
EE 
= 4 C3 
C) 
-C 
bi) 03 
(1) 
00) X 
03 
(D -1:: 3 4- 
-Zý 
. 
r- *F 
Ob 
C'3 
r- ýý .2 
C14 
71 
0 
. 
C) E-, 4-j 
. ý:: '!! ý -. 0 
ct 
"t -. (: ) . 
0 .4 
M 
cu 
týo M 
C, 3 .ý7: 3 
z3 
as 
ct 
cn 
4-1 -5 = 
cn 
4J 
cn U -,:: I Z::, 
ý- 5 C, 3 
E 
ll-ý rn 00 
- 7ý3 
-0 Cýs 
7ý 
u 
CIO 
C13 
7: ý 
(D ce) 0 0 00 C\j 0 C) 0 ItT LO ce) 00 0 0 C\l 0) 
-r-- 
(Y) 
C) 
0 
0 
0 
"ýT 
ce) 
7 C\j 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
00 
0 
C\l 
OD 
C\j 
-- 
(0 
0 
0 0 U') 0 
(0 (0 0 0 T. - C\l C) 0 0 CD ICT 
T 
C\j CY) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
C\J 
0 
C\l 
T-- 
C; 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
91 
1; 1 -1 
(A r- Q co 0) (o 0) 00 C\J -, t Lf) -, zr Cio 
CY) 
-- V 
00 C\l M (D CV) LO C\j C\j C\l rl- 0 C\l , r 0) CV) 
. 4 Qc 
Q) 1ý-- 0 LO r- "T 0) q1t , 0) 0) 
ll 
C\j C ) 9 (0 qct LO 'I't CO (0 0 r- ýT C\l C\J 0 
c ) 
(. 0 
C\j 
rý- 
V 
00 
ce) 
, 
Lf) 
ý N (33 'i Cý C; 
00 C ) 
0) 
C\j 
CM 
Lf) 
- ý0 1 
0 -0 CP -0 cP 80- 110-0- 80- 8P -do- I. -p- C-P -00- 1 0-ý 0-ý 6R - -0 -ý -K 0 X 0 C\j r- 0 It r- - (Y) C\j LO (C) LO 'It Iýt 0 CD 0 I'-- 0 rl- 0 LO (0 LO (C) (D Lf) LO Iýt (D LO (C) Lf) (D (D (D LO ICT 'It 
a C) 0 0 0 r- (D C) 0 0 0 Lf) 0 0 C) 0 - 0) 0 0 0 0 0 LO 0 C) 0 0 0 0 0 0 CD LO (D CD 0 0 0 -r-- 0 C) 0 0 C) 0 0 0 0 C) CY) It 0 0 0 0 0 C) (D 0 C) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CL c; ci C; C; C5 ci 6 C; C5 c; C; c; 6 C; 6 c; C; 
4" (a OD C\l LO C\j r- ' (V) 0 C\l - (D Lr) 'IT rl_ C') 0 LO (0 0) a) LO r- CD 05 C ) co Oo LO (0 4 co 0 Nil N r-- - 
0) co r-- 
CR 
LO CO (D LO (0 (D - C\J C\l rl- C') 0 0 ) C\j (0 co c) CS F, Lo r- C: ) C\j c) c) IZT - Itt (0 a) P4 C) Cý (6 4 Cý C\i r,: (6 L6 'i C, 5 c) (6 -i 
1* Q - ICT CIO ý (D (D (C) C\J 0') OD r- C') (0 r- C\j - CC) - r - 
LO 
OC) 
r-_ 
:t 
OD 
00 
00 
LO 
0) 
00 
CF) 
"t 
lq: t 
LO 
lq: t 
(C) 
IRT 
(0 
I: t 
"t 
LO 
(D 
LO 
(D 
rl- 
C\l 
00 
Lo 
00 
r - 
OD 
( ) 
CY) C C) C> 0 0 C) C) C) C) C) 0 0 0 C) 0 0 0 0 
Z C) C5 0 C; C=; C) C) C; C=; C; 6 C; ci C=; C; C; ci (1) 
U) "1- (0 - CT -CT a) C\j '4T -r-- (D r- r- 00 C") (D (D C) Ol ct cc 0 C\J C\J :1 C\j (C) C\j C\l C\J 00 C) LO (0 00 (. 0 (c) (0 (D CD r, - C> Q C) C) C) CD 0 C) C) C) C> C) 0 C> C) C> 0 C> C> 
6 ci 8 C; C) c) 8 o 8 CD 0 o ci ci 0 C> o 
6-01 -60, -. 01 -0-0 --. -0 0--ý C-P, C-P, -. 0- O>Q -0-0 loý -(SO- 10-0- lolý --OR 0-0- C\J 'Rt qT qt -r-- rl- V) LO LO r- f'- C\j C\J P- 'T r*- - 
r-- r, r-- r-- 00 r-- (c) (c) (D (D (D r- r- r- r- r- 00 
4) 
C) C) C) c) C) C) o o CD C) C) C) C) 0 C 0 0 CD C) C) C) 0 C) C) C) 0 0 0 C> 0 0 0 0 0 
C) c) C) o o C) CD C) o 0 0 C> C) 0 C, 0 CD C) C) C) C) C) C) CD C) 0 Co 0 CD 0 0 C> o C) 
CL C; C; C; C; C; C) C) 6 6 C; C) C; ci 6 C; 
C) c; 
4-d 
(a 
C\j 
Lo 
CV) 
,t 
CO 
- 
C\l 
C) 
C\l 
C\j 
r, - 
cy) 
rl- 
ct 
C\J 
r- 
fl- 
C\l 
rl- 
cv) 
(D r', 
co 
C\j 
(7) 
ý- C\J -r-- C\J 
LO 
0) 
r- 
- 
4) CV) , I- I'- (0 
C\j 
00 
0') 
00 0 qct 00 - 
(D q1t 0) 00 
r- 
00 
V) CD 
r- 
C') 
00 (0 Lr) (0 0 ) "1 4 0c) Uý Cý C: ) 'Rt (D 
C 
CD 
I c6 
6 cc; 1-ý C') C\J C:, C a, C C\j 0 71 ý I 7 I C O C\l C\l ý 
? 
C\j 00 CO CV) 0) C\j , OC) a) 0) (0 OC) (0 cr) 00 It LO N C\l OC) LO r. - (C) ,t -, t *- (3) C\j CD 00 CC) 'T 0) co 
U-) (. C) r, (3) , 04 "t "t :t Lo r, ,t Lo F, co a) C5 CD 0 0 0 , , - C: ) C) o 0 0 0 0 C) 0 0 
C) C: ) C) (=> C) o Cý C) C: ) o c, C) C: ) C) C) c-) 
VE 2 
a) r- r- oo a) - ' C\l 00 't 
r- 
" ,t CY) t 'IT - rý CY) 00 
0 co t - C\j 0 C\J t (Y) cv) Lo r- 0 ) 0) T C\l C\l C\j CT (Y) CY) LO (D r- rý- 0 0 0 (D C) C) C) d o (D 0 C) 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 C) C) 0 C; C; 0 C; C; C; c; c; ci o C) 
cm Lc) cm CS - - - 'CM Lf) CM CV) 
ci L6 d d d cm 0 0 T 6 6 I 
I 
cm 
I 
cm 
I 
C 
LL, CC Ir 13C cc cc cc a: cc m cc Icr ý.; < < < cr m cc < 4 < < < < < < < < < C) L) 0 L) L) C-) 
113 
c 
cn cn 
4. 
C 
_c ý- A < c> ý2 
cl 
u 
U Z) Z: 
-ci r- 
r_ Q) 
cu 
"£-- -4.. 1 CD Gn 
cn 
Z -(5 cz CD 
< cli 
C) E 4- M Vý 
4- 
. - 
cli 
4ý 
CD - >, kg U -. cj cu u -2 U- 44 
9.9 c14 ms 
QEE ý- u ce 1. ) 
ý1 -- cn VD J-- 'Z 
CD 
0 t4- Q) CZ Z 
. mm m- -c 
C Gn -u 
c 
CD 
CZ 
> 
ge -K-- C: r u E- - cl, CZ C) C 
4b- 
CD 
4- 
9.0 Z QJ ci 
40.. cz 
x 7ý E Z_- 
cn -3 'Z: -i 
> 
C) CZ 
1. ) Q) C) 7: ) 
CD ý-w ý- u CD. u 
C - CD 0 (D e C) Ln xt CO c» 00 - CM 00 (V) CM 2 CO 00 OD N C» 11- CD LO CD (D Ul) m OD LD LO OD ce) C) 
(0 fý- (D e Cr) (D 00 0 (0 CM 9-- OD M CO - cm Lo OD 00 o cm m (D r-- (D o CD ce) r, - OD U tu c). 6 CD 6 6 6 CD 6 0 6 6 CD CD CD ä CD CD 6 
CD 00 (D 0) Li) e (D 9-- CM OD LO 00 CM t-- r1- CM (7) CM (D le cr) -r- OD (D (0 (0 c\I (0 0) c1r) CD 0 
F 
LO 
ý 
(0 LO gt 0 (D OD (0 -r- (» OD CM CM e e le 
cu 7 r - Lx) LO CU CM T- Cýi 00 ul CU - le r1- 00 M CNJ 
Q) N ci 6 6 cý 1: ä c; c; CM cq c; (5 6 
0 -0-0- --0-0 10-9 -0- -. 0, -601 0-0- -. -0 1. -2 0>2 -0-0- -CiO- 1-0-2 1-0-2 100- o>O- o>O- 0. CD CM - U') (N r1- C) U') CD U') r- LO C) CD CO CD CO 
,2 ', 't LO r, - LO (0 U') U') xt (0 U') LO 'Kt U-) U') le LO le 
a) 
2 (C) CD C#') cr) OD OD C%i CM LO r, - II: t le CD r- r- . 
r-_ 00 
- N o C: ) C: ) cm c» C: ) cm o (0 e a c> Co U ) Lo aý m CD C) CD -r-- OD OD C) CD CD u) r1- ý 0 0 0 le N cý 0 CD CD CD e 0 CD CD CD (D (D CD 0 0 , c» 
CD 0 ä a c) c) 0 o CD c) a C: ) C: ) CD c) (D C: ) 
(#) - (Y) Kt r-- CY) (0 C» 1 
01) r- r- 
- 
CY) M (0 LO 0 0 -r- 
r, - (0 (D r, - lKt (D 0 ) C: ) (0 U ) CO cr) 0 C\i r, - LO OD 
F CD CM (D (0 . 
m 
- 
M LC) 
- 
(0 0) C: ) 00 
- 
(0 
- 
CD (D (0 LO OD 
7 
N 
cý 
m 
co 
e 
(D 
Co 
U ) 
ci 
r - 
, 
(0 
c5 
r - 
c, ) 
c> 
Co 
e 
co 
25 r - u ) 
cm 
(D 
e 
m 
cm 
r- 
cm 
e 
ý 
c) 
a 
CY 0 ul C: ) LO M M M (0 M r-- le LO 00 Ln y-- r- (0 00 qt 12 U-) ý CD ý t-- r1- ý -r-- LO M LO M CD CO Ce) LO e CM CO cr) le le LO CM CM CM CM (V) CM 0) Cm cr) CY) 't 11 12 C) 0 0 C: ) C: ) CD C: ) C) C: ) (D C) (D (D C) C) C) CD 
Z 1- a ä c; ä (D c) c; ä c; ä ä a CD CD a CD c) 
h. 
0) T C» (D r-- ý M (0 C» T- -r- r-- M xt CY) 0 CC) C) 
cn ' 
(L) t43 LO 00 (0 (0 ý M CO r, - CY) LO - le CI) (0 CM CM Co 0 C) CD CD CD CD CD (D C) CD (D 0 C) CD 
0 (D CD (D CD CD CD C) C C) CD C) C) C) C) CD C) 
m cl tu CD CD C) C) CD C) (D C) C) (D CD CD (D C) CD CD c? 
a) 
0 -0-0 äo- 10-2 -62 ýd2 10-2 C-iC-) -0-2 cäc2 10-0 -. -2 -0-0 -. o- 10-2 C-PI v- r- OD r1- M LO M r1- ý LC) ý CY) CV) e 0) CY) C) 
LE) 't cy) e "t e e e LO Nt LD LO LO Cy) "t e 't 
4) 00 r1- CD M - r, - C\J - (D C» - e (0 CM (D - 00 0) 0) -r-- 'Kt e CM (0 CM - - C» CO C) CM -r- M CO A C) 0 CM CM (D r-- - M xt M xt r, - le C: ) U-) (0 (0 CM (0 -r- CO (D - r, - C» LO (0 CY) C) CM CD CM "t CD 
> 0 6 c; ä CD CD 6 C: ) C: ) (D 6 C: ) (5 (Z; 6 ä (D 
T- Lo LO P- C, 3 (0 (D (» e - OD CV) U) LO U') r, - Igt e CD Q U') le CO r) M C) C» (V) C) CO (0 (0 CO CO 0) LO ýr- Lt) OD (V) (D (0 C) , r, - (0 M r, - (0 Ilt M U) LO LO C» e cr) CO C: ) (0 gý CD r, - - CD - r, - CO 
N 1 
c5 
1 
(5 
1 
CD 
8 
CD c5 9 c; 
1 , 8 
m 
6 , 8 
ci 
6 
r%- t- r- (0 C) t r1- C» 00 CD r, - CO CO U') - - (0 y-- > 0 Cm Co 0 F-- u-) (0 r-- C) cm (0 0) cu r- OD - (-) 
a) -r- ýr- CM CM M CD CD - - - CD - - - C\J (v) 0 0 0 C) 0 0 0 0 0 CD C) a CD CD CD (D CD 
0 CD c5 0 c; 0 C: ) c; c) C: ) ä 6 c5 CD 6 C: ) 6 
- ' CO c» 00 e CD OD r- CU M r1- - xt U ) LO U ) t-- U') 
cm 't e e 0) CD CD C) - - CM CM (D CY) (Y) M 
c) CD (D 0 Q 0 C) CD C) CD CD CD CD CD (D CD (D 
, 
CD CD 0 (D CD 0 0 (D C: ) cý C: ) (D CD 0 CD CD 0 ru C ä ä c) 0 (D 0 CD CD C) (? C? 0 CD (D C: ) 0 C: ) 0) 
0 
Z 
cm u-) r4 m - c - 0 - 0 CD - 
o T- CM U) 
c) CD 
% 
CD 
V ý 
, 6 CD 
6 . . . v-. . 
C i 
. 
C ) 
. cr Cm Lo 0 6 8 
C 4 
1 
L 
8 T-- c4 0 0 0 CM (4 6 6 6 
0 0 0 
114 
However, in the announcement period windows, (4,1), (4,0), (0,1) and the (-5,0) 
national deals perform better than cross-border deals but mean difference returns are 
significant only in the (-1,0) window. It seems that the return does not persist for too 
long after the announcement of the merger between national banks so that the returns 
are being negated from 5 days after the announcement. On the other hand the return 
in cross-border deals is persistently positive and peaks 20 days after the merger 
announcement at almost 1.3%. Moreover, in the (0,5) and the (0,10) event windows 
the return in cross-border deals is significantly higher than the return in national deals. 
Therefore, dunng the announcement of the merger (-1,0) it seems that the market does 
not believe that geographic diversification is beneficial for these institutions. But later 
on in the (0,5) and (0,10) event window it seems that the findings are consistent with 
the geographical diversification hypothesis where banks are seeking profitable, 
positive net present value, investments, and spreading their risk geographical IY41 
These findings of higher returns in cross-border deals are driven by similar results for 
target firms where returns are significantly higher than those in national mergers, (see 
table 3.16). On the other hand acquirers shareholders in cross-border deals are eaming 
higher returns than their counterparts in national deals, but difference in returns is not 
significantly different from zero (table 3.17). Our results, qualitatively speaking, are 
consistent with those of Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) except for the weighted- 
average returns, where they find that national deals earn higher return than cross- 
border deals in the (-10,0) event window. 
" For more details on the advantages of international expansion in the financial services industry see 
Goldberg and Saunders (1980), (1981) a, (1981) b, Hultman and McGee (1989), and Aguilar (1994). 
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Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) explained their results by saying that the relative 
average size, target to bidder, in cross-border deals is much lower than that M national 
dealS42. We report lower difference in average relative size between both sub-samples 
(49.6% in national deals and 34.4% in cross-border deals) for the period of 1987- 
1999, and when we restrict our analysis to the period 1988-1997 the average relative 
size we find is 45% in national deals and 16% in cross-border deals, yet we still 
observe that cross-border deals earn higher average returns than national deals. 
However, when we examine the return to targets in both sub-samples we find that the 
relative target returns, cross-border to national deals, is 2.24 times while in Cybo- 
Ottone and Murgia (2000) it is only 1.33 times. In other words, the difference in target 
returns between cross-border deals and national deals is much larger than that 
reported by Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000). Therefore we still report higher retums 
in cross-border deals though not significantly different from the return in national 
deals. 
3.5.3.4 The Relationship between the Method of Payment and 
Abnormal Returns. 
We partition our sample based on the method of payment as we believe this factor, 
which has not been examined in the European banking merger context, would provide 
new evidence on the financing decisions of banking mergers. We partition the sample 
into three sub-samples, one sub-sample for deals settled in cash, another for deals 
settled in equity and a third one for deals settled in a combination of equity, cash and 
loan notes. We have also examined the mean difference return between every two 
sub-samples and tested for the statistical significance of the results. 
42 They report average relative size for cross-border deals of 10.8%, and for national deals of 33.7%. 
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We observe from table (3.18) that for deals settled in cash the weighted average 
returns are positive and significantly different from zero in most of the event windows 
we examined, the returns persist in the longer event window and peaks in the (-20,30) 
event window at 1.52%. These returns for cash settled deals are higher than the 
returns earned in deals settled in pure equity exchange in almost all the event 
windows except the (-5,0) where the mean difference return is not significantly 
different from zero anyway (see table 3.18 Panel B). On the other hand, these returns 
are lower than the returns found for deals settled in a mix of cash, equity and loan 
notes in most of the event windows, but not for the long period event windows, such 
as the (-10,10), (-20,20) and (-20,30) windows. That is, the returns for mixed deals do 
not persist more than 10 days after the merger announcement. These findings for the 
weighted-average returns are driven by the target shareholders returns, which are 
higher than returns for equity deals but lower than the gains achieved by shareholders 
in mixed deals in short event windows (table 3.19). Again we find that the target 
shareholders returns in cash deals are persistently higher than in mixed deals for large 
event windows beyond 21 days around the merger announcement and peaking at 8.2% 
in the (-20,20) window. 
However, considering the acquirer shareholders returns, we found that in cash and 
mixed deals acquirer shareholders incur negative returns (table 3.20), which are not 
significantly different from zero except for the (0,30) event window for mixed deals, 
where the returns to acquirers drop to -2.3% (significant at the 5% level). On the 
other hand the acquirers shareholders in equity deals earn positive returns on average 
that accumulate to their highest level of 1% in the (-5,5) event window. These returns 
1-16 
to acquirer shareholders in equity deals are not significantly different from zero for all 
the event windows that we examined 5 days beyond the announcement of the merger. 
Our findings of higher returns in cash deals compared to equity deals are consistent 
with previous findings in the literature. Some studies in the banking literature reported 
that both returns to target shareholders and wei ghted- average returns, in cash deals are 
higher than in equity exchange offers (Baradwaj et al., 1990). In addition Beatty et al., 
(1987) and Rogowski and Simonson (1987) have found a positive relationship 
between cash transactions and the bid premium. Similar findings have been reported 
for non-banking mergers, e. g. Gordon and Yagil (1981); Wansley, Lane and Yang 
(1983); Eckbo and Langohr (1986); Niden (1986); Huang and Walkling (1987); 
Franks, Harris and Mayer (1988); Queen (1989); Franks, Harris and Titman (1991). 
On the other hand Cornett and De (1991a, 1991b) find no statistically significant 
difference in the excess returns earned in bank mergers involving cash offers and 
stock offers. 
Our findings of positive returns to acquirers in equity deals are consistent with 
findings, in the non-banking industry, by Allen and Sirmans (1987), Franks, Harris 
and Mayer (1988) and Chang (1998). Chang (1998) found, for stock bidders acquiring 
privately held targets, a two-day positive return of 2.64% and insignificant 0.09% 
return for cash bidders. On the other hand other studies in the literature, which 
reported contrasting findings, include Travlos (1987), Sudarsanam, Holl and Salami 
(1996), and Loughran and Vijh (1997). However, when we investigated every 
individual acquirer returns we were able to identify two outliers where the abnormal 
returns were highly positive. When we removed these two outliers (TSB bank and 
UBS), we observed overall negative average returns for the acquirers shareholders in 
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equity deals, a result which is consistent with the majority of the studies in the 
literature. 
We, finally, argue that the higher abnormal returns observed in mixed deals could be 
due to the small size of the sub-sample of mixed deals of II targets and the very small 
percentage of targets with negative abnormal returns, which drove the average CAR 
to be higher than the CAR in cash deals. 
3.6 Conclusion. 
In this chapter we used event study methodology to examine the market reaction to 
102 merger announcements in the European financial services industry between 1987 
and 1999; we report positive returns for targets in various event windows that we 
examined, while the returns to acquirers vaned across the deal type and the various 
event windows. We find that bank to bank deals are more rewarding than cross- 
product deals that are based on diversifying the scope of the banks operations into 
insurance business or brokerage and securities services, and that merger deals earn 
higher returns than acquisition deals. Our results confirm the findings of Vander 
Vennet (1999a) in a study that examined the post-merger performance of a sample of 
European banks merger between 1988-1992. 
Contrary to Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000), we find that the market reacts more 
positively to cross-border mergers than to national mergers, except for the 
announcement period event window (-1,0) where the market believed that marriages 
based on gaining market power are more profitable than those based on geographical c -ý 
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diversification. We also found that higher returns are generated for deals settled in a 
combination of cash, equity and loan notes compared to cash deals, while equity 
settled deals generating the lowest return. 
Our findings seem consistent with the argument that we showed earlier in chapter two 
that the intense competition and the pressure on profitability are encouraging banks to 
consolidate their market position. Banks seem to have planned to benefit from in- 
market consolidation and mergers of equal deals to exploit scale economy and 
synergistic gains rather than economies of scope. 
On the other hand one remarkable finding is the low positive abnormal returns to 
target shareholders as compared to other findings in the literature of bank merger. The 
high competition in the market and the pattern of decreasing profitability in the 
banking industry in Europe is spreading a gloomy picture of the future of performance 
in general. This fact is urging acquirers to be cautious in bidding for target banks; 
hence they are not overbidding compared to the USA bank mergers. We argue that the 
objective from these bank mergers is to consolidate market position and improve 
efficiency in order not to suffer from profitability deterioration. Having said that and 
since the low positive target returns in the literature is peculiar, we believe it is quite 
interesting to examine the factors that make some target banks earn higher returns 
than other targets. Therefore, our next step is to search for the determinants of target 
retums. We dedicated chapter four to accomplish this task. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
DETERMINANTS OF TARGET RETURNS 
4.1 Introduction. 
After we examined the abnormal returns associated with bank mergers in Europe, we 
also examined the effect of the deal characteristics on the target and acquirer returns 
and on the wel ghted- average returns. We observed low positive returns to target 
shareholders and explained that these findings stem from the fact that acquirers are 
not encouraged to pay high prices for target banks since the profitability of the 
financial services industry in Europe is under a great pressure coming from the 
increased competition. The competition is also expected to be more intense as the 
financial services industry is still undergoing a long restructuring process, which is 
mainly represented by more consolidation in the market (Vander Vennet, 1999a). We 
will now indulge more deeply into the analysis in order to understand and try to shed 
some light on the variability of the returns to targets. In other word, we try to explain 
cross-sectional variation in these returns, by examining, in addition to deal 
characteristics, the financial determinants of target banks abnormal returns in 
European mergers. 
The importance of doing this analysis stems from the fact that we observed a gap i I in 
the literature on European bank mergers. Moreover, most of the studies in the USA 
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tend to examine the determinants of merger premium rather than the determinants of 
target excess returns, and even these studies are not numerous and do not provide 
conclusive evidence for the USA, let alone for Europe. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: we discuss the findings of some of the 
studies in the USA that examined the determinants of merger returns and premium 
paid in section two. In section three we explain the methodology we use and the 
sample design, in section four we present the determinants that we use to predict the 
target return. We report our findings in section five and we conclude in section six. 
4.2 Review of the previous empirical evidence. 
Many studies have examined the financial determinants of firms engaged in mergers. 
One of the early ones is Palepu (1986) who compares 163 non-financial firms that 
were acquired during 1971 and 1979 with 256 firms that were not acquired. He found 
that the target firms were characterised by lower growth, lower liquidity, and lower 
leverage than the non-acquired firms. Some other studies, discussed below, examined 
the determinants of the merger premium and searched for certain financial 
characteristics before merger. 
Those studies reached contrasting conclusions in many of the financial characteristics 
that they examined. 
The evidence reported by researchers on the effect of profitability is mixed. Palia 
(1993) and Beatty et al (1987) find a positive relationship between the target's 
profitability and the bid premium, whereas Cheng et al., (1989), Rhoades (1987), 
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Rogowski and Simonson (1989) and Houston and Ryngaert (1994) do not find any 
significant relationship. Fraser and Kolari (1987) also find a significant relationship, 
which is more pronounced in banks with assets of less than $100 Million. Cheng et 
al., (1989) find also a negative relationship between the bid premium and the 
acquirer's profitability, whereas Rhoades (1987) reports no significant relationship. 
On the other hand, Wall and Gup (1989) find a negative relationship between the 
excess returns eamed by the acquirer and the target's profitability. 
Banks' capital ratios have also been examined. Fraser and Kolan (1987), Palia (1993), 
and Beatty et al (1987) find a negative relationship between the target's capital-to- 
assets ratio and the bid premium, although Rhoades (1987) and Rogowski and 
Simonson (1989) do not find any significant relationship. The negative relationship 
between the bid premium and the c apital-to-as sets ratio, found in Fraser and Kolari 
(1987), Palia (1993), and Beatty et al (1987), might be explained by acquirers 
considering high capital -to- assets ratio as a negative point since there is idle capital 
which is not invested in the market. 
Evidence is also mixed conceming the loan quality. Cheng et al., (1989) find that the 
percentage of chargeoffs to total loans 43 in a target bank is positively related to the bid 
premium, whereas Rogowski and Simonson (1987) find that loans to earning assets 
ratio is positively related. However, Beatty, Santomero and Smirlock (1987) find that 
acquirers paid less premium for targets with high (loan loss allowance + equity 
capital) to total assets, but Palia (1993) found no relationship using the chargeoffs to 
assets and the loan loss provisions to assets ratios. 
43 Cheng et al., (1989) use the chargeoffs to total loans as a proxy for the loan quality and it is the loan 4-1 C, 
losses to total loans. 
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On the other hand, studies that examined the target growth rate (Rhoades, 1987; 
Cheng et aL, 1989; Rogowski and Simonson, 1989; and Palia, 1993) did not find a 
significant relationship with the bid premium, and Wall and Gup (1989) did not find a 
significant relationship between the target growth rate and the target abnormal return. 
From these findings it seems that the target growth rate is not an attractive factor for 
acquirers - possibly because as the 'higgeldy-piggeldy growth' literature shows, 
growth rates tend not to be sustainable over time. Acquirers would probably put 
more importance on other performance-related factors such as the quality of assets or 
profitability or even the presence in certain business sectors such as retail loans or 
commercial loans. 
The relative size target to acquirer was also examined; Palia (1993), Rogowski and 
Simonson (1989), and Cheng et al., (1989), found a negative relationship between the 
bid premium and the relative size of target to acquirer. On the other hand Lobue 
(1984), Trifts and Scanlon (1987), James and Weir (1987a), and Kaen and Tehranian 
(1989) reported a positive relationship between the acquirer's excess returns and the 
relative size target to acquirer, while other studies reported a negative or nsIgnficant 
relationship (Wall and Gup 1989; Cornett and De 1991a). High target to acquirer 
assets might be seen as a negative point since large targets may involve a great 
challenge for the acquiring firms to transfer its own culture and invest in technology, 
however when the acquirer excess return is found to be positively related to the 
relative size target to acquirer this can be explained as large targets provide the 
opportunity to achieve scale economies which may not be achievable if the target is 
not large enough compared to the acquirer. C) kt) 
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Other studies incorporated other non-financial characteristics in the analysis, for 
example: Beatty, Santomero and Smirlock (1987), and Rogowski and Simonson 
(1989) found a positive relationship between cash transactions and the bid premium. 
This finding is consistent with higher target abnormal returns in cash deals than in 
equity deals. 
Palia (1993) and Beatty et al., (1987) find a positive relationship between the bid 
premium and the restrictive branching legislation in the target bank's state. Palia 
(1993) also found a positive relationship between the bid premium and interstate 
merger deals, and he found evidence for the entrenchment hypothesis for target banks, 
44 
and the diversification-control hypothesi s for the acquirer banks. That is, the 
relationship between the bid premium and the level of management ownership in the 
target banks was positive at low levels of ownership and then turned out to be 
negative at more than 48.32% of managerial ownership level. As for the acquirer bank 
management, the relationship of managerial ownership with the bid premium was 
negative and then changed to positive at more than 5.9% of management ownership. 
44 Diversification in this context is the manager's career-risk diversification. Palia (1993) explains that 
managers of a bank generally have limited financial wealth and a stock of human wealth that is often 
industry specific and non-di versi fi able. At low level of managerial ownership the managers' interest is 
*11 al*cned with the shareholders' interest therefore the relationship between the merger premium and sti I t__ 
their ownership level is negative but when their ownership increases to a certain level, so that they 
become significant shareholders, they begin to hold a large undiversified financial portfolio in the bank. In 
To reduce the risk of their undiversified financial portfolio the managers engage in mergers. The 
managers do not sell their stake in the market as they want to retain the benefit of controlling the bank. 
If manaaers value control, their incentive to diversify their undiversified financial portfolio i L_ i increases as 
their ownership level increases, resulting in a higher merger premium. On the other hand the argument 
for the managers of the target bank is that the manager with low ownership is motivated to diversify his 
career risk through product and geographic diversification, as long as the acquirer assures the target 
manager of continued employment. Hence he would be more willing to accept a lower bid than a 4-- 
mana, _, er with a large stake in the bank who is more concerned with his financial stake and would t, 
consequently want a higher premium. C_ 
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Finally, one main explanation for the contrasting findings of some of these studies 
may stem from the fact that they examine samples of different size, geographic 
location and period. For example, Cheng et al., (1989) studied 135 mergers in the 
Southeast region of the USA for the period 1981 to July 1986, Rhoades (1987) 
examined 1835 bank merger for the period 1973 to 1983, while Fraser and Kolan 
(1987) analysed 132 bank mergers in 1985 only. Moreover, the method of calculating 
the financial variables might drive the results as well for example, Cheng et al., (1989) 
used five-year pre-merger average of target banks profitability, they also used growth 
variables calculated as the end of the prior year's values divided by the variables' 
values five years prior to the merger. Whereas Palia (1993) used the return on assets 
(ROA) for one year pre-merger and the average growth over the five years preceding 
the merger. 
We also believe that one main disadvantage of these studies is that they defined the 
bid premium as the ratio of the deal value to the book value of assets and not to the 
market value of assets, the reason being that their samples included banks which are 
not publicly listed in the stock exhange. 
4.3 Sample design and Methodology. 
4.3.1 Sample Design. 
We start by matching targets and acquirers data from the initial sample that we 
studied in the previous chapter. That is, 76 targets and acquirers that merged between 
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Jan 1987 and Nov 1999 in Europe. The next step was to search for the accounting data 
for these banks and firms one year before merger. Our main data sources were the 
FitchIbca BankScope CD and the annual reports available on Laser D. Although our 
sample comes for various countries with differing accounting regulations, we believe 
the accounting data are comparably consistent across the whole sample for two 
reasons. The first is that the financial statements in FitchIbca BankScope CD are 
reported in a unified global format. The second reason is that the data that we 
collected from other sources, that is the Lazer D, was added to the FitchIbca database, 
hence it was converted automatically and instantly to the same unified global format, 
45 
using built-in software provided by the BankScope CD . Therefore, the issue of 
differing accounting regulation is not a source of concern in our sample. Because 
accounting data was not available for all the merging parties in our sample, the final 
number of deals dropped to 66 deals for which we have all the data needed for the 
analysis in this chapter. 
4.3.2 Descriptive Statistics (the Ex-ante condition). 
In Table (4.1) we report descriptive statistics for our sample and observe that in terms 
of size acquirers are much larger than targets, which is consistent with the evidence of 
non-bank mergers as well. However, regarding pre-merger performance, it seems 
acquirers are much more profitable than targets in terms of ROAA and ROE. This is 
consistent with the notion that targets are characterised by inefficient management 
which make them vulnerable to be taken over by more efficient management. 
45 FitchIBCA BankScope CD is a major source of database for Banks financial statements, many 
papers have used this source Includinco, Vander Vennet (1996), Bilcker (1999), Maudos, Pastor. Perez 
and Quesada (1999a), and Vander Vennet (1996 and 1999a). 
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Moreover, looking at efficiency in terms of the 'Cost to Income' ratio and 'Non- 
Interest Expenses / Average Assets 9, it seems the same conclusion can be reached. 
These findings are consistent with findings reported by Berger and Humphrey (1992), 
Altunbas et al., (1995), Berger (1998), and Rhoades (1998) and is cons'stent with the 
inefficient management theory. However, concerning capitalisation, it seems that 
targets and acquirers are well capitalised (capital ratio is over 8%, as required by the 
Bank for International Settlement) with an observation that acquirers enjoy slightly 
higher capital ratios than the targets, which might imply that solid capitalisation might 
not be an attractive issue which acquirers may consider when merging or acquiring 
another bank as long as both have good capital base. 
Loan quality seems also another factor of similarity between both parties, although 
acquirers have slightly higher 'Loan loss reserves / Gross loans' ratio, which may be 
attributable to a more conservative policy from the bank rather than a bad loan quality 
portfolio. On the other hand it seems that acquirers are not as aggressive as targets in 
terms of their exposure to the lending market since targets seem to have invested other 
financial resources on top of the deposits they have to grant loans and advances to the 
public. Examining this factor in line with a similar loan quality situation, we believe 
this might have been a factor that acquirers considered in order to decide on the 
merger decision. Acquiring banks with high loan to deposits ratio provides acquirers 
with an opportunity to increase their loan portfolio with a good loan quality portfolio 
in a relatively fast way. As for the growth history, it seems that targets are more 
aggressive in the market than acquirers in terms of assets and deposits growth. This is 
another means of faster growth for the acquirers through merging with targets which 
have a better history of growth. However, considering the Total Assets growth figure, 41-71 
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we notice that acquirers have been doing slightly better than targets. But taking this 
figure with the total customer loan growth figure, we observe that the part of assets 
that the acquirers have been increasing faster than the targets, is fixed assets and 
maybe investment in technology. Finally, in terms of market valuation with respect to 
book value of equity, it seems that acquirers and targets show, on average a Market / 
Book value of equity ratio which is very close to unity. We suspect that this ratio has 
any explanatory power for the motive of merger in general. 
4.3.3 Methodology. 
We can gain more insights from examining the association between the magnitude of 
the abnormal returns earned by target banks and certain characteristics, financial and 
non-financial. Cross-sectional regression model is an appropriate too] to investigate 
this association and has been used by most of the studies that performed such an 
exercise before (e. g. Beatty et al., 1987, Fraser and Kolari, 1987, Cheng et al. (1989), 
and Palia, 1993). 
The cross-sectional regression model that we used is the following: 
CARi = 60 + 81X]i + 
82Xý? 
i . ..... ++ 
8MXMi + F-j- 
Where, CAR is the independent variable, which is the target (-20,0) CAR with i 
number of observations. 
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Xmi represents the dependent variables, that is, the various characteristics that we are 
examining through their association with the target CAR, i=i is the number of 
observations, i. e. banks and firms in the sample, and M=I, -, M is the number of 
characteristics. We discuss these factors and the theoretical reasoning for using them 
in the next section. 
8m represents the regression coefficients that determine the explanatory power of each 
variable. F-i is an error term of the regression equation. 
To counter possible problems of multicol linearity we employ a test suggested by 
Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980). The eigenvalues and condition indeX46 figures are 
reported in table (4.4), the rule being that if the condition index is less than 31.62 
(square root of 1000), multicol linearity is not a problem for the independent variables 
in our mode, 47. 
We have also computed all standard errors F-i using the heteroskedasticity-consistent 
method of White (1980)48. 
46 We obtained the calculation of the Eigenvalues and Condition Index using the SPSS statistical 
package. 
47 This same test was also utilised by Davidson and Cheng (1997) 
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4.4 The Cross-Sectional Regression Variables 
To search for the determinants of target abnormal returns, we look at a number of 
factors, which we explain below in more detail. 
a) Proritability Variables. 
Profitability is the major determinant of performance and therefore target banks that 
are highly profitable are valuable in the market and attract a higher price from the 
acquiring banks. Therefore, someone would expect a positive relationship between the 
targets abnormal returns and its pre-merger profitability. The most popular 
profitability measures used in the literature are the ROA (Return On Assets, or Return 
On Average Assets) and the ROE (Return on Equity or Return On Average Equity). 
We use the ROA only, to reduce the problem of multicollinearity 49 , and not the ROE 
since the ROE might be misleading as banks have different leverage ratios cross- 
sectionally. Moreover, we also use the relative profitability growth of the target to the 
acquirer. This is another variable which we expect to be positively related to the target 
excess return since acquirers are willing to pay higher price for targets which 
outperform them in the market than targets which do not. 
b) Capital Adequacy Variables. 
The capitalisation of a financial institution is one of the most important determinants 
of its soundness and stability as these institutions hold large amount of debts, mainly 
48 To perform the White (1980) method of heteroskedasticity consitent t-statistics we used the 
econometrics package E-views. We also provide in Appendix B more explanation of the nature and the 
remedy procedure for multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity in the cross-sectional regression. 
49 The same procedure was followed by Cheng et al., (1989). 
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in the forms of deposits, as compared to non-financial institutions. Moreover, as 
financial institutions are also involved in credit granting and providing various 
financial services to the public, they are subject to risk taking in the process of 
operations. The risks taken by banks are, interest rate risks, market risk, credit risk, in 
addition to operational and technology risk, foreign exchange risk, sovereign risk, and 
liquidity nsk 50 . The primary means of protection against the risk of insolvency and 
failure, created by one or all of the risks cited above, is the financial institution's 
capital. Regulation requires financial institutions to keep a minimum amount of 
capital as collateral against risk-taking activities. In early, 1989, in accordance with 
the international Basle agreement, a new set of capital requirements was introduced 
and then the Bank for International Settlement fully implemented two nsk-based 
capital ratios on January 1,1993. The table below shows the specifications of capital 
categories. An explanation of the two ratios follows. 
Table (4.2): Total Capital Ratio Standards 51 - 
Zone Total Risk-Based Ratio Tier I Risk-Based Ratio 
1. Well Capitalised 10% or above And 6% or above 
2. Adequately capitalised 8% or above And 4% or above 
3. Undercapitalised Under 8% Or Under 4% 
4. Significantly Under 6% Or Under 3% 
undercapitallsed 
5. Critically undercapitalised 2% or under Or 2% or under 
Total risk-based capital ratio = Total Capital (Tier I+ Tier 11)/ Risk-adjusted assets 
50 Check Saunders, A. Financial Institutions Management, a modern perspective, third edition, Mc- 
Graw-Hill, 1999 for a deep analysis and discussion of various risks in the financial institutions' 
business and methods to manage these risks. 
51 Saunders (1999). 
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Tier I capital ratio = Tier I capital (or Core capital)/ Risk-adjusted assets. 
Tier I capital is defined as Common Shareholders' Equity plus Perpetual Preferred 
Stock plus minority interest in equity accounts of consolidated subsl*dl*an*es less 
Goodwill. Total Capital includes Tier I Capital plus a bank's loan loss reserves up to 
maximum of 1.25% or risk-adjusted assets plus various convertible and subordinated 
debt instruments. Risk-Adjusted Assets figure is comprised of two components: Risk- 
adjusted on balance sheet assets and Risk ad . usted off balance sheet assets 
52 
J 
A number of studies have incorporated capital ratios of the target banks into the 
analysis of its relationship with the bid premium. However, as far as we know none of 
the event studies have included the target or acquirer bank's capital ratios in their 
analysis. We, therefore, believe that acquirers might be attracted to acquire targets of 
high capitalisation and highly value their capital standing and soundness, therefore we 
expect a positive sign between the target abnormal returns and its capital ratio. On the 
other hand, acquirers might also consider that although banks with high capitalisation 
are stable and relatively safer than banks with lower capital ratios, yet they may see 
high capitalisation as a negative point in the sense that a high capital ratio might be an 
indication that the target bank is using capital inefficiently and therefore the expected 
sign is negative. This argument is consistent with the suggestions of Rogowski and 
Simonson (1987), Fraser and Kolan (1987), and Beatty, Santomero, and Smirlock 
(1987). In addition to the Total Capital Ratio, we also employ the relative Total 
Capital Ratio (Target to Acquirer) 53 to examine the effect of the relative capitalisation 
on the excess returns of the target banks. 
The definitions are cited from Saunders, A. Financial Institutions Management, a modern IIII Cý 
perspective. third edition, Mc-Graw-Hill, 1999, pages 454 and 456. 
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0 Loan Ouality Variables. 
Loan quality is one of the major determinants of bank performance; acquirers would 
pay a higher price to add a good quality loan portfolio to their existing portfolio of 
investments. Previous studies have used many ratios as a proxy to measure the loan 
quality effect on the bid premium paid to target banks. The ratios which have been 
used include, Total Chargeoffs to Total Assets, Non-performing loans to Total Assets, 
and the ratio of Loan loss Provisions or Loan loss Reserves to Total assets. We use 
the ratio of Loan Loss Reserves to Gross Loans as the proxy for loan quality. We 
argue, as Palia (1993) did, that the expected sign is ambiguous, as a high ratio might 
signal that the remaining loan portfolio is of a dubious quality and therefore the 
expected sign would be negative. On the other hand, high ratio may also indicate a 
conservative policy by the target bank taking precautions for future losses. We also 
employ two more variables, the Loan Loss Provisions to Net Interest Revenue of the 
target and the relative ratio target to acquirer and we believe that the sign is also 
ambiguous for the same reasons. 
d) Deposits Utilisation Variables. 
In order to measure how the bank is making good use of the resources available on its 
balance sheet we introduce the ratio of Total Customer Loans to Total Deposits. 
Acquirers are willing to increase the efficiency of using the resources available for 
them and therefore they would be attracted to acquire targets with high ratio of Loans 
to Deposits. Therefore, we expect to find a positive relationship between the target 
excess retums and this vaiiable. We do not know of any study that used this vanable 
before. 
53 This is the Total Capital Ratio of the target bank divided by that of the acquiring bank 
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e) Growth Variables. 
Growth is one of the main concerns for managers and merger and acquisition is one of 
the ways for fast growth. Moreover, in the 1980's merger participants in the USA may 
well have placed more emphasis on asset growth and geographic market extension 
than cost efficiency as concluded by Berger and Humphrey (1992). We use the 
Relative Assets Growth ratio (target to acquirer) to measure how the growth of the 
target compared to the growth of the acquirer can affect the target excess return. In 
addition to achieving growth through merger, we believe it is also essential for 
acquirer to acquire targets with higher growth history compared to their own growth 
history, as this is also a proxy for management efficiency in the market. We, 
therefore, expect a positive sign of this variable in explaining the target excess returns. 
f) Efficiency Variables. 
Expected efficiency improvement provides part of the motivation for M&A 
(Calomins and Karceski, 1998; Rhoades, 1998). In the USA, acquiring banks appear 
to be more cost efficient than target banks on average (Berger and Humphrey, 1992; 
Pilloff and Santomero, 1998; Cummins et al., 1999; Fried et al., 1999). On the other 
hand, similar evidence that profit efficiency is a motive for M&A were reported in 
European studies as well (Altunbas et al., 1995; Vander Vennet, 1999a; Focarelli et 
al., 1998). In the M&A literature studies have used various proxies to measure 
efficiency change associated with merger. Some of these proxies were 'Interest 
Expenses to Total assets', 'non-interest expenses to total assets' and 'total costs to 
total assets' (we provided in chapter 2a review of the studies that examined the 
efficiency change after merger and the various measures they used). We use a very C) t: ) 
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popular and more general measure, which is regarded by the regulatory agencies as 
one of the main determinants for efficiency, that is, the 'Cost to Income' ratio. In 
order to measure the comparability of the target and acquirer efficiency we use the 
'Relative Cost to Income' ratio (target to acquirer). Since we showed earlier previous 
evidence that acquirers plan to improve their efficiency as a result of the merger, it is 
then logical to assume that they will be paying a higher price for targets which are 
more efficient than they are. The higher this ratio is (i. e. the less efficient the target is 
compared to the acquirer) the lower the target excess return is. Therefore, we expect a 
negative relationship between the relative Cost to Income ratio (target to acquirer) and 
the target excess retums. 
g) Size Variables. 
The relative size variable has been included in many previous studies. The main 
purpose is to capture the ability of the acquirer to invest in change, technological, 
cultural ... etc and to achieve cost-cutting measures in the target bank (Palla, 1994b). 
The challenge for the acquirer, to achieve those goals, would be higher if the target is 
larger compared to the acquirer bank. This argument is consistent with previous 
evidence found in Palia (1993), Rogowski and Simonson (1989), and Cheng et al., 
(1989), where a negative relationship was found between the bid premium and the 
relative size of target to acquirer. We employ the relative size effect into the analysis, 
and we use therefore the relative size of Market Value of Equity of the acquirer to the 
target. We would expect the coefficient to have a positive sign, that is, the larger the 
acquirer is compared to the target, the higher will be the target excess retums. 
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h) Non-rinancial Variables. 
In addition to the financial characteristics we also incorporate dummy variables 
related to the deal characteristics, these are: 
9 Dummy for the product scope of the deal set equal to one if the deal is in-Market 
(Le bank to bank), zero otherwise (i. e. cross product). 
Dummy for the geographic scope of the deal set equal to one if the deal is 
national, zero otherwise (i. e. cross border). 
9 Dummy for the legal aspect of the deal, set equal to one if it is an acquisition deal, 
zero if it is a merger deal. 
o Two dummies for the payment method, a dummy set equal to one if the deal was 
paid for in cash, zero otherwise, and another dummy set equal to one if the deal 
was settled by a mix of cash, equity and loan notes, zero otherwise. The use of 
two dummies for the payment method is stemming for the fact that we are 
measuring the effect of three different payment methods, a similar procedure is 
found in Suclarsanam et al., (1996). 
We provide a summary of these independent variables in table (4.3) with the expected 
sign of each one of them. 
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4.5 The Determinants of Target Returns. 
The OLS (ordinary Least Square) estimate of the model is presented in Table (4.4). 
The signs of the coefficients related to the deal characteristics, as expected, are similar 
to our results in the bivariate analysis. The coefficient of the geographical scope 
dummy variable is significant at the 5% level, confirming earlier analysis results, 
where targets are earning high returns when they are taken over by acquirers from the 
outside their homeland. Meanwhile, another confirmation is also presented about the 
settlement of the deal, where targets who were paid in cash and in a mixture of cash 
equity and loan notes earned higher returns than those who were compensated by 
equity, both coefficients being significant at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Although the other coefficients related to deals characteristics are not significantly 
different from zero, they confirm earlier results in chapter 3. As for the profitability 
factor, the coefficient of the ROAA is positive and highly significant-this result is 
similar to previous USA findings of Palia (1993), Fraser and Kolary (1987), and 
Beatty et al. (1987) who report a positive relationship between the bid premium and 
the profitability of the target bank. However, the coefficient of the relative 
profitability of the target to acquirer is positive, as expected, but not significant. In 
sum the profitability factor confirms that targets with high ROAA generate higher 
excess returns than targets with lower ROAA. 
On the other hand, the capitalisation seems to be negatively related to the target 
returns, this result supporting the argument that acquirers see high capitalisation as a 
II ing negative point which signals that targets with high Total capital ratios are not usi 
their capital efficiently. 
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The latter result seems sensible if we look at the Mean Total Capital ratios of both 
targets and acquirers in table (4.1) which shows that targets are more than adequately 
capitalised and that both targets and acquirers have almost similar ratios. Our results 
support the findings of Fraser and Kolan (1987), Palia (1993), and Beatty et A 
(1987). The relative Total capital ratio is a significant factor which affects the target 
returns, as can be seen from the regression results, which supports the argument that 
targets which have higher capitalisation compared to their acquirers attract higher 
returns since their current capitalisation, when combined with the acquirer's, offers to 
the acquiring bank more opportunities to expand their investment and increase their 
loan portfolio in the market. But when we consider the Total capital ratio coefficient 
together with this coefficient it seems that there is a certain ceiling of capitalisation, 
which provides a source of comfort for the acquirer, so that targets which have a 
higher capital ratio than this ceiling are considered to be inefficiently utilising their 
capital base. 
The loan quality coefficients support the argument that acquirers are interested in 
targets with a conservative policy regarding their credit assessment. We observe a 
positive and significant (at the 10% level) coefficient for the Loan Loss Reserves to 
Gross Loans which means that acquirers might be judging two main things. Firstly, 
acquirers are looking at the credit policy of the target and valuing a conservative 
credit policy, which takes into account any possible future losses in the loans 
portfolio. Secondly, they might also be valuing the management team of the target 
bank for good credit assessment skills and this might add to the benefit that the 
acquirers are expecting to gain by acquir-incy good quality intellectual capital. This 
result is consistent with Cheno, et al., (1989), using the percentage of Charge-off to 4t 4-: 1 t) In 
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total loans, and Rogowski and Simonson (1987), using the loans to eamings assets 
ratio. On the other hand the coefficient of the relative loan loss reserve to gross loans 
variable is negative and significant at the 1% level. We believe that if acquirers 
consider that a high loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio for the target bank signals a 
conservative and attractive credit policy, yet a ratio which is higher than their own 
ratio may, on the other hand, signal that the quality of the loan portfolio becomes 
scary and worth being scrutinised very carefully. 
The ratio of target's Total Customer Loans to Deposits seems to be another factor, 
which positively affect the target's excess return. We think that this positive 
relationship is consistent with the finding that acquirers regard a high Total capital 
ratio as a negative point since they would prefer to acquire targets which are using 
their capital and their other liquid resources more efficiently in the market. A high 
Total customer loans to deposits ratio appears to be of very high significance for the 
acquirer since it reflects a fact that targets with higher lending ratios and more 
efficient deposits utilisation earn higher excess returns than other targets. 
The relative asset growth (target to acquirer) seems to be another attractive factor for 
the acquirers. The coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level, therefore, this 
suggests that a target's growth history is a determinant factor for earning higher 
excess returns. The assets growth of the target compared to the acquirer is considered 
by the acquirers as a driving force to increase profitability prospects and more 
presence in the market. 
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The coefficient of the relative Cost to Income Ratio is negative and highly significant, 
as we expected earlier, because acquirers tend to increase their efficiency by acquiring 
targets which are more efficient, leading to targets which are more efficient than 
acquirers generating higher excess returns. The relationship between the relative size 
(acquirer to target) and the target excess return is positive but the coefficient is not 
significant. Although the latter result is not significant, it is similar in direction to 
findings of Rogowski and Simonson (1989), Cheng et al., (1989), and Palia (1993) 
who find that the bid premium is smaller when the target is larger than the acquirer. 
4.6 Conclusion. 
In this chapter we search for the determinants of target returns and perform a cross- 
sectional regression using the target (-10,0) CAR as the dependent variable and a set 
of variables related to the deal characteristics and to the target and the acquirer 
financial characteristics one year before merger. We run the regression on a sample of 
66 bank mergers in Europe for which we could obtain all the data needed for the 
analysis. 
The first observation is that our earlier findings of the impact of the deal 
characteristics on the target returns are confirmed in this exercise. Moreover, we find 
evidence that targets with higher profitability pre-merger earn higher returns than 
other targets, moreover, we find that targets with lower capitalisation than others seem 
to earn higher returns as well since they are assumed to be efficiently utilising their 
capital knowing that they are already adequately capitalised. On the other hand, high Cý 
loan loss reserves to Gross loans for targets is seen as source of comfort for acquirers 
153 
as it implies a conservative policy by the target bank, and therefore these banks earn 
high returns too. As for the efficiency measure, it appears, as expected, that targets 
which are less efficient than their acquirers earn lower returns, and that when targets 
have high loans to deposits ratio they signal that they are efficient and aggressive in 
utilising their deposits resources and, therefore, they also earn higher returns than 
other targets. 
We have, up to now found the evidence for varying target, acquirer, and aggregate 
returns according to the characteristics of deal (chapter 3), we also examined the 
determinants of the target returns. But these findings, although they shed some light 
on the likely returns taking in account some aspects related to the deal or to the parties 
financial status, yet we have not so far been able to decide what the motives for these 
bank mergers have been. Therefore, we tend to examine this area in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
EUROPEAN BANK MERGER MOTIVES. 
5.1 Introduction. 
After we have examined the market reaction for M&A in the European banking 
industry, and have identified certain non-financial and financial determinants of target 
returns, we noticed a great variability of the returns according to various 
characteristics. We believe it is worth doing further analysis in order to determine 
what motivates banks to pursue growth strategies through M&A. 
We have discussed various M&As motives in chapter 2, and noticed that M&A could 
be motivated by increasing shareholders wealth via many ways such as: synergy, 
improving efficiency, diversification, or market power. M&As could also be 
motivated by non value-maximi sing temptations of the acquirer management such as: 
agency or hubris. Perhaps the most popular of all these motives that have been 
advanced in the literature of M&As have been synergy, agency problem, and hubris. 
One of the few studies that examined the M&A motives in the non-banking industry 
is Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993), while the evidence for the bank merger is 
limited to very few studies such as Zhang (1998) that used the same methodology as 
BN (1993) for the USA banking merger. Both studies, we believe they do not apply to 
the European context, for many of reasons, one being the differing regulation 
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governing the activities of the financial services industry in the USA and Europe, as 
we pointed out earlier in chapter 3. Therefore we can not draw from these two studies 
any conclusions to be applied on the European banking scenano. Having said that, we 
thought it is essential to help fill, even partially, the gap in the literature of M&As 
motives in the European banking industry. 
In section two we discuss the earlier evidence in the M&As motives literature, in 
section three we propose the methodology we use. While we report our findings in 
section four, we conclude in section five. 
5.2 Historical Evidence on Bank M&As Motives. 
The literature on merger motives utillsed several proxies to examine the existence of 
one or several possible motives for merger. For example the finding of positive total 
gain of merger deals in a sample has been considered fair evidence for mergers being 
motivated by the achievement of synergistic gains (Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1988). 
The lack of positive acquirer gains, or even evidence of negative acquirer gain, has 
been thought of as indicating that these mergers are motivated by either agency or 
hubris (Malatesta, 1983) or that they provided support for managerial explanation 
(Nealy, 1987; Hawawini and Swary, 1990). Moreover, other researchers content that 
managers might engage in growth-onented or empire building strategies in order to 
create a diversified portfolio within the firm to lower their employment risk (Amihud 
and Lev, 1981; Coffee, 1988). 
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Another bank-specific motive for growth is the concept of too-big-to-fail. But O'Hara 
and Shaw (1990) argue that this type of motive, joining the club of too-big-to-fail 
banks may be beneficial for the shareholders, therefore it is not totally consistent with 
an agency problem type of behaviour of the management. 
Examining the motives for the European banking merger followed a path similar to all 
the other studies that is, researchers tried to derive conclusions from the findings of 
post-merger operating performance change or X-efficiency change. 
Vander Vennet (1996) found that in domestic majority-acquisitions the post-merger 
performance deteriorated and therefore, he deduces that defensive and managerial 
motives seem to dominate and observes that these mergers do not seem to benefit 
from synergistic effects and can not be explained by the efficiency theories. On the 
other hand in domestic mergers of equal partners Vander Vennet (1996 and 1999a) 
reported improvement in the operational efficiency, the frontier efficiency measure, 
and the profit levels. Consequently he deduces that the operational and managerial 
synergies and scale economies are probable explanations for the recovery in 
performance. However, as for cross border mergers Vander Vennet (1996) concludes 
that the acquisition of a foothold presence in foreign bank markets with growth 
opportunities may be the principal motivation since he did not find any evidence for 
improved performance. 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) summarised the various theories and motives of 
M&A into three main categories as shown in table (5.1). 
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Table (5.1): Patterns of Gains Related to Takeover Theories. 
The Merger Motive Total Gains Gains to Target Gains to Acquirer 
1. Efficiency or Synergy 
2. Hubris (winner's curse, overpay) 
3. Agency problems and mistakes 
By definition, total gains are positive for synergy, zero for hubris, and negative for 
agency problems and so on. The event studies that examined the market reaction to 
M&As announcement have not been able to clearly distinguish among all three 
motives, cited above. The difficulty is that three motives may simultaneously exist in 
any sample (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Zhang, 1998). This problem is 
overcome by investigating the relation between target and total gains instead of 
depending on average gains (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993). 
Having said that we explain the hypothesis proposed in Berkovitch and Narayanan 
(1993) and their methodology for examining M&As motives, which we adopt, in the 
following section. 
5.3 Methodology. 
Berkovitch and Khanna (1990) show that the target gain is a function of the total gain, 
conditional on the takeover motive, and the acquirer gain is a function of the target 
gain, conditional on the takeover motive as well. Berkovitch and Narayannan (1993) Z7) 
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surnmansed these relationships which we report in table (5.2) below - 
54 Zhang (1998) departs from this arg), ument and from the patterns of gains reported in table (5.1) to test 
the prcscnce of the three major moti,, 'es in US bank takeovers. They examined the relationship type 
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Berkovitch and Narayannan (1993) justify the implied relationships that in a synergy 
motivated merger the target and the acquirer would benefit from the synergy. Any 
increase in the total gain would lead to an increase in the target gain, which in turn 
implies an increase in the acquirer gain; thus the positive relationships in the table. 
Table (5.2): The Implications of Different Hypotheses Regarding the Relation 
between Target Gain and Total and Acquirer Gains. 
Correlation between 
Hypothesis Target Gain and Total Gain Acquirer Gain and Target Gain 
Synergy Positive Positive 
Hubris Zero Negative 
Agency Negative Negative 
On the other hand, in an agency motivated merger, the increase in target gains is 
accompanied by a decrease in the total gain at the expense of the acquirer 
shareholders, where part of the gain is extracted to the benefit of the acquirer's 
management due to agency rent, moreover, since the acquirer gains are inversely 
related to the severity of the agency problem, the target and acquirer gains are also 
negatively correlated. But if synergy and agency motives are present in the sample, 
and since both motives have opposite predictions, the results (of the relationship 
between target and total gains) may either reflect the stronger of the two effects or C) 
betxNeen the target gains and the total gains, and the acquirer gain and the target gain, their findings 
confirmed the existence of synergy and hubris motives. 
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may show a zero correlation between target and total gains. In the latter case, the 
results could be misleading implying, erroneously, the presence of hubris motive. 
To avoid this problem Berkovitch and Narayannan (1993) suggest using another test, 
that is, dividing the sample into two sub-samples based on the total gains whether 
they are positive and negative, and then examining the correlation between target and 
total gains, and between target and acquirer gains within each sub-sample. The logic 
for doing this is that in the case of agency motive, if it exists, it is more likely to be 
present in the mergers with total negative gains than in mergers with positive total 
gains. 
However, in hubris there is a transfer of gain from the acquirer to the target as a result 
of overpayment, or winner's curse, no matter how much the target gain increases, yet 
the total gain is unaffected at approximately the zero level. Therefore, in hubris, there 
is no relation between the total gains and the target gain and the relationship between 
the target gain and the acquirer gain is negative. 
We adopt this argument and follow the pattern of relationships as shown in the table 
(5.2) above. We use initially two regression models, as in Berkovitch and Narayanan 
(1993) and Zhang (1998), in order to test the relationships postulated above, these are: 
Target Gain = aj +, 8j (Total Gain) +E (1) 
Acquirer Gain = cc + 82 (Target Gain) +, U (2) 
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We use the results we obtained in chapter three for 76 completed deals (results of the 
abnormal returns are reported in Table (3.5) Panel A). Target and acquirer gains are 
defined as the change in wealth of the shareholders of the target and acquiring banks 
or firms. The gains are computed in money terms. The target gain is the product of the 
target CAR in the 5-day event window (-2,2) and the target's market value of equity a 
month before the merger announcement. We compute the acquirer gain in a similar 
way. The total gain is, then, defined as the sum of the target gain and the acquirer 
gain. We also divide the sample into two sub-samples one with total negative gains 
and the other with total positive gains. 
5.4 European Bank Merger Motives-the New Evidence. 
Table (5.3) provides the estimates of the target and acquirer gains for the sample of 76 
M&As deals in the European Financial services industry. We can see from the table 
that the mean target gain for the total sample of 76 deals is E 47 million (significant at 
the I% level), and the mean acquirer gain is C 18 million (significant at the 5% 
level). In 67.4% of the cases targets earn positive gains, while in 47.37% of the cases, 
acquirer gains were positive. 
The total gain, that is the sum of the target and acquirer gain, was positive in 64.47% 
of the cases. The latter finding is almost the same as in Zhang (1998) where he reports 
a 64% of the deals eaming positive gains. This finding suggests that these positive 
total return deals were motivated by synergy, while the remaining 35.53% of the deals 
were motivated by either agency or hubris. 
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On the other hand in 61.70% of the M&A deals with positive total gains, the acquirer 
gains were positive. This result is very close to the result reported by Berkovitch and 
Narayanan (1993) of 63.9%. Moreover, the sub-sample of negative total gains shows 
that the loss from M&A may be large, the mean total loss for this group being -C 
48.98 million. This loss is mainly attributable to losses for targets. When we 
investigate this sub-sample closely we notice that the majority of this negative gain is 
due to one major deal, apparently the deal with the minimum gain in the table, of 
target negative gain of -C 785 million (this deal is the merger between Banesto and 
Banco de Santander on Jan 28,1994). 
When we remove this deal from the sub-sample of total negative gains then we 
observe that the mean total loss drops significantly to -C 24.324 million and the target 
mean gain becomes -C 8.566 million. Moreover, if we remove this one deal from the 
whole sample the mean total gain increases to C 75.86 million and the mean target 
gain becomes C 58.18 million. 
In Table (5.4) we report the results of the regressions 55 . In panel A, we report the 
regression results of the target gain against the total gain, for the entire sample as well 
as for the sub-samples of total positive gains and total negative gains. For the entire 
sample the correlation between target gains and total gains is positive and statistically 
significant at the I% level, the estimate of 8 is 0.626 (t = 3.746). 
We have also tested for autocorrelation in the samples using the Durbin-Watson d-statistic and found 
that autocorrelation is non-existent. 
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TABLE 5.4: Relations between Target Gain and Total and Acquirer Gains 
Sample Size a 18 
R' 
Panel A. Target Gain =a+, 6 (Total Gain) +e 
All 76 6.349 0.626 62.40% 
(0.5651) (3.746)*** 
Positive Total Gains Only 47 20.211 0.595 47.90% 
(1.182) (2.259)** 
Negative Total Gains Only 29 15.989 1.048 95.80% 
(3.029)*** (27.224)*** 
Panel B. Acquirer Gain =a +, 6 (Target Gain) +, u 
All 76 18-152 -0.00234 <0.00 
(1.948)* (-0.0097) 
Positive Total Gains Only 47 38.256 -0.195 5.10% 
(2.953)*** (-0.726) 
Negative Total Gains Only 29 -16.684 -0.086 16.70% 
(-2.988)*** (-6.737)*** 
The numbers in parentheses are White's (1980) heteroscedasticit-N--coiisisteizt t-statistics. 
(***) Indicates significance at the 1% level. 
(**) Indicates significance at the 5% level. 
(*) Indicates significance at the 10% level 
This result is consistent with the synergy hypothesis; the evidence of the synergy 
hypothesis persists with the two sub-samples of total positive gains and total negative 
gain. If we look at the intercept term, we notice that it is not significantly different 
from zero for the total sample and the sub-sample of the positive total gains. This tells 
that the target does not gain when the total gain is zero, which is consistent with the 
synergy hypothesis but not the hubris. On the other hand for the sub-sample of 
negative total gain the intercept is positive and significant at the 1% level. which 
suggests that the targets still gain even when the total gain is negative. This suggests a 
degree of hubris is present. 
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Panel B of table (5.4) provides the results of the regression between the acquirer and 
the target gains for the entire sample as well as for sub-samples of positive and 
negative total gain. For the entire sample, the coefficient between acquirer and target 
gains is negative, though not significantly different from zero. This seems to support 
the hubris hypothesis. The same result is obtained for the sub-samples of positive and 
negative total gains, but the coefficient is significant only in the sub-sample of 
negative total gains. On the other hand the intercept a is positive and significantly 
different from zero in the total sample and the positive total gains sub-sample. This 
suggests that when the target does not gain, the acquirer is able to maintain a positive 
gain, in other words, this is consistent with the notion that without hubris the acquirer 
on average should be able to retain its synergy gains. Thus hubris may explain the 
results of positive average target gains and zero average acquirer gains. The key to 
explaining the negative total gains may lie in the statistically significant negative 
intercept in the sub-sample of negative total gains. In this sub-sample, the negative 
intercept, which is significant at the I% level, suggests that the acquirer loses even 
when the target does not gain. This implies that after adjusting for hubris, the acquirer 
in the sub-sample of negative total gains would still lose (to the acquirer 
management). This result implies that agency, along with hubris, may explain the 
bank takeovers with negative total gains, even though we do not observe it in the 
coefficient, 8 since synergy is the dominating motive in these takeovers. 
Although the gains in this sample are not highly dispersed around the mean, yet to 
ensure the robustness of our results to very limited outliers, we identified one major 
outlier earlier and removed it then we run the regressions one more time. The results Cý 
we obtained are reported in Table (5.5) and provide support for the conclusions \ve 
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arrived at earlier since these results are not qualitatively different from the original 
results. 
TABLE 5.5: Relations between Target Gain and Total and Acquirer Gains, after 
adjusting for outliers in the sample. 
Sample Size a 18 R' 
Panel A. Target Gain =a+, 8 (Total Gain) +E 
All 75 16.693 0.547 55.20% 
(2.239)** (3.481)*** 
Positive Total Gains Only 47 20.211 0.595 47.90% 
(1.182) (2.259)** 
Negative Total Gains Only 28 2.039 0.436 30.50% 
(0.574) (1.819)* 
Panel B. Acquirer Gain =a+, 8 (Target Gain) +p 
All 75 17.133 0.0093 <0.00 
(1-601) (0.028) 
Positive Total Gains Only 47 38.256 -0.195 5.10% 
(2.953)*** (-0.726) 
Negative Total Gains Only 28 -18.339 -0.301 7.50% 
(-3.153)*** (-1.456) 
The numbers in parentheses are White's (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics. 
(***) Indicates significance at the I% level. 
(**) Indicates significance at the 5% level. 
(*) Indicates significance at the 10% level 
5.5 Conclusion. 
:D In this chapter we test the existence of three major motives of bank M&A: synergy, 
agency, and hubris by examining the relations between target and total gains and 
between acquirer and target gains. To perform this task we followed the same 
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methodology developed by Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) and adopted later by 
Zhang (1998). 
We report a positive and statistically significant relation between target gains and total 
gains for the entire sample and the two sub-samples of positive and negative total 
gains. This relation suggests that synergy, rather than agency, is the dominant motive 
for the M&A in the European financial industry. Our next step was to examine the 
simultaneous presence of hubris in isolation from the relation between acquirer gains 
and target gains. Although the coefficient is significantly different from zero in the 
negative total gains only, yet it cames a negative sign, which is consistent with the 
hubris hypothesis. The significantly positive intercept in the entire sample and the 
positive total gains sub-sample suggests that the acquirer gains should the target's 
gain be zero, that is without hubris the acquirer would be able to maintain his 
synergistic gain. Therefore, hubris may be the main explanation for observing positive 
target gains and zero or negative acquirer gains. 
While evidence of hubris exists, these results suggest that agency is not a major 
motive in the European financial services takeovers. This claim may be reasonable 
due to the close monitoring that bank's mergers might be subject to from the 
supervision and regulatory bodies in their home country, in addition to the rare hostile 
takeovers, in this industry. Moreover, one factor that could help to measure the 
presence of agency related motives is by examining the acquirer returns subject to 
various managerial ownership scenarios, an exercise which is not possible at this 
stage since the data on ownership in such a diversified sample is almost impossible to 
obtain. 
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Finally, it is evident now that synergy has been a major motive in the European 
financial services M&As that took place between 1987 and Nov. 1999. But managers 
have always claimed that synergistic gains are possible and even certain, have they 
merged their firm with the other party, in order to convince stakeholders to bless their 
decision. Whether these synergistic gains are realised afterwards is another long 
lasting argument, which needs to be confirmed or rejected by examining the 
performance change few years after "the marriage" took place. So, did the merging 
parties live happily ever after? We examine the post-merger operating performance, in 
order to answer this question, in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
THE POST-MERGER OPERATING PERFORMANCE 
6.1 Introduction. 
The market valuation for the European mergers that we examined was positive, 
implying that the market anticipated shareholders value increase to be resulted out of 
these mergers. Consequently, the positive market reaction implied that synergy was 
the major motive in the European mergers. Moreover, the evidence of the synergy 
motive was confirmed in the previous chapter, but have these anticipated and planned 
synergistic gains been realised? Have the merging parties been able to improve their 
performance in the post-merger period? What are the sources of the performance 
change? Did the market, at merger announcement, correctly anticipate the post- 
merger performance change? Could the post-merger performance change be 
determined before merger, and if so, what are the characteristics of the merging 
parties that determine post-merger performance? We attempt to answer these 
questions in this chapter and we compare our findings with the earlier very limited 
evidence for European bank mergers. 
We showed in chapter two that studies that examined the post-merger operating t) 
performance in USA reached in general a consistent conclusion that these mercy I., ers 
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failed to improve performance, with a few exceptions e. g. Healy et al., (1992) for non- 
bank mergers, and Cornett and Tehranian (1992) for bank mergers. However the 
evidence concerning European bank mergers has been so far limited to a couple of 
studies, viz Vander Vennet (1996) and Vander Vennet (1999a). These studies 
examined the same sample of bank mergers and concluded that domestic mergers of 
equal partners improved performance and that synergy and market power were the 
main sources of this improvement. In the next section we discuss the findings of a few 
studies in the bank merger literature, in section three we explain our methodology. 
Whereas in section four we report our findings, the answer to the questions that we 
proposed above, then we conclude in section five. 
6.2 Previous 
Performance. 
Evidence on Post-merger Operating 
Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) introduced a very interesting methodology to 
examine performance changes associated with take-overs in the USA. Their sample 
consisted of the largest 50 take-overs that took place between 1979 and 1984. They 
used the industry adjusted operating cash flow return on market value of assets as 
their metric to measure the change in operating performance from -5 to +5 years 
around the take-over year. The market value of assets at the beginning of each year 
after merger was adjusted to exclude the change in equity value of both parties at the 
merger announcement date. They also used industry-adjusted measures of accounting 1: 5 C) 
rates of return to search for the source of value change. The authors found that merged C) 
firms show significant improvement in asset productivity relative to their industries, C- 
leading to higher operating cash flow returns after merger. Median industry-adjusted 
170 
returns for the merged firms were 3% in the year after merger, 5.3% two years after, 
3.2% three years after and 3% after four years, all significantly different from zero at 
the 10 % level of significance. Healy Palepu, and Ruback (1992) replicated their 
results using a different measure of the value of equity each year, a measure which 
they computed for the merged firms before and after merger, yet the results were 
robust and did not change 
56 
. 
Pilloff (1996) examined mergers of publicly traded banking institutions for a sample 
of 48 mergers that took place between 1982 and 1991 in the USA by analysing the 
average level of operating performance and conducting an event study. The operating 
performance measures show little to no gain two years post merger compared to two 
years pre merger. Moreover, the cross sectional analysis showed that low target 
profitability, high target and acquirer total expenses, and high target absolute and 
relative size are correlated with subsequent performance improvements. Pilloff (1996) 
found also that value weighted abnormal returns are influenced by expense-related 
variables and concluded that the market values mergers which offer the greatest 
potential for cost reduction. While the findings of Pilloff (1996) that merger gains are 
modest to non-existent on average are consistent with the bulk of the literature, they 
are inconsistent with the work of Cornett and Tehranian (1992) who also analyse a 
sample of 30 mergers involving publicly traded banks in the USA between 1982 and 
1987. Cornett and Tehranian find that post-merger performance improvements and 
value weighted abnormal returns at announcements are significantly positive and they 
are correlated with one another. Using a methodology closely matching the one 
56 According to Healy et al, (1992) the quasi Market Value of Equity in year +1. for example, would be 
Market value of Equity for taroet and acquirer at the beginning of year -1 plus year -1 and year 0 ltý 
values of the merged firms after tax cash flow from operations (net of interest expense, non-operating L_ 
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adopted by Healy et al. (1992), Cornett and Tehranian (1992) concluded that their 
sample produces superior cash flow returns on assets during the post merger period. 
This improvement in cash flow performance was due to improvements in the ability 
to attract loans and deposits, in employee productivity, and in asset growth. They also 
report statistically significant increases in the operating income to assets employed 
ratio and, especially, in the return on book equity. However, Berger and Humphrey 
(1992) point out that this latter result is strongly influenced by capital write-off, which 
reduced the denominator and gave a perverse boost to apparent performance. 
Moreover, Pilloff (1996) argues that Cornett and Tehranian (1992)'s industry- 
adjustment procedure does not control for differences in performance among banks 
operating in various regions of the country. "In particular, the impact of the downturn 
in the Southwest during the late 1980's appears to be at least partially driving their 
findings of perfonnance gains". Pilloff (1996) reached this conclusion after he had 
examined empirically the effect of a national benchmark on the results of Cornett and 
Tehranian (1992), and hence used a regional benchmark as well then he obtained 
contrasting results to those reported by Cornett and Tehranian (1992). We adopt a 
similar methodology to perform the analysis in this chapter, however we explain this 
methodology in the next section. 
The two only studies, that we are aware of, that examined M&As in the European 
banking industry are Vander Vennet (1996 and 1999a). Using a traditional accounting 
study and X-Inefficiency method, Vander Vennet (1996) addressed the question 
whether acquisitions and mergers improve the performance of the institutions 
involved based on a sample of 422 domestic and 70 cross-border acqui III isit i on s in the 
income, and cash taxes) plus cash from new share issues minus cash dividends to common and 
preferred shareholders and cash used to acquire treasury stock. 
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EC between 1988 and 1992. The analysis shows that the target banks in domestic 
majority-acquisitions exhibit an inferior performance pre-merger compared to the 
acquiring banks in terms of profitability and cost efficiency ratios. The post-merger 
performance seems to have deteriorated. On the other hand Vander Vennet (1996) 
found that the effective combination of banks in domestic mergers of equal partners 
turns out to provide ample opportunities for performance improvement. The 
operational efficiency and profit levels experience a si ificant improvement-, the 
frontier efficiency measure showed similar improvement as well. The findings for 
cross border mergers is mixed although the expense ratios and the frontier efficiency 
measures showed significant improvement, yet this did not result in improved profits. 
Moreover, Vander Vennet's (1999a) findings were not different since he further 
explored merger motives using the same sample as Vander Vennet (1996). His 
regression results confin-ned the earlier findings that profitability and efficiency 
improvements are associated with domestic mergers of equal partners. One 
shortcoming of both studies is that they did not include many accounting ratios in 
their analysis. We argue that some sides of the bank operations might have been 
affected, as a result of the merger, faster than other sides. For example, the merging 
parties might have reduced the personnel expenses due to branch closure, but at the 
same time their administrative expenses could have increased due to higher 
depreciation which may result from investment in technology. On the other hand 
these two studies used the same sample of bank merger in Europe for the period 1988- 
1992. Whereas our sample covers the period 1992-1997 and is hoped to provide a 
broader picture of the effect of mergers on the operating performance of the 
participating parties. 
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6.3 Sample design and Methodology. 
6.3.1 Sample Design. 
The sample we use to investigate the post-merger operating performance is a sub- 
sample of the initial sample of 102 deals that we used to investigate the market 
reaction to merger announcement in the European banking industry in Chapter three. 
We also followed a refinement strategy based on excluding deals where the acquirer 
was involved in another deal two years before and three years after the merger deal in 
place. We also excluded deals where the target bank was also involved in a merger 
deal within the two years preceding the merger deal under investigation. The aim of 
this refinement strategy is to ensure that every deal in our sample is free of any effect 
of another transaction that the bank might have done. We wanted to measure the 
economic effect of a specific deal on the operating performance of the party involved 
and not the economic effect of an acquisition programme that may include several 
deals within very close periods of time. In this sense we believe our sample 
overcomes potential data contamination problems in both Healy et al., (1992) and 
Cornett and Tehranian (1992). Healy et al., (1992) restricted the analysis on the M&A 
transactions between 1979 and 1984 involving the 50 largest targets assuming that it 
is "less likely that the acquirers in the sample undertake equallýv large acquisitions 
before or after the events we study, reducing the probability of confounding events " 
(Healy et al., 1992, page 138). However, Cornett and Tehranian (1992) investigated 
the post merger operating performance for 30 bank mergers where the purchase price 
was more than USD 100 million. Their refinement strategy was based on eliminating t: ) 
acquisitions from the sample if the bidder was involved in more than one acquisition 
of USD 100 million or greater, andlor if the bidder undertook more than FIVE 
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acquisitions (of any size) over the event period (Comett and Tehranian, 1992 page 
215). 
Applying our refinement strategy reduced the sample to 35 merger deals completed 
between 1992 and 1997. Although we did not restrict our sample to large deals as 
Healy et al., (1992) and Cornett and Tehranian (1992) did, the deals in our sample are 
strategically influential investments on the operations of the acquiring banks. This fact 
can be observed by looking at the average deal value, which is USD 2,534 million, 
and the average percentage of shares acquired during the merger transaction, which 
amounted to 82.5%. In fact, all the merger deals in our sample involved a change in 
control over the target bank and these figures show clearly that the size of deal is large 
enough to be considered as an influential investment decision on the operations of the 
acquinng bank in the future. 
For every transaction we collected the following information: 
The announcement date of the deal and the effective date. 
The value of the deal. 
The percentage of shares owned by the acquirer before, during and after the 
transaction. 
- The form of the deal, whether it was a Merger or a Takeover 
deal. 
The consideration offered, cash, equity or other 
Balance sheet and Income statement information. 
Stock price and market value data for the sample banks and firms were collected from 
Datastream database. We collected the accounting data from two main sources; these 
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are: the FitchIbca BankScope CD and the annual reports available on Laser D. 
FitchIbca BankScope CD reports the financial statements in a unified forinat which 
provides consistent comparability among all the banks and firms available in the 
database regardless of the differing accounting regulations and standards in the 
various countries involved. Moreover, the BankScope CD is equipped with a software 
which enabled us to add financial statements which were collected from Lazer D. This 
feature, also provides consistency in reporting the financial statements even those 
which are added from outside the BankScope CD 57 . Therefore, the issue of differing 
accounting regulation is not a source of concern in our sample. 
6.3.2 Methodology. 
6.3.2.1 The operating performance measures. 
There have been several studies in the literature that have examined the change in 
operating performance associated with major corporate events such as, M&A, stock 
splits, management buyouts and initial public offerin gS58 . The performance measures 
used varied from one study to the other. Many studies used traditional accounting 
ratios such as ROA and ROE (Rhoades, 1986; Rose, 1987a; Rose, 1987b; Rhoades, 
1990), and operating income to assets or operating income to sales (Kaplan, 1989-, 
Denis and Denis, 1993; DeGeorge and Zeckhauser, 1993; Mickelson and Partch, 
1994; Mickelson and Shah, 1994; Holthausen and Larcker, 1994). Whereas some 
57 FitchIBCA BankScope CD is a major source of database for Banks financial statements, many 
papers have used this source including, Vander Vennet (1996), Bikker (1999), Maudos, Pastor, Perez 
and Quesada (1999a), and Vander Vennet (1999a) 
58Studies that investigated the operating performance of firms includes Spindt and Tarhan (1992). and 
Linder and Crane (1992) who study USA bank merger, Loughran and Ritter (1994) ý'N'ho study 
seasoned equity offerings. Stirickland, Wiles, and Zenner (1994) who study intervention by the United 
Shareholders Association, Mulherin and Poulsen (1994) who study proxy contests, Jain and Kini 
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studies used the change in earnings per share divided by the share value (Healy and 
Palepu, 1988; Asquith, Healy, and Palepu, 1989; and Healy and Palepu, 1990), other 
studies used cash flow measures scaled down by the book value of assets (Denis and 
Denis, 1993 and Holthausen and Larcker, 1994). Also popular is operating cash flow 
to market value of assets (Healy, Palepu, and Ruback, 1992; Cornett and Tehranian. 
1992; and Healy, Palepu, and Ruback, 1994). Barber and Lyon (1996) evaluated some 
of the methods used where they examined the choice of an accounting-based 
performance measure, a statistical test, and a model of expected operating 
performance. They reported that the choice of performance measure is generally 
inconsequential, with one exception. Test statistics based on a cash-flow measure of 
operating income (i. e., cash flow return on assets) are uniformly less powerful than 
those based on other performance measures that they considered, such as return on 
assets, return on cash-adjusted assets, return on sales and return on market value of 
assets. But because of the nature of a particular research question, the choice of 
performance measure can be critical. We believe one of the reasons for this finding 
could be the method of computing the cash flow return on assets. Barber and Lyon 
(1996) defined operating cash flow as: operating income before depreciation plus the 
decrease in receivables, the decrease in inventory, the increase in accounts payable, 
the increase in other current liabilities, and the decrease in other current assets. Some 
other studies defined operating cash flow as: sales minus cost of goods sold, selling 
and administrative expenses, plus depreciation and goodwill amortisation (e. g. Healy 
et al., 1992 and 1994), and others used the free cash flow which, on top of the 
operating cash flow defined in Healy et al., (1992 and 1994), included the interest, 
preferred dividend and common dividend (Denis and Denis, 1993). The Barber and 
(1994) who study initial public offerings and Denis and Denis (1995) who study leveraged 
recapitalisations. 
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Lyon (1996) definition of operating cash flow is very broad. We think it might be 
characterised by high variability cross-sectionally since the value of inventory; for 
example, may vary according to the type of business of the sample firms even if these 
firms belong to the same two-digit SIC code group. 
Barber and Lyon (1996) reported also that the models that are most powerful in 
detecting abnormal performance use a firm's lagged performance in forming a 
measure of expected performance. Most of the studies that examined the operating 
performance change after a specific event took into account the latter observation of 
Barber and Lyon (1996), in the sense that they compared the post-event operating 
performance with the pre-event operating performance. 
We start the first step of our analysis by following the same methodology used by 
Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) and adopted by other researcher such as Cornett 
and Tehranian (1992) and Higson and Elliot (1994), that is, the pre-tax operating cash 
flow returns on the market value of assets, in order to measure the improvement in 
operating performance. We define operating cash flow as the profit before tax plus 
interest on long-term debt plus depreciation and goodwill wnte-offs (as used by 
Cornett and Tehranian, 1992). The market value of assets we define, unlike Cornett 
and Tehranian (1992)59 , as the market value of common shares plus the 
book value of 
preference shares and the book value of total debt (long term and short term) less 
cash. 
59 Cornett and Tehranian (1992) do not include the book value of short-term debt in their measure of 
market value of assets. 
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The second step is to search for the source of operating performance change by 
examining the change in the financial ratios and determining the components of the 
operating cash flow return. 
The financial ratios we examine belong to common bank performance indicators. 
Some of these ratios have been used by previous studies; however, our study 
introduces more ratios, which are intended to measure various sources of efficiency 
change. Moreover, we also use the loans to deposits ratio which has not been used in 
other studies, we believe this ratio is a good indicator of how well the bank utillses its 
deposits resources to grant loans to the market, this is why we included it in our 
analysis. In sum our study uses more ratios than any other study we are aware of, our 
aim is to measure the performance change that may belong to any side of the bank 
operations. Please note also that we summarised in table (2.1) the findings of the 
studies that examined the post-merger operating performance, and we exhibited the 
ratios that were used in every one of thern. 
The ratios we utilise for our analysis are the following: 
I- Profitability measures: the profitability is the measure of the overall performance 
of any firm or bank. We use two common measures, the ROAA (return on average 
assets) measured as the net income after taxes as a percentage of book value of 
average total assets and ROE (return on average equity) measured as the net 
income after taxes as a percentage of book value of average equity. 
2- Capital adequacy measures: the capitalisation of a financial institution is a main 
determinant of its soundness and stability. We use three main ratios these are: the 
total risk-adjusted capital ratio measured as Total Capital (Tier I+ Tier 11)/ Risk- 
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adjusted assets. 60 Equity to Deposits ratio, which is the percentage of deposits 
covered by the banks own equity and the Equity to Total customer loans ratio, 
which is the percentage of loans financed by the banks own equity. 
3- Loan quality measures: Loan quality is one of the major determinants of bank 
performance since the quality of loans the banks carry in their portfolio affects 
their risk taking and profitability in the medium to long run. We use the ratios of 
Loan loss reserves to Gross loans, and the Non-performing loans to Gross loan S61. 
4- Deposits utilisation: in order to measure how the bank is making good use of the 
resources available on its balance sheet we introduce the ratio of Total Customer 
Loans to Total Deposits. 
5- Efficiency measures: many ratios have been used in the literature to measure the 
banks ability to make the best use out of its assets in place in terms of generating 
higher income or incurring lower expenses. Mergers always promise that they will 
lead to efficiency improvement in terms of lower costs and higher revenues due to 
synergistic gains and complementary operations of both parties. We use several 
ratios in order to determine precisely where the change has come from, which part 
of the expense items or the income items. These ratios are: Non-interest expenses 
to Average assets, Interest expenses to Average assets, Non-interest expenses to 
Interest expenses, Other operating income to Average assets, Other operating 
income to Interest income, Personnel expenses to Average assets, Other 
administrative expenses to Average assets, and the Cost to Income ratio. 
60 Tier I capital is defined as Common Shareholders' Equity plus Perpetual Preferred Stock plus 
minority interest in equity accounts of consolidated subsidiaries less Goodwill. Total Capital includes 
Tier I Capital plus a bank's loan loss reserves up to maximum of 1.25% or risk-adjusted assets plus 
various convertible and subordinated debt instruments. Risk-Adjusted Assets figure is comprised of L_ 
two components: Risk-adjusted on balance sheet assets and Risk adjusted off balance sheet assets. 
61 Non-performing loans are those loans, which do not generate interest or commission income because t- 
of customers' default payment. These loans are usually classified as very high credit risk loans and they 
are at only one higher grade from being classified as bad deb ts. 
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6- Interest rate fisk measure: this is a measure of the bank exposure to interest rate 
risk. We measure this exposure as the ratio of Net interest revenue to earning 
assets. 
7- Liquidity risk measures: this is a measure of the bank's ability to meet its short- 
term obligations from the liquid assets in place. We use three ratios, the Cash and 
due from banks to Total assets, Liquid assets to Total deposits and borrowings, 
and the ratio of Net loans to total Assets. 
Finally, because some of the performance measures might be correlated with each 
other., we accounted for possible problems of multicol linearity by employing the same 
test we used in chapter four. That is, we computed the elgenvalues and condition 
index and found that multicolinearity is not a problem for the independent variables in 
our models. Moreover, we also computed the Durbin-Watson d-statistics and found 
that the independent variables in our models do not suffer from serial correlation. 
6.3.2.2 The performance benchmark. 
The cash flow, accounting and market value data for both the target and the acquiring 
bank are aggregated for two years pre-merger in order to form the pro forma base 
case, which then facilitate the comparability with the post-merger years. When we 
compare this pro fonna benchmark with the post-merger performance measures we 
will be able to determine the performance change. For the post merger period we use 
the figures for the combined entity in the three years following the merger. We also 
deduct from the market value figure in the post-merger years the change in the equity 
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value of the target and acquiring bank during the merger announcement (_ 1,0)62 
When the market value revaluation is not excluded from the capital base in the post 
merger years, it will not be possible to observe any abnormal post-merger cash flow 
retums. 
Because the change in performance might be attributable to economy-wide and 
industry effects, or to a continuation of bank-specific performance during the pre- 
merger, we use abnormal industry-adjusted performance measures to evaluate the 
post-merger performance. We collect the industry figures from the same source that 
we use to collect the data for our sample, that is, the FitchIBCA database, we collect 
the figures for every country in our sample separately. 
In order to calculate the industry-adjusted figures for every performance measure we 
use, we deduct from every measure the average industry figure, which correspond to 
the country to which the sample bank belongs 63 . There are numerous studies that 
adjust for the industry-wide effect when investigating the operating performance 
change of firms or banks after the occurrence of certain corporate events. Some of 
these studies are: Healy and Palepu (1988), Asquith, Healy, and Palepu (1989), 
Kaplan (1989), Healy and Palepu (1990), Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992), Cornett 
and Tehranian (1992), Denis and Denis (1993), DeGeorge and Zeckhauser (1993), 
62 Cornett and Tehranian (1992) and Healy et aL, (1992) deduct the change in the equity value from 
five days before the merger announcement to the day the target is delisted from the stock exchange. We 
believe that this could be a very long period. For instance, most of the time the merger in the financial 
services industr takes time to be approved by the regulatory bodies, and therefore the change in equity y L_ - 
value during this long period of time might be attributable to other factors which are not related to the 
merger event. 
63 For instance if the bank is a French bank we use the banking industry figures for France. In cases 
where the target bank and the acquiring bank are from two different countries, when we calculate the 
industry-adjusted performance measures we use the weighted-average industry figures for the countries 
of both parties weighted by the total assets of each bank. Zcý 
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Mickelson and Partch (1994), Mickelson and Shah (1994), Holthausen and Larcker 
(1994), and Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1994). 
We estimate the abnormal industry-adjusted cash flow returns using the following 
cross-sectional regression: 
IACRpOStj a+ß IACRpre, i+ Ei (1) 
The abnormal industry-adjusted cash flow returns is the intercept a of the cross- 
sectional regression of post-merger industry-adjusted cash flow returns (IACRp,,,, i) on 
the pre-merger industry-adjusted cash flow returns (IACRp,, i) for the same sample 
bank. While 8 captures any correlation in cash flow returns between pre- and post- 
merger years, therefore, 8 IA CRp,,, i measures the effect of the pre-merger performance 
on the post-merger returns, and ej is an error term. We use the same approach to 
measure the abnormal industry-adjusted performance for all the ratios we introduced 
earlier in the previous section. 
6.3.2.3 The effect of the accounting method. 
There are two methods of accounting used to consolidate the financial statements of 
any merged institutions. These are the purchase method (acquisition accounting 
method) and the pooling of interest method (merger accounting method). Z-: > 
According to the purchase method, the assets and liabilities of the target firms are 
recorded at their market value, and any difference between the market value and the 
purchase price is recorded as goodwill and is amortised or written off in the 
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subsequent years. Under the purchase method, for the first year of the merger the 
results of the target and acquiring firms are consolidated from the date the merger 
took place. However, according to the pooling of interest method the assets and 
liabilities of the target firms are recorded at their book value and therefore the 
revaluation of assets is not being permitted according to this method which means 
goodwill do not appear in the balance sheet of the merged institution. The pooling of 
interest method allows the consolidation of the results of the merging parties from the 
beginning of the year regardless of when the merger took place. 
These differences between the two accounting methods cause the reported earnings in 
the purchase method to be lower since in this method the depreciation, cost of goods 
sold, and goodwill expenses are higher. Moreover, because under the purchase 
method pre-acquisition profits are recorded separately, the earnings of the merging 
parties are likely to be consolidated for a shorter period of time compared to the 
pooling method. The book value of assets in the post-merger years is generally higher 
in the purchase method due to the asset write-up. Therefore, the lower earnings in the 
purchase method are due to the differences in the accounting methods, which implies 
that accounting rates of returns can be conveying a fake picture of the performance 
post-merger compared to the pre-merger years. Consequently, the cash flow measure 
of performance is not affected by depreciation or goodwill and represents a better 
measure for operating performance compared to the earnings measures. 
On the other hand all the deals in our sample used the purchase method to consolidate 
the accounts of the merging parties and therefore our sample does not suffer from any 
problem related to the use of differing accounting methods of merger. In our opinion 
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the merging parties in our sample might have used the purchase method of accounting 
in order to benefit from tax shields due to the fact that under this method the reported 
earnings are lower than in the pooling of interest method, as we showed earlier. The 
reasoning could be that the merging parties are postponing tax payments until the 
merger benefits are realised in the medium or longer term. 
6.4 THE RIFSULTS. 
6.4.1 Post-merger Cash Flow Return on Assets. 
In table (6.1) we report the bank, industry-adjusted, and abnormal industry-adjusted 
mean operating cash flow return on market value of assets for the full sample of 35 
bank merger deals in Europe for deals completed between 1992 and 1997. In Panel A 
of table (6.1) we report bank (unadjusted) mean operating cash flow return on assets 
(in column 2) and industry-adjusted mean operating cash flow return on assets (in 
column 3). From Panel A of the table we can see that the mean (unadjusted) operating 
cash flow return on assets was 2.78% two years before merger and 3.15% one year 
pre-merger, this brings the bank mean operating cash flow return on assets to 2.97% 
for the pre-merger period under investigation. The figures for the post-merger period 
show a higher operating cash flow return on assets in the first two years subsequent to 
the merger year, while the third year show a slight decrease. The mean operating cash 
flow return on assets for the three post-merger years do show an improvement at 
3.21%, but this improvement was not significantly different from zero. These figures I C) 
are far lower than those reported in Healy et al., (1992) where the average pre-merger 
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cash flow returns was 25.3% and post-merger was 20.5%. The large difference is 
understandable since Healy et al., (1992) concentrate on the largest non-financial 
USA mergers between 1979 and 1984. Compared to financial services institutions, 
non-financial services firms are characterised by lower assets or in general higher 
Returns on Assets since the financial services institutions (mainly commercial banks) 
hold large amounts of deposits which drive almost any ratio scaled by the assets value 
downward compared to non-financial services firms. On the other hand these results 
are close to those reported in Cornett and Tehranian (1992), for 30 USA bank merger 
deals between 1982 and 1987, where the mean pre-merger cash flow returns was 2% 
and the mean post-merger figure was 2.6%. But it was not stated whether the 
improvement is significant or not. 
However, the results of cash flow return improvement can be attributable to 
contemporaneous events and for economy wide effects. The trend in the whole 
industry might be driving the improvement in cash flow return for the merged 
institutions, and therefore, drawing conclusions from these figures might be 
misleading. The other alternative would be to adjust for the economy wide effects and 
the industry trends by using industry-adjusted cash flow retumS64 . 
In column 3 and 4 in Panel A., table (6.1) we report the mean industry-adjusted 
operating cash flow returns and the percentage of sample banks with positive 
industry-adjusted returns. The merged banks in our sample outperformed their 
industry in the five-year penod we investigate. The industry-adjusted cash flow return 
64 The same procedure was used in Healy et aL, (1992); Cornett and Tehranian (1992), Higson and 
Elliot (1994), Manson Stark and Thomas (1994), and Healy et al., (1994) using the same methodology 
that we adopted here. Moreover, for a list of some studies that adjust for the industry and economy 
wide trends please check the section titled The Performance benchmark in this chapter. 
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on assets was 0.94% in year -2 and 1.85% in year -1, however the mean industry- 
adjusted cash flow return for the two pre-merger years was 1.4% and was 
significantly different from zero at the 10% level. Most importantly the banks in our 
sample outperform their industry during the third post-merger year where the banks 
recorded a positive return of 1.87% (significantly different from zero at the 1%). 
TABLE (6.1): Mean Cash Flow Return on Assets (Total Sample). 
The table reports the mean operating cash flow return on actual market value of assets 
for 35 combined target and acquirer banks in years surrounding mergers completed in 
the period 1992 to 1997. It also shows the abnormal industry- adjusted returns in Panel 
B. 
Panel A: Pre and Post-merger operating cash flow returns 
Year relative to 
merger 
Bank Mean Industry 
adjusted mean 
% positive Number of 
observations 
T-statistics 
-2 2.78 0.94 75.86% 29 1.66 
-1 3.15 1.85 82.35% 35 (2.67)** 
Mean Annual perfo rmance for years -2 and -1 
2.97 1.40 80.00% 35 (2.01)* 
1 3.66 1.11 85.71% 35 1.31 
2 3.37 0.67 84.62% 26 0.68 
3 2.60 1.87 86.67% 15 (3.80)*** 
Mean Annual performance for years 1 to 3 
3.21 1.21 88.57% 35 (2.21)** 
Panel B: Abnormal industry-adjusted operating cash flow returns (t-values in 
parentheses) 
1ACR postl = 0.56% + 0.53 
IACRp,, 9,1 R2 = 0.33 
F-statistic = 16.19*** N= 35 
(0.974) (4.024)*** Adjusted Fý = 0.31 
The numbers in parentheses are White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consis tent t-statistics 
Significantly different from zero at the 10% level, using two-tailed test 
Significantly different from zero at the 5% level, using two-tailed test 
Significantly different from zero at the 1% level, using two-tailed test 
However the mean industry-adjusted cash flow return for the three years was positive, 
1.2117c, and significantly different from zero at the 5% level of significance. In sum, C) 
these figures show, contrary to the unadjusted figures reported earlier, that the post- 
187 
merger operating performance of the merged banks in our sample, measured by mean 
industry-adjusted cash flow returns, has on a relative basis, DECREASED. The 
percentage of positive industry-adjusted returns is 85.7% in year 1,84.6% in year 2, 
and 86.7% in year 3. Although these are high figures and well above the figure 
expected by chance alone (50%), yet this should not be misleading since the pre- 
merger period reveals similar patterns, where the percentage of positive figures is 
75.9% in year -2 and 82% in year -1. 
We have also showed that the mean pre-merger industry-adjusted cash flow return 
was significantly positive at 1.4%. Therefore, even though the mean post-merger 
industry-adjusted returns have decreased but stayed significantly positive at 1.21%, 
this positive figure might be due to the continuation of superior pre-merger industry- 
adjusted performance and not due to the merger itself. In order to disentangle the 
effect of any pre-merger performance on the post-merger performance, we use a 
cross-sectional regression approach to compare the post-merger performance with the 
pre-merger performance. We report the details in the following section. 
At the beginning of our analysis we noticed an improvement in the (unadjusted) mean 
operating cash flow return from 2.97% to 3.21%, but after we accounted for the 
industry-wide effect we observed that the merging banks did not exhibit any 
improvement. Actually we showed that the industry-adjusted cash flow return 
deteriorated from 1.4% to 1.21 % after merger, therefore, it seems that three years after 
merger the planned or expected synergy from merger was not reallsed three years 
after merger. However, some might argue that the three years period could not be lon-c-, 
enough to have the merger benefits realise due to cultural change and the difficulty to CI 
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adapt to the new policies and procedures that might have been put in place. But 
practitioners pretend that within the first year after mer er, the expected cost saving is 9 t: ) 
about 50% while full savings can be achieved after three years (Rhoades, 1998). 
Moreover, others found on average savings of 35% of the acquired bank's data 
processing and back-office operations expense within six to nine months after the 
mergers 65 (Keefe, Bruyette, Woods, 1990). Therefore, we think that the three-year 
period is fairly a good time frame according to which certain merger benefits should 
have been realised if they can be attained. 
6.4.2 Abnormal industry-adjusted cash flow returns. 
We use the cross-sectional regression equation (1) explained earlier in section 6.3.2.2 
and we report the results of this cross-sectional regression in Panel B of table (6.1). 
From the shown results we can see that the estimate of ais positive but not 
significantly different from zero which means that there is no evidence of abnormal 
post-merger performance. In addition, the estimate offlis 0.53 and significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level. This means that the industry-adjusted cash flow 
returns persist over time. Moreover, the mean positive returns in the post-merger 
period are due to the continuation of bank-specific performance during the pre-merger 
period and not due to the merger itself, since the estimate of a is not significantly 
different from zero. 
Our results showing the lack of any evidence of post-merger performance 
improvement contradict those reported by Cornett and Tehranian (1992) who use a 
Similar methodology. The difference between our results and those of Cornett and 1-1) 
65 Quoted from Avkiran, N. K., 1999. The Evidence on Efficiency Gains: The role of mergers and the Z-- 
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Tehranian (1992) could be due to the fact that we study a different geographical 
market, and a different period. We also extend the analysis to disentangle the effect of 
the continuation of the pre-merger performance, which was not accounted for by 
Cornett and Tehranian (1992). But Cornett and Tehranian's industry-adjustment 
procedure does not control for differences in performance among banks operating in 
various regions of the country and therefore their results could be biased due to the 
use of a national benchmark rather than a regional benchmark. This observation was 
supported by Pilloff (1996)'s findings who replicated the results of Cornett and 
Tehranian (1992) and found no evidence of performance improvement. While we 
predicted the problem of using one unified benchmark for banks from different 
countries, and used a benchmark for every bank in our sample. 
Looking at table (6.1) we can see that we could not include all the banks in our 
sample for all the years we examined because data was not available for some of 
them. For instance, for banks which merged in 1997, there were no financial 
statements available for analysis in year 3, i. e. year 2000, while some other banks 
were not represented in year -2 because data was not available, before year 1991, for 
these banks as well. Therefore, we accounted for the possible problem of having the 
results affected by the weight of some banks which are represented in every year we 
study, and the lack of weight for other banks which are not represented in every year. 
For this reason we constructed another sample which includes banks for which we 
have data available for years -1,0,1, and 2, giving a sample of 26 bank mergers we 
then performed the analysis one more time and rerun the cross-sectional regression as 
we did when we examined the largest sample. 
benefits to the public. Journal of Banking and Finance 23,991-1013. 
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We report the results in table (6.2) and we can see that the results are not materially 
different except that the evidence is stronger of no post-merger improvement in 
industry-adjusted operating cash flow return. The bank (unadjusted) mean cash flow 
return show a similar pattern, and close figures, to the original total sample in table 
(6.1). Comparing the figures for the one pre-merger year with the mean two post- 
merger years we notice an improvement (column 2). On the other hand when we 
investigate the industry-adjusted figures (column 3) we notice that for the pre-merger 
year there is no evidence of superior performance for the sample of 26 bank mergers, 
the industry-adjusted cash flow return is 1.55% not significantly different from zero at 
the 10% level. Whereas the performance is significantly above the industry mean 
during the first year after the merger and is 1.43 %. Moreover, when we consider the 
mean industry-adjusted cash flow return for the two post-merger years, we observe 
that the figure of 1.04% is not significantly different from zero and is lower than the 
pre-merger figure as well. From these figures, we conclude that there is no evidence 
of operating performance improvement dunng the two post-merger years. 
We extend the analysis to measure the abnonnal industry-adjusted cash flow return, 
Panel B of table (6.2), and find that the positive post-merger industry-adjusted cash 
flow return, although not significantly different from zero as we showed earlier, is due 
to the continuation of a bank-specific performance before the merger. This is clear 
from looking at the estimate of 8 (0.42), which is significant at the 5% level. 
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TABLE (6.2): Mean Cash Flow Return on Assets (26 Deals). 
The table reports mean operating cash flow return on actual market value of assets for 
26 combined target and acquirer banks in years surrounding mergers completed in the 
period 1992 to 1996. It also shows the abnormal industry-adjusted returns in Panel B. 
Panel A: Pre and Post merger operating cash flow returns 
Year Bank Mean Industry % positive Number of T-statistics 
relative to adjusted mean observations 
merger 
-1 3.38 1.55 73-08% 26 1.67 
1 3.89 1.43 80.77% 26 (2.02)* 
2 3.37 0.67 84-62% 26 0.68 
Mean Annual performance for years 1 and 2 
3.63 1.04 84.62% 26 1.22 
Panel B: Abnormal industry-adjusted operating cash flow returns (t-values in 
parentheses) 
IACR postj = 0.39% + 0.42 IACRp,,, 
(0.49) (2.527)** 
Fe = 0.21 F-statistic = 6.388** N= 26 
Adjusted R2= 0.18 
The numbers in parentheses are White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consis tent t-statistics 
Significantly different from zero at the 10% level, using two-tailed test 
Significantly different from zero at the 5% level, using two-tailed test 
Significantly different from zero at the 1% level, using two-tailed test 
In sum, using the cash flow return on assets to investigate the operating performance 
change for the merged banks, we deduce that: 
The mean industry-adjusted cash flow return on assets decreased in the three post- 
merger years compared to the two pre-merger years for the 35 bank mergers that 
we investigate. The positive and significant post-merger return is due to the 
continuation of a bank-specific performance during the pre-merger period and not 
due to the merger itself, since there is no evidence of abnormal industry-adjusted 
cash flow return for the post-merger period. 
- For the smaller sample of 26 bank mergers the analysis reveals that, although the 
industry-adjusted cash flow returns are not significantly different from zero in the 
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two periods, pre-merger and post-merger, yet the evidence is that there is no 
improvement in performance. Moreover, the positive post-merger return is due to 
the continuation of a bank-specific performance during the pre-merger period and 
not due to the merger itself, since there is no evidence of abnormal industry- 
adjusted cash flow return for the post-merger period. 
Our results contradict those of Cornett and Tehranian (1992) for USA bank merger, 
and Healy et al., (1992) for non-bank mergers in the USA as well, as we showed 
earlier. 
The positive industry-adjusted cash flow return in the post merger period can be 
attributed to various reasons and can anse from different sources. In the next section 
we examine where this positive return came from and try to determine what the 
components of the operating cash flow return are, we therefore, examine the change in 
some financial ratios, which belong to common bank performance indicators. 
6.4.3 Sources of Cash Flow Returns. 
6.4.3.1 The Unadjusted Performance Measures. 
We follow the same method of analysis that we used to examine the post-merger 
operating cash flow return in the previous section. In table (6.3) we report a 
comparison of the mean operating performance measures for 35 bank mergers for two 
pre-merger years and three post-merger years without adjusting for the industry trend. 
Whereas in table (6-4) we report the comparison after we adjusted for the industry 
trend. The unadjusted performance measures (table 6.3) should be considered as the 
193 
second step analysis for the bank mean unadjusted cash flow return (table 6.1 column 
2). 
The unadjusted figures in table (6.3) show the following: 
The two profitability measures that we used, ROA and ROE, show an increase from 
two years pre-merger to three years post merger. The increase of the two ratios is not, 
however, significantly different from zero moreover, the percentage of banks which 
have a positive change in the profitability ratios is 57%, slightly above having the 
change due to chance i. e. 50%. As for the capitalisation, it seems that the merging 
banks have experienced a decrease in capitalisation, in terms of all the measures we 
use even though the decrease is only significantly different from zero for the Equity to 
Deposits ratio which decreased from 12.95% to 9.47%. 
The Total capital ratio decreased from 14.38% to 12.06% and the Equity to total 
customer loans ratio decreased from 12.44% to 10.48%. On the other hand, the loan 
quality ratios show that the merging banks significantly improved the quality of their 
loan portfolio. The Loan loss reserve to Gross loans decreased from 5.77% to 3.54% 
(significant at the 10%), the Loan loss provisions to Net interest revenue also 
decreased from 29.44% to 16.79% (significant at the 1%), and the Non-performing 
loans to Gross loans decreased almost by half to 4.11 % (significant at the 10%). 
The deposits utilisation ratio does not seem to have changed significantly, whereas, 
the Non-interest expenses to Average assets and the Interest expenses to Average 
assets improved significantly after merger, at the 10% and 5% level respectively. C) 
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Though the other efficiency measures changed, the change was not significantly 
different from zero. 
The net interest revenue to earning assets seems to have decreased from 2.8 1% to 
2.12%. This significant decrease (at the 1% level) is reasonable because of the trend 
of decreasing interest margins in the whole financial sector. On the other hand, as for 
the liquidity measures, it seems that the positive change was not significant. 
As a summary, we do not find an evidence of a significant profitability improvement 
for the 35 bank mergers we examined, moreover, the efficiency effect of these 
mergers fail to be realised very strongly. We do not find significant improvements in 
most of the efficiency measures that we used. Merged banks appear to have improved 
their non-interest expenses and interest expenses ratios, in addition to this source of 
value gain it seems that the loan quality improved as well. But considering the 
decrease in the Non-performing loans to Gross loans ratio, together with the other 
loan quality ratios, we believe that the merged institutions did not shift to a lower 
credit risk loan portfolio by granting better quality loans. It seems that the decrease in 
these ratios was due to the write off of a large amount of the bad debts that they held 
in their portfolios. Having said that, we deduce that this is the main reason why the 
Non-performing loans to Gross loans almost halved after the merger, and this huge 
decrease is not due to an increase in the amount of customer loans, which increased 
only by 11% on average, but is due to the large decrease in the amount of Non- 
performing loans (more than 75%). 
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These findings are also confirmed when we restrict the analysis to the sample of 26 
bank mergers (see table 6.5 above) where we get close figures to the ones reported 
above in table (6.3). 
In addition, in order to gain more insights from these results, we also report the 
gradual change every year in the unadjusted performance measures in table (6.7) for 
the total sample, and in table (6.9) for the 26 bank mergers. 
In sum the analysis of these ratios supports the conclusion, which we obtained earlier 
that the bank mean (unadjusted) cash flow return improved but not significantly 
during the post-merger period. Therefore, the improvement in Non-interest expenses 
to Average assets and in Interest Expenses to Average assets did not provide enough 
support for the banks cash flow position. 
6.4.3.2 The Abnormal Industry-adjusted Performance. 
In this section we extend the analysis to examine whether the industry trend affected 
our conclusions in the previous section. Therefore, we deduct the industry mean 
figures from our sample ratios and analyse the results one more time, afterwards, we 
calculate the abnormal industry-adjusted performance measures and examine whether 
the change is due to the merger itself or is a continuation to the pre-merger 
performance. We reported the results in table (6.4) below and we reached the 
following conclusions concerning the common bank performance measures. 
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The profitability: the ROE show similar results to the unadjusted ratios that we 
examined earlier, there is no evidence of significant change in profitability during the 
post-merger period. However, the ROA and ROE ratios were not significantly below 
the industry average before merger but the ROA seems to have dropped to 0.60% 
below the industry average after the merger (significant at the 1% level). Moreover, 
the intercept a, the abnormal industry-adjusted ROA, in the cross-sectional regression 
of post-merger industry-adjusted ROA on pre-merger ROA is -0.46% and is 
statistically significant. This evidence indicates that the merger led to a decrease in the 
ROA ratio. 
The behaviour of profitability for the merging institutions can also be detected by 
observing table (6.8), in which we show how the ratios changed gradually every year, 
from one year pre-merger to three years post-merger. It is obvious from this table that 
the ROA dropped to 0.66% (significant at the 1% level) below the industry average 
one year right after the merger. Moreover, when we restrict the analysis to the smaller 
sample of 26 mergers, the results do not change, actually they become more apparent 
since ROA decreases to 0.87% below the industry average and the figure is significant 
at the 1% level. 
Our findings are, in general, similar to most of the other studies done in the USA and 
Europe. For instance, Rhoades (1986) reported no profitability improvement for the 
acquiring bank in 413 USA bank mergers. Similar findings were later reported in 
Rose (1987b) for the acquiring bank and in Rhoades (1990), Spindt and Tarhan 
202 
(1992), for the target bankS66. While Spong and Shoenhair (1992) reported that the 
average ROA and ROE for the target banks decreased, but the median figures have 
increased. Whereas Rose (1987a), Rose (1989), Cornett and Tehranian (1992)67, 
Berger and Humphrey (1992), O'Keefe (1992), Rose (1992)68 , Linder and Crane 
(1992)69, Peristiani (1993a), Pilloff (1996), and recently Kwan and Eisenbeis (1999) 
found similar evidence, of no profitability improvement, for the combined entity of 
target and acquiring banks. 
On the other hand the evidence of improved profitability was limited to very few 
studies, these included Cornett and Tehranian (1992) (for the ROE ratio but not the 
ROA ratio) and Peristiani (1993b) who find that ROA ratio has improved for the 
combined entity of target and acquirer. Rhoades (1998) also reports ROA 
improvement for seven out of the nine case studies that he summansed, while Rose 
(1995) found that the ROA and ROE ratios improved for acquiring banks during the 
two post-merger years but deteriorated afterwards. Similar pattems to Rose (1995) 
were found in Craig and Santos (1997) for quarterly data from quarter -4 to quarter 16 
relative to the acquisition date. However, Vander Vennet (1996 and 1999a) reported 
improved profitability in the European credit institutions for domestic mergers of 
equal partners only, but no improved profitability for domestic acquisitions and cross- 
border acquisitions. 
66 Spindt Tarhan (1992) found that the ROA ratio for the target bank did not improve but the ROE 
improved after merger. While Spong and Shoenhair (1992) found that the mean ROA 
67 Cornett and Tehranian (1992) found that the ROA ratio did not improve but the ROE improved after 
merger, for the combined entity. 
68 Rose (1992) used the ROA and ROE ratios as well and found that the ROE ratio improved while the 
ROA did not. 
69 Linder and Crane ( 199-1) used the operatinc, income to assets ratio, but also found that this ratio 
improved for mergers within the BHC. 
203 
C 
40 
42 
cn 
cz 
ce 
72 
Z 
ce 
ÖZ 
1--0 
cli 
_c 
E 
C 
Cli 
CZ 
cli 
c, 2 
C -ZJ , 
4- 
CD 
CD 
Im 
= --, i ( 
m 
E 
0 1- 
0 * M Llý c» LO 
ZD (D 
Li 
C) C> CM C» Lo uý oý CO (0 b CD 'L' LO CM ci 
(0 f', * "t 
« 
- 
r1- 
ce) 
CM 
0 
e 
o 
e 
C: ) 
r- 
m ý 
8 cm 
r, » (Z; C? ý (0 cý 
, , 
CD ö ci i ä c; cý E 
0 r_ 
40 ö2 Ö'2 -0,0 0-'- ä20 -. -' -0-0 O-o- '. -, 2 -00- of '0--2 0-0, JO -0 -0,2 -0-' '-., 2 of '0-' J 0 gi. LO Y-- 
00 
LO 
- CO 
LO 
-r-- 
t- 
CIJ 
OD 
Cr) 
CM 
-r- 
00 
Cr) 
CD 
-r-- 
(D 
e 
00 
Cr) 
LO 
Cy) 
M 
Cýýj 00 
LO 
(0 
(0 
e 
xt 
LO 
CM 
(0 
C\i 
r-- 
x 
cr) 
, 
r, - 
(ýe 
x 
m 
CY) 
r'- C) c, ) o 
1: t 
cq ' x 
OD 
t « r- co CO clj 
M 
cr) 
CM 
, 
CD 
cy) 
CD 
(0 
(0 
5 r - c; 7- : 
Lc) c; 
cý ä . -- 
cyý cý 00 OD Lc i (0 mt 
Cm 
l'- 
e CD o c:. e 
,1 c> e CD C: ) a 
N 
r c-i" -ci" '0-2 -0-0 '-0'2 c-i'- 0-- -0, - ö2 0-2 J- '0-2 of Ci" -p-o 0-2 --02 -0-0 -0-0 -00- Ö-2 -00- o 0 ý (D (» 00 CU 00 ý CM CM (D r1- CM C, 3 CM (D M CY) CU (0 xt (D - gL CO LO ý CY) le M ce xt xt LO CM -r- t- qt ýt ý- CM (0 le LO nt CO 
Jo 
C\J 
r, - 
(0 (3) 
ci 
Lo 
, 
OD 
Co , C: ) 
e 
r- 
OD 
cr) 
C\J 
, 
CM 
0') 
CO -x m cr) 
C\J 
xt 
e 
xt 
(P 
CO 
C) 
M 
(D e e 
C\J 
cy) mt 
' "0 0 C\, r- ' 
cý cý c5 cý 7 -, i cý cý c; 9 c5 . c; R c5 ä cý 
«a 
.. 0. Z 
,q ýo1111 (0 
' 
A (0 : Lo 9) . 1-0 4) gn -h. Co . 6. i Q) q 14- 
%X Co Z 2 
`1 
1 0 Q) Co to qq U) u) to - 1 
to 
C 
4 
. 
> to 
Q) q: c - 0 
Co rc C - , Q) -111. - 
Co 
q e Lii -e 0 o 
E 
2 -2 , li (Z ý- , - Co ( ) to Z u) - 0 LLj 
Cm Co lu CJ 
U0 0 0) Q) 1 0 CO 
42 
. 10 
ý 
CC 211 
Q) 
Z - (5 
to 
0 
qq F- 
0) 
0 
k-- 9) «X 
Z 
-- 
q) 
Co 
Z 
Q) - tu ß E q 15 
72 Q) (b >c c) >c 
A 0 Q tu E -ý. 9) Lu - 
cýx Lu 
r E rc b % ic > .ý CJ ýz Co 0 ýj -b- x x 4 ) t -, 0) - _ E U , 
to 0 
i3 
Z 
0 
Z 
0 CL 0 
.2 .. 
9) 
0 
(A 
0 
vc 90 Z LLJ 
LU , 0) Z -- Q. Q) Z -ri -- 1- E 0 r- Z 4 q cj - , , . & Q) CU 
2 4- . 6- 
2 Zi 'ý 
1 
ý ' CL tu Co Z . 1123 r. q) Z :s 
22 s 
a. ) (b 
rc 
4) 
cc 
ß 0 
Lu 
tr 
Lu 
to 
U 
0 0 0 0 . - 0 . 4- Q) q) . . 
(, ) 01 (3 
Z--M 
ý: r- r- Q) 
. 
(1) Q) Q) ýz 
-ýn- : zz r- 
. 
11) ýz ýe e 
lý . iz- r- CI 
. ý>- -ýY) Co U) (0 (n - 
204 
ýc 
-0 
ce 
CL) ce 
ce 
9. d IZZ ---4 cu r_ Z4 * (U ce u 
-0 ;. = ýi-i 
cn 
: 
ce 
zi 
6-J 
4- 
C) 
CD 
mC cli 
00 u 
CD 
4-, 
-0 Q) 
ce 
cý: 
LO 
jo J 0- 0-2 '0- 0-ý 6- 0- O-o- -, j ö'- 0--2 '0--2 -0-0 -0-0 0 29 äe -2 >e 0 0 CY) r, - 0 r, - r- C) 0 (D CD CD F-- C) CD CD rl_ CY) ce) CD 0 r- r- 
Z CL CNJ CM CM le (D Ilt le C\i OD 'e xt N - r- (0 (0 (0 CM 
Co 
> 
cm 
0 
m 
Cc) 't 
x 
CD - C» 
0) 
LO 
C: ) 
U') 
(D 
C» C: ) C\J 
C» 
CM 
U') 
C) 
.x 
c,: > 
C\i 
(D c» m (D CD L1) 
CJ C) CD cz; cý ä c? 
Lt) 
- -8 
C: ) 
c? 
CM (0 t- Co 
c; 
cý 
CD 
uý 
cm 
e 
Lr; 
:E CO) 0 Co 9 cr) 
C%i :L 
U) 
J- Jo 
, 0, CJ- 
ýo2 -0-' -do- 0- -00- 00- -o-e -0--2 -60- 0,2 -0-2 "0-2 "0-0- Jo 
J 
O-o- -02 0-2 
11 0 C, 2 CD 0 C) r-- r1- ul - 00 CM 00 CI) CO e (C) 00 0) C\J 't CY "t CM LO 
Z CL C\i LO CNJ CM - CO M - M cq CM LO 't M - - LO xt Lx) (D - 
-60- 
0 > cm 
0 
m 
C» C\i * C\i -- 
0') CO k 
co -x 
-X 
-w -x 
cm , 
x x 
m C) CM m 
E 
m 
LO 
5 
Lf) 
i 
Cr) 
(0 .. - 
(: ) -r (» m 
rý- cy) 
C» 
(Z CD 
CD 
P- 
rIl (0 
c ) 
(C) ' ', ýt 
CD 
OD 
CM 
nzt 
(0 , n OD C\, 
0 . -x r- 
( e c:, CD C> . C? 
ý 
ci c5 c; CD e 
O Co m KL 
V) :2 -. -2 -, -2  0, -09- -0-' J- 'o-2 Ö-2 äo, J, -00, '-o-2 '0-'- 0-0- 'o-2 0-'- 0-0- -o-2 -cio- äo- c-i- --0- 11 0 cr) e . C, ) (D (» (D -r- (0 r1- C> CY) P- C» C) CO - CD t- e - - C) Z CM r- CM CM CM CO le ýr-- le CY 'Kt le "e C) 04 Ln LO LO LO CM 
0 
16- 
0 
Co x 
C\J r- 00 
(0 
(0 cm C) LC) 
c» 
(0 LO 00 r, - 
C%i 
, 
Xt 
Co 
0 11) 
(0 Ict 
CY, 
CD OD 
; <» 
CD (D Lo co L') D 
<» 
Lt) LO LO C'> c> -e 
r - OD 
0) 
E 
x 
c5 c c; c) e a 
C? C? c, ) , C? o - CD CD C: ) C: ) c? c) 
0 
U) CV) = --. 2 --0,0 -Zjo -0-' -o-2 -o-9ý --02 jý -ozý2 -o-2 -o-2 -02 -o-o 0-2 -oo, -oo, -0,0 -, 0, --0-0 ag -0-0 -0-- 11 0 c) (0 C> C\j C\j -, - oD -e r, C\j r- (» CM 00 OD le 't (0 0) C) C: ) C) (» C\j Lr) - Cy) e Co C%j -nt Cr) e C\j - (0 (v) 't Cýj C\I LO LO LO LO CM Z 
0. 
16- 
M 
h- 
CD 
Co 
3 LO 
c» 
N M (0 Lo (: ) 
r- (: ) (r 
M C) N 
ci 
Ci 
-x - 
CO Z 
x - CM (0 (D Lc) CY) 
-x - e 
x x C) * c» ce) le CM 
LO 
C, 1) 
x OD 
ce) 
4) 
: 
h- 4) -2 
ä C: ) cý 
, e CJ 
c; 
ý C%J 
C: ) 
(. 0 
Cq . 
OD 
c) 
CO 
c) 
CO 
(0 
- CD - CD 
. 
r-- 
E r CO 
0 
-ýI 
qcz 
1 
Z loe 
1 
0 loe 
Co 
:e Co Q) C 
+A. 
9) 
Co -t- lole Z A 1 
Co 
Co 
o 
42 X 0 Q) (0 Co ß 
E O t Co 
- , 9) 
i 
Q) 
CE 
ca q 
n 122. Z. - , G JX Co 
l E 0 (Z - ( 9) 
Q) ýx «"' r , c) - F-- 0 , (U (0 0) 0) Co e Lu le - 0 r (0 (b - C) t. 0 LU CQ % CJ 
M 
Z + i Z 
Ct 0 
: >b 
lý- 
C 0 -- > 61 b cu 
ý; 
Z t. 
tu 
.. 
-ý Co 
0 Co . 62 b. Z '*, bb 
ý. ' 
U) 
i 
11. ý, - u) x > K- q) 
CX 
X 
C 
0 
: %6.. Ce -4. i 
kz 
ý, ' 
q) . 0) rc 0 , Q) Co 0 Z cb ICZ Z Lu q u -rx 
w 4) 4) 0 u) 
qq 4q CU 
:2 
Q) 
c3 
t 
ý. z 
Co 
", x 
cc ti. 0 0 CL cx u) -- 
ýs Lu -ý 0 
Z ci -0- 
4. 0 
r, q 2 CU C) - 
* j. c m . i -i CL 8 . 
0 
3 Z tu - , Z Z ct Z 
JI ci. s 
(4 
0 -0- 
CO 
tu 
4. 
Z 
cr cc Lu Lu (i i k k Z o o CL 
. 4- O (j 
Q) 
k U zt -i 4 . ý -i 
9) -U - -0 ' Q) 70 Q) 
Z: z rý 
:, (0 -- Co 
r2 Z 
.Z-- (lö 
aM 
(U 
113 12- Q) 
AO (b C) zt:: 
r_ r- M 
m (U u Z- rj (j ZC- 
205 
CD 
421 
Z: 
_c 
110 
Cl) 
ct 
E 
w= C*, Cý 
0U rq 
IZ >-.. ;. 
cn 
:3 ct 
cn 
C) 
ct 
E 
ct 
cn 
-C u ct 
Cýs 
u 
CM : 2, 
c 0 -d" ä2 - 0 "02 -d'- --' -00- -0- '. --2 -, 
'- -0- -0,2 0-0- of '0-2 -2 --0 
J > 2 --2 11 0 M CD , 0 r1- t- LI) - 00 CM OD CI) CO t (0 OD C» CM nt 
0 
CM le 
0 
CM U-) 
Z a. CM 
LO CM CM M CY) CO CM Oj LO e C) LO e LO (0 
-CI 
ß. 
> cu 
CM C%i (» Co Co I 
E LO 
U') cr) 
(c 
0 co r- c» 0 
Co 
r, - 
r, 
Cm cr) 
(0 e 
CD 
l 
CM 
M 
(0 
C D CM 
cr) c2 CM 0 .L x r ei 
! c; c; c; - c; ci xý C 
xý 
C - 0 CD * 0 c> 'e 0 O cu m 
D D 
(na. 
CM 
l 
:2 
0 -0--2 c-. -" , - 
J- 
0-0 -d" >02 '. 
'- äo- '0-'- ö'- ö2 "0-0- -0-0 -do2 -00- '0-2 '0-2 '0-2 '0--2 '0--2 0--2 11 LO Lf) . le (» 9-- LO U) CM CM LO LO Cy) (0 OD CM r- CM CM 'Kt 'e 00 LO 
z IL (0 
ý CY) ý M e T- cr) ý CM e (Y) le CM ý (0 U') LO LO - 
0 
h- CM m * CO x r-- CO ' r- e C) -x Cf) C\i I xt C) Co t-- , (D ' t (D 0 
C» 
. 00 LO OD 
LO r- e (0 C J (j) , cr) e (3) 
> 
1 
Jät 
00 C> U ) c2 CD C: ) CD 00 ) 
CC) ci 6 ', ýt co C: ) CD C: ) 
E r_ C? C CD CD 
0 m 
1 1 
LL, 
CY 22 -101 -101 C-PI JO -. -2 -. -2 äol 10-2 0-0- -CiO- äo- -0-0 -0-0 10-2 äol -0-2 ä2 102 -0-0 1019 10-9 11 0 0 , (D M 00 CM OD CM CM 0 t- CM CO CM (0 C» M C\J (0 'e (0 "- 
Z CL Cr) LO -r- CO e CO r) gt t 
LO CM - p, - "t e - CM (0 e LI) e C') 
1: L 
&- (1) CM (0 C» L1) Co , "t OD Cm clj CC) cr) t e 00 CO Zt CNJ Co CO CM ý OD C) P'ý Cf) - Ci cm 4 (e cý 4 c) (D 
> x c; 
CT-\j ä 
3 cý cý 
ä cý a; C? c; c; c c ? o (D 77 cý E cu 
0 
öe -., ý 102 1 -0 ( 1 1 1 0 1 U) Co -4.. o 9 
(A 0 K: z 
(4 0 9 "x Co Z 
C 
CU 
0 
ýR 0 8 
% 
Co 0 
tw. 
0) 
C 
Cx 
X 
Lu 
(0 
q 
0) 
% 
f 
Co 
U) l-; 8 & c) 
rc 
1 0 C: L o Q) 4 ICZ ß ý. 
rc 
CJ 
0 0 
& j- 4) , u X to zi 
-- 2 Z 4.. - b.; ý 1 Co Co 0) ei 
m qq Lij 0 -1 Ce 9) 9 0 Lij 
IM 9) (5 
C 
1 
. t ; 
- 
>b 
C tu «: x 0 u) r- Q) Z Z 0 
ß > K) , Co . . to - Q) >. 0) 16. cx rc 9) 0 b-. - t _c : >b > 
CC 
-ý 
0 
12- 
-ý 
cri 
9) 
(A 
1 
Co 
4) 
C 
ýN. 
Z 
CU 
9) 
E 
e 
-ý. 
Z 
q) 
LU 
, 
x: 
ý Lj 
Z 
cz 
, 
9) 
:i 
ß 
to. ) 
q: z 
* 
IM 23 is hz 0 ct CL 0 0 n. _ 0 . 4.. CJ 
Lu LU J Z 
31-13 E- 2 Z SZL Z Z cu ir 2; 3 
r c L L ( c 0 . 0 C (i 
4) 0) 
t c - LI u -) i k Z Z 
L 
:, Z r: ý C: (V 7z cu 
(3 L j) cli 
Y. 2 r. 2 
ýý (4 -- (1) 
. - 
' 
ci 
12 
- zz Z- c 
' CE (Z r 
206 
The Capital adequacy: table (6.4) shows that the mean Total Capital ratio decreased 
from 2.76% below the industry average (although was not significant) to 4.28% 
(highly significant at the 1% level) below the industry average after merger. The same 
pattern is observed for the Equity to Deposits and the Equity to Total customer loans 
ratios. The equity to deposits dropped from 3.21% above the industry average to 
1.61% below the industry average, and the equity to total customer loans decreased 
from 1.47% to -0.9%. But both ratios were not significantly different from zero during 
the pre-merger or the post-merger period. 
The estimates of the abnormal industry-adjusted post-merger performance for these 
ratios provide evidence for decreased capitalisation. The estimate related to the total 
capital ratio is -3.95% and statistically significant, and the estimate of the abnormal 
industry-adjusted post-merger equity to deposits ratio is -3.25% and significant as 
well. Whereas, there is no evidence of abnormal post-merger change in the equity to 
customer loans ratio since the estimate of ais not significantly different from zero. 
We can see the decrease in the Total capital ratio clearly in table (6.8) as well where it 
follows a downward trend beginning from year one after merger. Pilloff (1996) and 
Rose (1995) also found decreased capitalisation measured by equity to assets, whereas 
Kwan and Eisenbeis (1999) found that the equity to assets ratio improved after 
merger. However, Cornett and Tehranian (1992) reported an insignificant 
improvement of the capital to assets ratio of the merged banks driven by increased 
deposits and loans figures as well. 
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Loan quality: the loan quality ratios that we used exhibit above industry average 
ratios before merger and below industry average after merger, which are not 
significantly different from zero. On the other hand when we restrict the analysis to 
the small sample of 26 mergers (table 6-6), we notice that the Non-performing loans 
to gross loans ratio was not significantly different from zero before merger (4.38%) 
and dropped to -0.9% after merger (significant at the 5% level). This ratio dropped 
significantly in the first year after merger to -0.80% and to -99% in the second year 
(table 6.10). 
On the other hand the evidence on improved loan quality is obvious due to the 
significant estimate of the abnormal industry-adjusted post-merger performance in the 
loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio which is -0.467%. In addition to that, when we 
restrict the analysis to the smaller sample of 26 bank mergers, we find another 
evidence of improved loan quality and decrease in credit risk since the abnon-nal 
industry-adjusted post-merger performance in the non-performing loans to gross loans 
ratio is -1.03% and is significant at the 5% level (table 6.6 column 7). 
Moreover, in support of our earlier analysis for the unadjusted performance measures, 
we deduce from this outcome that the merged banks tend to start a restructuring 
process right after the merger. This process starts by polishing the loan portfolio of 
these banks, which affects the banks capital standing and market exposure, therefore, 
the first step was to write off large parts of the bad debts in the loans portfolio. 
Our results of decreased credit risk due to the merger are similar to those in Vander 
Vennet (1996 and 1999a) for a sample of EU domestic bank mergers of equal partners 
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while Cornett and Tehranian (1992) reports no change in loan quality after merger for 
USA bank mergers. 
Deposits Utilisation: the total customer loan to deposits was above the industry 
average before merger but was not significantly different from zero. However, after 
merger the ratio increased to 11.61% above industry level (significant at the 10% 
level). This fact means that merging banks tended to make the best use of their loans 
capacity. The significant increase of this ratio above the industry average could be the 
main reason for the significant decrease in the Total capital ratio below industry 
average that we observed earlier. But we could not find enough evidence of abnormal 
performance change due to the merger (the estimate of ais not significant) 
Efficiency: as we can see from table (6.4), we have used several ratios to measure I- 
efficiency change associated with merger. The Non-interest expenses to Average 
assets ratio was 0.31% below the industry average before merger, but not significantly 
different from zero, then dropped more than two times to -0.67% after merger and 
was highly significant at the 1% level. The same pattern is observed for the Interest- 
expenses to Average assets ratio which dropped from -3.39% to -4.16%, both figures 
are significantly different from zero at the 10% and 1% respectively. The merger 
clearly provided ample opportunity to improve non-interest expenses and interest 
expenses ratios, the estimates of the abnormal industry-adjusted performance 
measures for these two ratios are -0.64% and -3.43% and are significantly 
different 
from zero at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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We also used the components of the non-interest expenses to average assets ratio to 
examine where exactly the change could have come from. The ratios were the 
personnel expenses to average assets and the other administrative expenses to average 
assets. The two measures were not significantly different from zero before merger, 
then they improved to 0.63% and 0.32% below the industry averages respectively, for 
the three post-merger years, both were highly significant (at the 1% level). 
When we examine the gradual change of these ratios every year, from table (6.8) we 
notice that the other administrative expenses to average assets ratio took a downward 
trend at year one post-merger, while the personnel expenses increased slightly at year 
one and then dropped afterwards. The latter observation might imply that the 
management of the merging banks could have incurred redundancy costs to deploy 
excess staff and improve productivity per employee afterwards, however without 
having data on the change in the number of staff, this conclusion might be misleading. 
Therefore, when we restricted the analysis to the smaller sample of 26 bank mergers 
(table 6.10) we notice that the personnel expenses to average assets ratio started a 
downward trend right after the merger, hence we can not strongly support the earlier 
conclusion. 
Similar to the Interest expense and the non-interest expense ratio, it seems that the 
merging banks improved their expense ratios significantly. The estimates of the 
abnormal performance measures for the personnel expenses and the other 
administrative expense ratios are, -0.56 and -0.31 respectively, and both are 
highly 
significant at the 1% level. tý 
210 
We also used the general and most common cost efficiency measure, the cost to 
income ratio, but this measure did not provide any evidence for superior performance 
neither pre-merger nor post-merger. 
We also examined one profit efficiency measure, that is the other operating income to 
average assets ratio, and we notice from table (6.4) that the ratio dropped to 0.55% 
below the industry average (significantly different from zero at the 5%). The 
downward trend can be obviously observed in tables (6.8 and 6.10). However the 
intercept a, representing the abnormal industry-adjusted post-merger other operating 
income ratio, provides a clear evidence of deteriorated profit efficiency due to the 
merger. The estimate of a is -0.55 and is significantly different from zero at the 5% 
level. 
The improvement in cost efficiency due to merger is not consistent with USA bank 
merger studies 70 , but similar to the findings of EU bank merger studies. Vander 
Vennet (1996 and 1999a) finds evidence of improvement in cost efficiency for the 
domestic mergers of equal partners, by observing lower labour cost to assets, 
operating expenses to assets and cost to income ratio. As Vander Vennet (1996 and 
1999a) concluded, we believe the merged banks exploited synergies and reversed 
their pre-merger performance, which was not distinguishable from the industry level, 
to exceed the industry performance in the post-merger period. This supports our 
earlier findings, in the previous chapter, that exploiting operational and managerial 
70 For studies that examined the cost ratios change associated with USA bank mergers see Rhoades 
(1986), Rhoades (1990), Spindt and Tarhan (1992), Berger and Humphrey (1992), Linder and Crane 
0992), Srinivasan and Wall (1992), Rose (1992), DeYoung (1993). Peristiam (1993a, 1993b), Rhoades 
(1993), and Kwan and Eisenbeis (1999). 
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synergies to improve cost efficiency was the major motive for these bank mergers, 
and it seems that the expected synergy was reallsed three years after merger. 
But these marriages among the European banks are not perfect without obstacles, 
since they examined decreased profit efficiency after merger. We believe that, as we 
explained earlier in chapters 2 and 3, the main challenge that is facing the financial 
services industry in general, is the decreased profitability level due to intense 
competition. Moreover the deteriorated profit efficiency, measured by the other 
operating expenses ratio to average assets, might be stemming from continued intense 
competition in the banking industry, which originally motivated these banks to merge 
and improve cost efficiency as we postulated earlier in Chapter 3. 
Interest Rate Risk: as in Cornett and Tehranian (1992), we evaluated the interest rate 
risk behaviour of the merging banks. We notice from table (6.4) that the interest rate 
risk measure decreased from 0.37% to 0.08% after merger, but these figures are not 
significantly different from zero anyway. Moreover, there is also no evidence of 
abnormal industry-adjusted post-merger performance change since the estimate of the 
intercept a is not significantly different from zero as well. It seems it is logical to 
observe that., in a highly competitive and sophisticated banking environment it is less 
likely to reach interest rate risk situation above industry average. This is consistent 
with the notion that oligopolistic rents have become less prevalent in European 
banking (Vander Vennet, 1999b). 
Liquidity Risk: two of the liquidity indicators that we used do not exhibit significant 
change due to the merger. The cash and bank accounts to assets ratio increased from t) I 
21 1? 
0.35% to 0.45%, while the net loan to assets ratio decreased from -0.01% to -0.5217c 
below the industry average after merger, but none of the figure is significantly 
different from zero. Moreover, the estimates of the abnormal performance measures 
do not provide evidence of significant post-merger performance change as well since 
both estimates are not significantly different from zero as well (0.24% and -0.5 1 %). 
On the other hand the third ratio we used is the liquid assets to total deposits ratio. 
This ratio was -5.82% before merger and improved to -4.21% after merger, the 
figures being significantly different from zero at the 10% and 5% levels respectively, 
but there is no obvious evidence of abnormal industry-adjusted post-merger 
performance change. However, the evidence is contrasted for this ratio in table (6.6) 
where the smaller sample of 26 mergers experience deteriorated liquid assets to total 
deposits ratio from -2.46% (insignificant) to -4.06% (significant at the 10% level) 
after merger. Moreover, the significant estimate of the intercept a (-3.38% significant 
at the 10% level) provides evidence of deteriorated abnormal industry-adjusted post- 
merger liquidity. The latter result is consistent with the findings of Vander Vennet 
(1996) for 492 European bank mergers. 
6.4.4 The Relation between Cash Flow Returns and Market Returns. 
In chapter three we examined the market reaction to the announcement of the banks 
merger in our large sample of 102 deals. The results of the analysis revealed that the 
market reacted positively to these bank merger announcements, which implies that the 
capitallsed future economic gain, by the market, of these mergers was positive. After 
we have examined the change in post-merger operating perfon-nance, it seems our 
results are not supportive of this hypothesis. But in order to form a final conclusion 
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about this issue, we need first to re-estimate the market reaction to the merger 
announcement for the deals that are included in our operating performance analysis, 
that is the 35 deals and observe if the market reacted positively to these mergers. 
Second, we will perform further analyses, which aim to correlate the market return at 
merger announcement with the post-merger operating performance. 
In table (6.11) Panel A we report the cumulative abnormal stock returns for the 35 
merger deals that we study in this chapter. We report the returns to targets, acquirers 
and the combined return, that is, the weighted-average return for both parties 71 . 
Returns reported, are the two-day merger announcement returns for the (-1,0) 
window. The returns for target banks is 1.49% and is significantly different from zero, 
while the acquirer bank return is not significant. The weighted-average return for the 
target and acquirer banks is calculated based on the weights of the market value of 
equity for each party one month before the announcement of the merger, and shows 
that the weighted-average return is 0.5% and is highly significant. This implies that 
the market reacted positively to these mergers and expected future improvement in the 
operating performance. On the other hand comparing this result to the findings of 
examining the change in cash flow return, we notice that the market expectations were 
not realised in the post-merger period. However, we move on to perform another test 
by correlating the market return at merger announcement with the post-merger cash 
flow retums. 
We follow two procedures, the first one was used in Healy et al., (1992) and is based 
on regressing the industry-adjusted mean post-merger cash flow return (IACRp,,,,, i) on t: 7) 
71 The calculations of the abnormal returns were extracted from chapter three were we used the event 
study methodology to examine the market reaction to merger announcement. 
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two independent variables, these are, the industry-adjusted mean pre-merger cash 
flow return (IACRpe, j) and the market return at merger announcement (AVIV), whIch 
represent the change in value of assets at merger announcement. The cross-sectional 
regression used is the following: 
IA CRpost, i=a+ß IA CRpr i+0A V/V + Ei (2) 
(Ei is an error term). 
AV/V measures the asset return,, which is the unlevered abnormal return at merger 
announcement. Therefore, OAVIV represents the abnormal industry-adjusted cash flow 
return, since this is implied by the hypothesis that the merger announcement abnormal 
returns (whether they are positive, negative or nil) reflect the capitallsed value of 
future cash flow change. This means AVIV = (1/0) *ACFIV, where ACF1V is the 
abnormal industry-adjusted cash flow changes, and, I/Ois the discount factor, that is, 
0 is the discount rate at which the future cash flow changes are capitallsed by the 
market. 
Asset returns at merger announcement AVIV are weighted averages of returns to 
equity and debt: 
A V/V = (AE1E) * EIV + (ADID) * DIV (3) 
Assuming that the value of debt does not change at take-over announcements, asset 
72 
returris is equal to equity retums multiplied by the equity-to-assets ratio . We use the 
72 Healy, Palelpu, and Ruback (1992): Does corporate performance improve after mergers'! Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 31, page 158. L-- 
215 
value of assets and equity at the beginning of the merger year to compute the equity- 
to-assets ratio. Therefore, we run the cross-sectional regression in equation (2) with 
the AVIV being the abnormal stock return at merger announcement multiplied by the 
equi ty-to- assets ratio. Moreover, we rerun the cross-sectional regression using the 
abnormal stock return instead of the abnormal asset return and observe whether the 
results will differ. 
The second procedure, following other studies such as: Cornett and Tehranian (1992) 
and Pilloff (1996), to investigate the relation between the market return and the post- 
ion coeffic' merger operating performance is by calculating the Pearson correlati ients 
between the abnormal stock return and the post-merger operating performance 
improvements. 
In Panel B of table (6.11) we report the results of the cross-sectional regression 
equation (2). We included the intercept term in the equation and tested for 
significance whether it is different from zero. 
From the results we notice that the coefficient of the industry-adjusted pre-merger 
cash flow return is positive (0.77) and highly significant at the 1% level. The 
coefficient of the abnormal asset return is -2.14 but is not significantly different from 
zero, these findings confirm earlier results that the positive IACRp,.,, are due to the 
continuation of pre-merger performance, moreover that there is no relation between 
the industry-adjusted post-merger cash flow return and the market return. The latter 
finding is not consistent with the hypothesis that the stock market revaluation of t: ) 
merging firms at merger announcements reflects expected future economic gains. 1-7) t) t C) 
216 
TABLE (6.11): Abnormal Stock Returns at Merger Announcements for Target, 
Acquirer and Combined Banks, and Tests of the Relation between Abnormal 
Stock/Asset Returns and the Industry-adjusted Post-merger Cash Flow Returns 
for 35 Target and Acquiring European Banks Merging between 1992 and 1997. 
Panel A: Abnormal Stock Return at Merger announcement 
CAR Target Acquirer Combined 
(-1,0) 1.49% 0.25% 0.50% 
Z test (33.02)*** 0.0145 (12.05)*** 
Panel B: Relation between Mean industry-adjusted post-merger cash flow return and Abnormal 
asset return at merger announcement. 
1ACR postj = -0.138% + 0.77 IACRp,,., i -2.14 (AVIV) 
(-0.17) (4.97)*** (-0.51) 
R2 = 0.45 F-statistic =1 2.935*** N= 35 
Adjusted R2 = 0.41 
Panel C: Relation between Mean industry-adjusted post-merger cash now return and Abnormal 
stock (equity) return at merger announcement. 
IACR post,, = -0.186% + 0.74 IACRp,, -., l +0.066 
(AEIE) 
(-0.22) (4.96)*** (0.12) 
R2 = 0.44 F-statistic =1 2.717*** N= 35 
Adjusted R2 = 0.41 
The numbers in parentheses in Panels B and C are White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics 
Significantly different from zero at the 10% level, using two-tailed test 
Significantly different from zero at the 5% level, using two-tailed test 
Significantly different from zero at the 1% level, using two-tailed test 
Assuming the capital markets are efficient, we conclude that the market positive 
revaluation of these bank mergers could be expectations that were not realised due to 
other bank specific negative circumstances post-merger or that these banks have over- 
estimated their potentials for improving cost efficiency and profitability. 
In Panel C of table (6.11) we report the results of the regression using the abnormal 
stock returns instead of the abnormal asset returns. We observe similar pattern of no 
2 17 
significant relation between the IACRp,,,, and the abnormal stock return since the 
corresponding coefficient is 0.066 but not significantly different from zero. 
TABLE (6.12): Abnormal Stock Returns at Merger Announcements for Target, 
Acquirer and Combined Banks, and Tests of the Relation between Abnormal 
Stock/Asset Returns and the Industry-adjusted Post-merger Cash Flow Returns 
for 26 Target and Acquiring European Banks Merging between 1992 and 1996. 
Panel A: Abnormal Stock Return at Merger announcement 
CAR Target Acquirer Combined 
(-1,0) 0.98% 0.20% 0.19% 
Z test (32.669)*** 0.0104 (10.99)-*- 
Panel B: Relation between Mean industry-adjusted post-merger cash flow return and Abnormal 
asset return at meraer announcement 
IACRpost, i = -0.55%+ 0.72 IACRp,,, l -2.15 (AVIV) 
(-0.49) (3.76)*** (-0.07) 
R2 
= 0.39 F-statistic =7.34*** N= 26 
Adjusted R2 = 0.34 
Panel C: Relation between Mean industry-adjusted post-merger cash flow return and Abnormal 
stock (equity) return at merger announcement 
IACR p, t, 1 = -0.52% + 0.70 IACRp, ýg, i -0.14 
(AEIE) 
(-0.46) (3.80)*** (-0.15) 
R2 = 0.39 F-statistic =7.25*** N= 26 
Adjusted R2 = 0.33 
The numbers in parentheses in Panels B and C are White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics 
Significantly different from zero at the 10% level, using two-tailed test 
Significantly different from zero at the 5% level, using two-tailed test 
Significantly different from zero at the 1% level, using two-tailed test 
We also performed the same analysis for the smaller sample of 26 bank mergers and 
reported the results in table (6.12) above. In Panel A we show the cumulative 
abnormal stock return for the target, acquirer banks and the weighted-average 
CAR 
for both parties, the CAR are lower than those for the 35 bank mergers, however the 
CAR to the target and the wei ghted- average CAR are highly significant. We also 
reported the results of the cross-sectional regression equation (2), using the abnormal 
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asset return at merger announcement in Panel B and abnormal stock return in Panel C. 
The results we obtain are similar to those reported in table (6.11) confirming our 
conclusion that the market reaction at merger announcement can not explain the post- 
merger operating performance. 
We also calculate the Pearson correlation coefficient between the abnormal stock 
return and the industry-adjusted performance improvements and we report the results 
in Panel A of table (6.13). It appears that none of the performance changes is 
correlated with the abnormal stock return, confirming earlier evidence that the market 
is unable to anticipate any subsequent performance improvements at the time of the 
merger announcement for these merger deals. We also performed the analysis for the 
smaller sample of 26 mergers and obtained similar findings. We reported the latter 
results in table (6.13) Panel B. 
6.4.5 Determinants of Industry-adjusted Post-merger Cash Flow Return. 
After we have examined the operating performance change after the merger, it was 
obvious that these mergers did not lead to a significant improvement in the cash flow 
return three years after the merger took place. We intend at this stage to examine 
whether the operating cash flow return can be predicted in advance, i. e. whether the 
merging institutions possess certain characteristics during the pre-merger period 
which enable them to outperform the industry or to improve performance post- 
merger. To accomplish this task we run a cross-sectional regression using the IACRp,.,, 
or the change in the IACR as the dependent variable and the pre-merger performance 
measures that we have used in our analysis so far, as the independent variables. 
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In table (6.14), below we report the results for five models. For the first two models 
we used the IACRP,, t as the dependent variable for the total sample of 35 mergers. 
Whereas in the other three models we used the change in IACR as the dependent 
variable for the large sample of 35 mergers in model 3, and the smaller sample of 26 
mergers in models 4 and 5. All the models we used provided consistent results across 
all the performance measures, the dependent variables, and the samples that we have 
used. 
The profitability variables are negative and significant in all the models that we used. 
However, we did not include the two profitability variables, ROAA and ROE, in the 
same model in order to reduce the multicollinearity problem. The negative sign of the 
coefficient implies that the pre-merger high profitability status of the merging parties 
can not provide support for the future cash flow return. This could be due to the fact 
that profitability levels are already exhausted and that the banks could be operating 
close to the efficient frontier in terms of profits. This is also consistent with the notion 
that banks which are performing badly pre-merger have high potentials for improving 
performance when they merge, a finding consistent with the conclusion of Berger and 
Humphrey (1992) and DeYoung (1993). 
The coefficient of the Total capital ratio is negative and significant in model I while it 
is not in model 2. Moreover the ratio of capital to total assets has an opposite sign Z: ) 
(positive) and it is significant in all the models, which include this variable. In our 
view this highlights the importance of the capital to assets ratio 
has on the soundness 
of the financial institutions, since it represents the core capital of the 
bank. A high 
capital to assets ratio before merger may have provided the merging 
banks with higher 4: ) 4'-') Z: ) 
-)-) I 
potentials for increasing their investment and exposure in the market. Whereas the 
negative sign of the Total capital ratio, which already includes the core capital of the 
bank, reflects that the merging banks have excess capitalisation, this could hinder 
their profitability and revenue ratios in the future. In other words high total capital 
ratio before merger may lead to required return on capital, which is not employed. 
The ratios of equity to deposits and equity to customer loans have both positive and 
significant coefficients. This stresses the importance of being able to cover the 
deposits and finance the customer loans from the shareholders resources invested in 
the bank. We believe this is consistent with having strong core capital before merger. 
The loan quality coefficients support our earlier finding in chapter four that acquirers 
are interested in targets with a conservative policy regarding their credit assessment. 
We observe a positive and significant coefficient for the Loan Loss Reserves to Gross 
Loans and the loan loss provisions to interest revenue ratios in all the models. This 
result means that merging banks with a conservative credit policy have the potential to 
escape the risk of downturns in the economy, which may lead to large credit risks and 
maybe losses afterwards. The coefficient of the non-performing loans to gross loans 
ratio supports this argument since it carries a negative sign and it is significantly 
different from zero. Merging banks, which have high non-performing loans, have 
probably bad credit policy standards and this caused decreasing cash flow returns in 
the post-merger period. 
') II 
The Customer loans to deposits ratio is positive and significant in model 2. The high 
ratio provide the support for increasing the cash flow return generated by the interest 
and commissions received compared to the interest and commissions paid. 
The efficiency of the merging financial institutions in the pre-merger period is the 
main driving force for improved cash flow return. Consistent with other findings 
(such as Pilloff, 1996) improving cost efficiency is the main motive for merger. The 
coefficients of the non-interest expenses, the interest expenses, the other 
administrative expenses, and the cost to income ratios are all negative and significant, 
implying that the positive IACRp,,,, and the improvement in this return is associated 
with the cost efficiency status of the merging banks dunng the pre-merger period. 
On the other hand the coefficient of the personnel expenses to assets ratio is positive 
and significant which could mean that the improvement in IACRp,,, (model 3) is 
associated with good quality human capital before merger, the personnel expenses 
ratio might be a proxy for the quality of human capital which is able to generate the 
banks cash flow in the post-merger period. 
However, the positive IACRp,,, and the improvement in IACR is associated with high 
other operating income to assets ratio. This is evident by the positive and significant 
coefficient in models 1,4 and 5. On the other hand, the positive and significant 
coefficients for the net loans to assets and the liquidity ratios imply that high net loans 
and liquidity position before merger provide ample opportunities for positive and 
increased IACR in the post-merger period. 
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6.4.6 Do Cash Flow return on Customer loans and Cash flow return 
on Deposits provide a different picture? 
Banks are mostly involved in traditional activities such as granting loans and 
attracting deposits from the public. Customer loans are the major source of bank 
income, in the form of interest income, while deposits are the major use of bank 
expenses in the form of interest expense. As a final analysis step we decided to use the 
customer loans and the total deposits as the basis for examining the change in cash 
flow return, that is we intend to calculate the change in cash flow return on customer 
loans and deposits pre and post-merger (we are not aware of any study that followed 
this procedure in the literature of bank mergers). To perform the analysis we followed 
the same steps and procedures that we adopted for examining the change in cash flow 
return on market value of assets in sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2. 
In tables (6.15) and (6.16) we report the results for the operating cash flow return on 
customer loans. In table (6.15) we report the results for the total sample of 35 bank 
mergers and we observe that the (unadjusted) bank mean cash flow return on 
customer loans was 3.75%, during the pre-merger period, then increased to 4.14% for 
the three years post-merger period; however, the increase was not significantly 
different from zero. The same pattern is observed for the sample of 26 bank mergers 
in table (6.16) where the ratio increased from 3.67% to 4.29% but the increase was 
not significantly different from zero as well. 
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TABLE (6.15): Mean Cash Flow Return on Customer Loans (Total Sample). 
The table shows the mean operating cash flow return on Total Customer Loans for 35 
combined target and acquirer banks in years surrounding mergers completed in the 
period 1992 to 1997. It also shows the abnormal industry-adjusted returns in Panel B. 
Panel A: Pre and Post-merger operating cash flow returns 
Year relative Bank Mean Industry adjusted % positive Number of T-statistics 
to merger mean observations 
-2 3.93 -1.85 34.48% 29 (-1.79)* 
-1 3.57 -2.40 35.29% 35 (-2.39 
Mean Annual performance for years -2 and -1 
3.75 -2.12 34.29% 35 (-1.73)* 
1 4.40 0.34 65.71% 35 0.31 
2 4.09 0.86 61.54% 26 0.77 
3 3.93 0.18 60.00% 15 0.19 
Mean Annual performance for years 1 to 3 
4.14 0.46 60.00% 35 0.13 
Panel B: Abnormal industry-adjusted operating cash flow returns (t-values in 
parentheses) 
1ACR 1.00% + 0.473 IACRpre, l Fe = 0.22 F-statistic = 9.417*** N= 35 
(0.875) (2.793)*** Adjusted Fe = 0.198 
The numbers in parentheses are White's (1980) heteroskedasticily-consistent t-statistics 
Significantly different from zero at the 10% level, using two-tailed test 
Significantly different from zero at the 5% level, using two-tailed test 
Significantly different from zero at the 1% level, using two-tailed test 
Our next step was to adjust for the industry effects as we did earlier. We report the 
results in column 3 of each one of the tables (6.15) and (6.16). The industry-adjusted 
figures, in table (6.15) column 3, show that the merging banks were lagging behind 
the industry for the pre-merger period. For year -2 the 
cash flow return on customer loans was -1.85c/(-, (significant at the 10(-7c level). while 
in year -1 the ratio was even lower at -2.4% 
(significant at the 51,7c level). The ratio, 
afterwards, increased to an average of 0.46% above the industry 
Icvcl for the three 
years after merger. This increase is also confirmed if wc 
look at the results of the 
sample of 26 bank mergers in table (6.16) column 
3. But it sccms that, the ratio , vas 0 
not significantly lower than the industry figure in the pre-merger period nor was it 
significantly higher in the post-merger period. 
TABLE (6.16): Mean Cash Flow Return on Customer Loans (26 Deals). 
The table reports the mean operating cash flow return on Total Customer Loans for 26 
combined target and acquirer banks in years surrounding mergers completed in the 
period 1992 to 1996. It also shows the abnormal industry-adjusted returns in Panel B. 
Panel A: Pre and Post merger operating cash flow returns 
Year Bank Mean Industry % positive Number of T-statistics 
relative to adjusted observations 
merger mean 
-1 3.67 -1-55 46.15% 26 -1.17 
1 4.49 1.30 73.08% 26 1.09 
2 4.09 0.86 61.54% 26 0.77 
Mean Annual performance for years 1 and 2 
4.29 1.08 65.38% 26 0.94 
Panel B: Abnormal industry-adjusted operating cash flow returns (t-values in 
parentheses) 
1ACR = 1.91% + 0.54 IACRp,, l R2= 0.39 F-statistic = 15.13*** N= 26 
(1.853)* (3.7354)*** Adjusted F? 2= 0.36 
The numbers in parentheses are White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics 
Significantly different from zero at the 10% level, using two-tailed test 
Significantly different from zero at the 5% level, using two-tailed test 
Significantly different from zero at the 1% level, using two-tailed test 
In order to test whether the change in performance is due to the merger or is a 
continuation of the pre-merger performance, we run the cross-sectional regression 
equation explained in section 6.3.2.2 and we report the results in Panel B of tables 
(6.15) and (6.16). From table (6.15) Panel B we can see that the estimate of a, the 
abnormal industry-adjusted cash flow return on customer loans, is 1% but not 
significantly different from zero. However, if we look at the results in table (6.16) for 
the sample of 26 bank mergers, we can see that the estimate of a is slightly higher, at 
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1.91% and slightly significant at the 10% level, which confirms that part of the 
change in the ratio is due to the merger of both banks. 
TABLE (6.17): Mean Cash Flow Return on Total Deposits (Total Sample). 
The table reports the mean operating cash flow return on Total Deposits for 35 
combined target and acquirer banks in years surrounding mergers completed in the 
period 1992 to 1997. It also shows the abnormal industry- adjusted returns in Panel B. 
Panel A: Pre and Post-merger operating cash flow retums 
Year relative to Bank Mean Industry adjusted % positive Number of T-statistics 
merger mean observations 
-2 3.86 -1.13 41.38% 29 -1.14 
-1 3.27 -1.84 44.12% 35 (-2.16 
Mean Annual performance for years -2 and -1 
3.57 -1.48 45.71% 35 -1.24 
1 4.54 1.28 74.29% 35 0.89 
2 4.31 1.72 65.38% 26 0.91 
3 3.23 0.08 60.00% 15 0.09 
Mean Annual performance for years 1 to 3 
4.03 1.03 65.71% 35 0.76 
Panel B: Abnormal industry-adjusted operating cash fiow returns (t-values in 
parentheses) 
IACR = 2.10% + 0.824 IACRpre, i F? 
2 = 0.30 F-statistic = 14.15*** N= 35 
(1.245) (1.775)* Adjusted Fe = 0.28 
The numbers in parentheses are White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consis tent t-statistics 
Significantly different from zero at the 10% level, using two-tailed test 
Significantly different from zero at the 5% level, using two-tailed test 
Significantly different from zero at the 1% level, using two-tailed test 
On the other hand considering now the cash flow return on total deposits, we observe 
a similar pattern for the unadjusted figures reported in tables (6.17) and (6.18), were 
the merging banks improved their unadjusted cash flow return on deposits after the 
merger. Similar results are observed for the Industry-adjusted figures however, the 
ratios in the pre-merger and post-merger period were not significantly different 
from 
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zero. Moreover, the estimates of a, the abnormal industry-adjusted cash flow return 
on deposits, in both tables (6.17) and (6.18) are not significantly different from zero. 
TABLE (6.18): Mean Cash Flow Return on Total Deposits (26 Deals). 
The table reports the mean operating cash flow return on Total Deposits for 26 
combined target and acquirer banks in years surrounding mergers completed in the 
period 1992 to 1996. It also shows the abnormal industry-adjusted returns in Panel B. 
Panel A: Pre and Post merger operating cash flow returns 
Year Bank Mean Industry % positive Number of T-statistics 
relative to adjusted observations 
merger mean 
-1 3.31 -1.01 50.00% 26 -0.82 
1 4.68 2.15 76.92% 26 1.18 
2 4.31 1.72 65.38% 26 0.91 
Mean Annual performance for years 1 and 2 
4.50 1.93 73.08% 26 1.04 
Panel B: Abnormal industry-adjusted operating cash flow returns (t-values in 
parentheses) 
IACR p, t, 1 = 2.9% + 0.965 IACRpi R2 = 0.41 F-statistic = 17.18*** N= 26 
(1.609) (2.075)** Adjusted Fe = 0.39 
The numbers in parentheses are White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics 
Significantly different from zero at the 10% level, using two-tailed test 
Significantly different from zero at the 5% level, using two-tailed test 
Significantly different from zero at the 1% level, using two-tailed test 
In sum the evidence of improved performance due to the merger event is very thin and 
is limited to the ratio of industry-adjusted cash flow return on customer loans for the 
sample of 26 bank mergers. Moreover, we noticed that both ratios that we examined 
in this section showed an improvement after the merger. This result is not consistent 
with the result that we obtained for the ratio of industry-adjusted cash flow return on 
market value of assets. We explain this as follows: 
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1. The improvement in these two measures (cash flow return on loans and 
cash flow return on deposits) could be driven by faster growth in loans and 
deposits in the industry compared to the merging banks in our sample. 
This fact can be observed in tables (6.19) and (6.20), where it is clear that 
the industry growth rates in customer loans and deposits were higher than 
the merging banks growth rates for every year after merger compared to 
the first year before merger. 
TABLE (6.19): Bank and Industry growth in Total Customer Loans 
The table shows post-merger bank and industry growth in Total Customer Loans for 
35 combined target and acquirer banks in mergers completed in the period 1992 and 
1997. 
Growth Period in 
Relation to Merger 
Bank loans growth 
rate 
% Positive Median Industry 
loans growth rate 
% Positive 
Median Median 
Year -1 to 1 9.10 71% 14.74 80% 
Year -1 to 2 20.69 65% 36.07 81% 
Year -1 to 3 20.72 93% 45.26 87% 
TABLE (6.20): Bank and Industry growth in Total Deposits. 
The table shows post-merger bank and industry growth in Total Deposits for 35 
combined target and acquirer Banks in mergers completed during the period 1992 and 
1997. 
Growth Period in 
Relation to Merger 
Bank deposits 
growth rate 
% Positive Industry deposits 
growth rate 
% Positive 
Median Median 
Year -1 to 1 5.56 
0/- 54- 23.89 89% 
Year -1 to 2 6.36 58% 39.44 88% 
Year -1 to 31 20.79 67% 71.14 87% 
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2. The improvement in IACR on customer loans may still be consistent with 
the deterioration in IACR on assets since a large part of the banks eaming 
assets consist of other investments such as bond and debentures holding 
and inter-bank accounts which do not earn as much income as customer 
loans. In the sense that banks are supposed to earn enough income and 
increase cash flow inasmuch as to cover the "satisfy" its total assets base. 
Therefore, higher returns are expected from investments in customer loans, 
then in other earning assets in order to cover the opportunity cost of not 
eaming any return from Non-eaming assets such as Central bank reserves 
accounts, and tangible and intangible fixed assets. 
6.5 Conclusion. 
In this chapter we provided more updated findings on the post-merger operating 
performance in European banking. We used a sample of bank mergers between 1992 
and 1997, and we believe this is the only and most recent study that covered a period 
starting after the adoption of the Single Market Programme in 1992. 
To examine the post-merger operating performance in European banking merger, we 
followed the methodology of Healy et al., (1992) which was then adopted and applied 
by Cornett and Tehranian (1992) on USA bank merger. Our findings revealed that 
post-merger industry-adjusted cash flow return has decreased compared to the pre- 
232 
merger situation however the change was not abnormal but the positive IACRp,.,, are 
still due to the continuation of pre-merger bank-specific performance. 
We also examined the change in performance using traditional accounting ratios and 
found that the merger led to a decrease in the ROA ratio to significant level below the 
industry average three years after mergers which was mainly due to lower 'other 
operating income' ratio. The intense competition might be the main reason for this 
result. The capitalisation of the banks dropped as a result of the increase in customer 
loans faster than the increase in the equity figure. The merging banks improved their 
loan quality by writing off large parts of the bad debts in their portfolios. In addition, 
the main positive outcome of the merger was that the improvement in cost efficiency 
represented by both the interest expenses and the non-interest expense ratios, such as 
the personnel expenses and the other administrative expenses. It seems that the 
merging banks benefited by exploiting operational and managerial synergies to 
improve their cost efficiency after the merger, however the improvement was not too 
large to replace the decreased profitability and therefore the industry-adjusted cash 
flow return did not improve after merger. 
We examined the relationship between the post-merger performance and the market 
reaction at merger announcement as well but could not find any evidence of such a 
relationship. Assuming the capital markets are efficient, we believe that the market 
positive revaluation of these bank mergers could be expectations that were not 
reallsed due to other bank specific negative circumstances post-merger or that these 
banks have over-estimated their potentials for improving cost efficiency and 
profitability. 
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In this chapter we also searched for the determinants of IACRp,,, and the change in the 
IACR and found that low profitability levels pre-merger could provide opportunity for 
improvement since they mean that there is profit inefficiency that can be remedied 
and improved after merger. On the other hand, We observed that a conservative credit 
policy and good cost efficiency status pre-merger provide the support for improved 
cash flow returris after merger. 
We also performed a final test using the cash flow return on customer loans and cash 
flow return on deposits. Both ratios improved but not significantly, however the 
evidence of a merger-related improvement was very thin and was only observed for 
the cash flow return on customer loans in the sample of 26 bank mergers. 
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CHAPTERSEVEN: 
CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction. 
The level of consolidation in the financial services industry has been accelerating 
rapidly. This merger wave started by the early nineties and was caused by many 
forces of change that affected the competitive position of banks and other financial 
services firms around the world and especially in Europe (deregulation, technological 
development, the globalisation, and the introduction of the Euro). The introduction of 
the Second Banking Directive and the Capital Adequacy Directive removed 
restrictions and paved the way in front of banks to widen the scope of their business 
functionally and geographically. Moreover, the rapid development in technology also 
changed the mechanisms of distribution, the product bundling, allowed the structuring 
of new products, and provided cost cutting potentials through economy of scale and 
less dependence on human intervention. Consequently, the competition became more 
intense in the market, which put more pressure on the profitability levels. 
Furthermore, managers are forced to consider strategic decisions such as mergers. 
Therefore, the M&As activity in the financial services industry has accelerated and 
reached unprecedented levels around the end of the twentieth century. This was 
temptinc, to explore the i11 C. ) impact on 
bank performance change, which motivated us to 
do this research. 
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7.2 Summary of the Findings. 
In chapter two we provided a review of the previous literature on M&As and we 
concentrated on the studies that examined the performance of the parties involved and 
the market valuation of M&As. We also exhibited the factors that are accelerating the 
merger activities around the world in general and in Europe, afterwards we reviewed 
the literature on M&As motives. 
In chapter three we examined the market valuation for the M&A deals that took place 
in the European Financial services industry between 1987 and 1999; we found that the 
market reacted positively to the announcement of these mergers. According to various 
deal characteristics we found that higher returns were earned by deals between 
commercial banks compared to cross-product deals, merger deals compared to 
acquisition deals, cross-border mergers compared to national mergers, and by deals 
settled in a combination of cash, equity and loan notes. 
In chapter four we searched for the deten-ninants of target returns. Our sample 
consisted of 66 bank mergers in Europe and we found that target returns are driven by 
high target profitability and lower capitalisation before merger. Moreover, we found 
that the market regards high 'loan loss reserves to gross loans' ratio for targets as a 
source of comfort as it implies a conservative policy by the target bank. Other drivers 
of high target returns were better efficiency status relative to the acquiring bank and 4.: ) 
high loans to deposits ratio for the targets since this signal that they are efficient and 
II 
II ing their deposits resources. aggressive in utilis 4. -D kt) 
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In chapter five we searched for the motives of the European bank M&As and tested 
for the existence of three major motives of bank M&As i. e. synergy, agency, and 
hubris by examining the relations between target and total gains and between acquirer 
and target gains. 
Our main finding suggested that synergy, rather than agency, is the dominant motive 
for the M&A in the European financial industry and hubris may be the main 
explanation for observing positive target gains and zero or negative acquirer gains. 
Because the banking industry is known for being subject to scrutiny and close 
monitoring from the local and international supervisory bodies we did not find that 
agency effects form a major motive in these mergers. 
In chapter six we examined the post-merger operating performance and wanted to 
observe whether the market and the managers' expectations of achieving synergistic 
gains had been realised. Although we found that post-merger industry-adjusted cash 
flow return has decreased compared to the pre-merger situation, yet the change was 
not abnormal. However the positive IACRp,,, were due to the continuation of pre- 
merger bank-specific performance. 
Using traditional accounting ratios we found that the merger led to a decrease in the 
ROA ratio to a significant level below the industry average three years after mergers 
which was mainly due to lower other operating income ratio. The capitalisation of the 
banks dropped as a result of the increase in customer loans faster than the Increase in 
the equity figure. The merging banks got involved in cleanin up their loan portfolio Cý 9 
237 
which led to improvement in their loan quality. In addition, the main positive outcome 
of the merger was the improvement in expense ratios. Therefore, we find that the 
merging banks succeeded, only marginally, in exploiting operational and managerial 
synergies to improve their cost efficiency after merger, since the improvement was 
not too large to support the decreased profitability and boost the industry-adjusted 
cash flow retums. 
We also could not find any relationship between the post-merger performance and the 
market reaction at merger announcement, which means that the positive market 
reaction to merger announcements effectively constituted expectations that failed to 
be realised. We also found that a low profitability level, a conservative credit policy, 
and a good cost efficiency status pre-merger could provide ample opportunity for 
improvement in IACR. 
7.3 Implications of the Research Results. 
Our findings imply that the intense competition and the pressure on profitability is 
spreading a gloomy picture of the bank performance in the future in general, and is 
encouraging banks to consolidate their market position. Banks seem to have planned 
to benefit from in-market consolidation and mergers of equal deals to exploit scale 
economy and synergistic gains rather than economies of scope. The objective from 
these bank mergers is to consolidate market position and improve efficiency in order 
not to suffer from profitability deterioration due to the intense competition in the 
market. 
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Our results imply also that there is a certain threshold for acceptable attractive 
capitalisation. Acquirers are looking at the credit policy of the target and valuing a 
conservative credit policy, which takes into account any possible future losses in the 
loan portfolio. Secondly, acquirers are also valuing the management team of the target 
bank for good credit assessment skills and this might add to the benefit that the 
acquirers are expecting to gain by acquiring good quality intellectual capital. 
Moreover, the assets growth of the target compared to the acquirer is a driving force 
to increase profitability prospects and presence in the market for the acquirer. 
On the other hand due to the close supervision that the banking system is subject to in 
general, not only depositors but also shareholders are protected from managerial ill- 
advised decisions. This was apparent by having the synergy as the major motive for 
M&As in Europe with a thin evidence of hubris and agency effects. 
The merger of two parties is not providing means for improving performance but the 
bank-specific performance during the pre-merger period is still causing positive 
IACFpost. Therefore, banks need to search for real common factors for potential 
performance improvement between one another before merger and only depend on 
their pre-merger superior performance over the industry. The loan quality has been the 
major concern for merging parties; therefore, cleaning up the current loan portfolio 
could be the first step on the way for maintaining the profitability, market exposure, 
and capital standing levels. Moreover, it seems also that there is not much to do on the 
revenue side to improve perfon-nance, but the merging parties should concentrate on 
the cost side to improve efficiency since banks with high profitability levels pre- 
mergers are unable to exploit any synergy gains to improve cash flow returns. The 
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latter conclusion implies that these banks have already exhausted their potentials for 
cash flow improvement from the profit side. 
Mergers, which are able to improve IACF and maintain a high IACFp,,,, are those 
mergers between partners with high customer loans to deposits, and high cost 
efficiency levels pre-merger. Hence, the efficiency of the merging parties before 
merger is a major driving force for subsequent performance improvement. 
7.4 Avenues for Further Research. 
The sample we considered is restricted to the publicly traded banks and therefore 
sometimes it might be a bit dangerous to draw conclusions that are applicable to the 
whole industry. The research covered 17 European countries where every country was 
represented with a small number of transactions, this is also does not enable us to 
distinguish which country has a more successful M&A history in banking and which 
does not. 
The research on M&As in the European financial services industry is still minimal. 
We feel one major issue is the involvement of the managers with the change in the 
bank control. Managers are taking the decisions to merger with other parties; a very 
interesting issue would be if their ownership status affects their decision to acquire 
other banks. The literature from bank merger has not yet covered this area inasmuch 
as it deserves attention. The motives of managers to take M&As decisions could 
change with their various ownership scenarios. 4- 
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In the USA interstate bank mergers are dominating the scene, this is contrary to the 
picture of the European banking industry where banks are still expanding within their 
home country more than across the borders, this is. The reasons for this being the 
challenge of adapting to a new culture, language and other country specific factors 
across various countries in Europe as opposed to one culture and language in the 
USA. Moreover, it has been noted that banks are able to diversify their risk 
geographically within their home country more than if they choose to enter new 
markets across the borders (Danthine et al, 1999). It would be therefore interesting to 
study the causes and consequences of mergers more deeply and seek inside 
information from the bank managers themselves about their policies and plans. 
In order to perform such a research we believe conducting clinical studies based on 
small number of bank mergers in various individual European countries would help to 
shed more light on the transformation of the banking industry in Europe. 
One more interesting issue would be to investigate what distinguishes bank mergers 
from non-bank mergers. Is the key difference the close supervision that banks are 
subject to? We believe there are other aspects that still can be explored, which has to 
do with the market's expectations. The profitability of banks, in terms of ROA and 
ROE, is far lower than profitability of other non-financial services firms. So it is 
interesting to know why bank shareholders are still willing to maintain ownership 
which does not reward them higher than if they hold non-bank shares or participation. 
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APPENDICES. 
Appendix A. 
This appendix gives the details of the statistical tests used in the Chapter 3. 
1) To examine the statistical significance of the mean standardised CAR between any 
two dates, we use the procedure adopted by Dodd and Warner (1983) which is similar 
to that of Patell (1976) and Dodd (1980). 
For each security j, the abnormal return (the prediction error) for every day in the 
testing period is standardised by the square root of its estimated forecast variance, to 
form a stanclardised abnormal return. 
ARit 
SARjr - 
Sjt 
Where 
112 
2 
I (Rmt - R, ) 
sj, si Lj -2 Li I (Rmt - R, ) 
2 
In this case, sj is the estimated residual variance from the market model regression for Z: ) 
I 
security j, R,,, is the average market return over Lj days used for the regression, 
and R,,, t is the return on the market index at days t during the estimation period. 
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For each security j, the standardised prediction errors, i. e. abnormal returns for every 
day in the event window to be examined, are cumulated to form the standardised 
cumulative abnormal returns, Wj: 
t=d2j SARjt 
wj= I- 
t=dlj jd27dij +1 
If the prediction errors, i. e. abnormal returns are normal and independent across t, 
then the standardised cumulative abnormal returns Wj is distributed Student-t with (Lj- 
73, W unit normal. 2) degrees of freedom; since Lj is large i is assumed to be distri 
To test the significance of the average standardised cumulative abnormal returns 
SCAR in a sample of N secunties, we then compute 
Z= WiVN 
Where 
IN 
wj=-I, wj 
N j=i 
Assuming that the standardised cumulative abnormal returns are independent across 
securities, then if the expected value of the standardised abnormal return is equal to 
zero. The test statistic Z will be distributed unit normal for the assumed unit normal. 
73 in our sample Nve used 190 days for the estimation period. 
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Appendix B. 
Multicol linearity 
The Nature 
Multicol linearity is created if two or more of the explanatory variables in a cross- 
sectional regression are correlated. 
In cases of perfect linear relationship or perfect muticollineanty among explanatory 
variables, we cannot obtain unique estimates of all parameters. In general, in most of 
the cross sectional regression applications two or more explanatory variables are not 
exactly linearly related. Consequently, multicollinearity could be too high but not 
perfect (Gujarati, 1992). 
The Consequences 
We might encounter one or some of the following situations in the cases of high 
multicol linearity: 
a) Large variances and standard error of OLS estimators. 
b) Wider confidence interval. 
c) Many insignificant t ratios. 
d) A high R2 value but few significant t ratios. 
e) The OLS parameters and their standard errors become very sensitive to small 
changes in the data. 
Wrong signs for the coefficients. 
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The Detection. 
Kmenta (1986) observes that: 
a) Multicol linearity is a question of degree and not of kind. The meaningful 
distinction is not between the presence and the absence of multicol linearity, but 
between its various degrees. 
b) Since multicollinearity refers to the condition of the explanatory variables that are 
assumed to be nonstochastic, it is a feature of sample and not of the population. 
Therefore, we do not test for multicollinearity but can, if we wish, measure its 
degree in any particular sample 74 
However, there is no single measure for multicollinearity, but it can be detected by 
observing one of the following: 
A high R2 value but few significant t ratios. 
- High pairwise correlation among the explanatory variables. 
Examination of partial correlations. 
Subsidiary, or auxiliary, regressions. One of the ways of finding out which 
variables are highly linearly related to each other is to regress each variable 
against the other in the remaining variables and observe the corresponding, R- of 
the regression. 
74 Ian Kmenta. Elements of Econometrics, 2d ed.. Macmillan, New York. 1986, P. 43 1. 
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But what is the cut off point? The problem with all these methods is that it is difficult 
to decide what level of correlation between two variables is acceptable or not. 
However, one of the very popular techniques is based on the calculation of the 
Condition Index. The rule of thumb is that if the condition index is less than 31.62 
(square root of 1000), multicol linearity is not a problem for the independent variables 
in the model (Belsley, Kuh and Welsch, 1980). 
Heteroskedasticitv 
The Nature. 
An important assumption of the linear regression model written below is that the 
disturbances F-i entering the population regression function are homoscedastic, i. e. 
they all have the same variance, cyi 2, if this is not the case then we face the situation of 
heteroscedasticity, or unequal, or non-constant variance. 
CARi ` 80 + 61XIi + 62X2i . ..... ++ 
6mxmi + F-i- 
The Conseauences. 
Although the OLS (ordinary least square) estimators are still linear and unbiased, yet 
they no longer have minimum variance, which means they are no longer efficient. 
Briefly, when heterosceclasticity is present, the usual hypothesis testing routine is 
unreliable, raising the possibility of drawing misleading conclusions. 
Therefore, we follow the procedure of White (1980) to calculate consistent estimators 
of the OLS parameter covariance matrix regardless of the presence of 
heteroscedasticity. 
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